Scandal-Driven Regulation of China’s Stock Market: Dynamics among the State, Market, and Stockizens by HUANG, XUANYU (Author) et al.
Scandal-Driven Regulation of China’s Stock Market: 
Dynamics among the State, Market, and Stockizens 
by 
Xuanyu Huang 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Approved April 2015 by the  
Graduate Supervisory Committee: 
 
Marjorie S. Zatz, Co-Chair 
Gray Cavender, Co-Chair 
Ning Wang 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
May 2015 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since it was officially established, China’s stock market has witnessed rapid 
cultural, social, economic, and legal transformations during the last two decades. But the 
development of China’s stock market brought with it the frequent occurrence of securities 
crimes and other types of white-collar crimes that harmed vast numbers of public retail 
stockholders.  
This study reviews sociolegal theories, especially law and finance theories, to 
shed light on the construction of regulatory mechanisms for the Chinese stock market. 
The critical point for stock market regulation is to curb securities irregularities and 
protect investors. This study applies white-collar criminological theories, especially 
crime-as-choice theories, to link the theoretical analyses of the causes of securities crimes 
to the laws, policies and practices governing the Chinese stock market. Historical, 
documentary and policy analyses, case analyses, and analysis of interviews, and 
observations of weibos and blogs are employed in this study. The data sources consist of: 
(1) historical information on the development of China’s stock market and its regulation, 
both in terms of legislation and practice; (2) interviews with 40 retail stockholders, each 
of whom has more than ten years of experiences in stock trading, in two Chinese cities, 
Shenzhen and Haikou; and (3) online statements and comments of 30 well known 
Chinese economists, law scholars, financial commentators, lawyers, and securities 
experts in Sina weibos (microblogs) and blogs. 
Based on the analyses, this study suggests revising relevant laws and establishing 
supporting mechanisms to reduce securities irregularities and crimes in China’s stock 
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market and strength the protection of stock investors. My study also draws attention to 
the growth of rights consciousness of public retail stockholders, which has potential to 
propel political and legal reform for the development of the Chinese stock market.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Context 
In 1990, the Chinese government established the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and started formal stock trading in P. R. 
China1. The stock market was created with the dual goals of raising capital for state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and establishing a modern enterprise system in China. Its 
initiation was marked by heated ideological debates pertaining to whether this move was 
capitalist or socialist. Ever since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 
1949 and then pushed China to socialism from 1952 to 1956 (Coase and Wang 2012, p. 
12), the stock market had been viewed as an evil of capitalism. But once the market was 
established, Chinese people quickly showed enthusiasm for engaging in the stock market.  
The last two decades have seen a swift expansion of China’s stock market. In 
2010, its total market value reached 26.54 trillion RMB (4.08 trillion US dollar), 
surpassing that of Japan’s and becoming the second largest in the world (CSRC, 2011); in 
2013, the total market value of China’s stock market dropped to about 23.91 trillion RMB, 
being the fourth largest in the world (CSRC, 2014). The number of domestic listed 
companies grew from 14 in 1991 to 2,498 in 2013 (CSRC, 2014). The number of valid 
stock accounts grew from 370,000 at the end of 1991 to 132,471,500 at the end of 2013 
(CSRC, 2014), most of which are personal stockholders’. The Chinese government 
exclaimed that it took only twenty years for China’s stock market to go through a journey 
                                                           
1 In this study, China’s stock market refers to the stock market in mainland China, not including stock markets in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan.  
2 
 
that required over a hundred years to develop in Western countries (CSRC, 2008). The 
stock market has become an important part of Chinese people’s lives, especially in urban 
areas. A vast number of stockizens (stock-citizen) —the term used to refer to stock 
investors or stockholders—have emerged. Chinese stockizens have played important 
roles in the rapid growth of the stock market and China’s subsequent economic 
development. Some scholars even claim that Chinese stockizens will determine China’s 
future (see, e.g. Wu, 2011).  
Accompanying the rapid expansion of China’s stock market have been a host of 
securities frauds and crimes (Chai, 2008; Feng, 2010; Lang, 2004; Li Renhua, 2006; Li 
Lei, 2009; Liao, 2008, 2013; Mu, 2008; Wu, 2000, 2008; Zhao Xiaoguang, 2006; Zhao 
Yunfeng, 2011; Zhao and Yang, 2006; Zhou Jianjun, 2008; Zhou Xiangwen, 2008). Wu 
Jinglian criticized China’s stock market as an “unruly casino” (Wu, 2008). Insider trading 
and illegal manipulation of stock prices are common phenomena in China’s stock market 
(Huang, 2008; Li, Song, Lu, and Zha, 2008; Zhang, 2008; Zhao and Mu, 2008; Zhou, 
2009). Although the Chinese government established a series of laws, they have been 
largely ineffective in controlling securities crime (Feng, 2010; Lang, 2008; Liao, 2008; 
Zhao, 2006; Zhao and Mu, 2008; Zhao and Yang, 2006). Since they are disadvantaged in 
terms of capital, information, and expertise, Chinese retail stockholders were often 
victims of insider trading, manipulation and other securities offences. 
Although the Chinese economy developed rapidly and Chinese companies grew 
fast in the past two decades, the majority of retail stockholders did not profit from their 
stock investments. It seemed that China’s stock market was enhanced at the expense of 
vast numbers of retail stockholders. In the bear market, corporate or big individual 
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stockholders could often avoid loss through insider trading, and in such cases retail 
stockholders would bear the loss (Lang, 2012). Even the mouthpiece of the Chinese 
government, the website of people.com, published an interview with experts who stated 
clearly that stockizens were the biggest philanthropist in China (People.com, 2011). The 
abnormal phenomena that the majority of retail stockholders could not share the 
achievements of the economic development and were often harmed by rampant securities 
irregularities ruined investors’ confidence in the Chinese stock market.  
The prevalent securities irregularities and unfair treatment of public stockholders 
have roots in China’s institutional transition, and reflect the economic, cultural, social, 
and legal changes taking place in contemporary China. This study applies “law and 
finance” theories to explore the construction of regulatory mechanisms and the roles of 
the government and other players in the stock market. The research of La Porta and 
colleagues (1996) set off an upsurge of study in the field of “law and finance,” which 
surrounds the theme that “law matters” the development of financial markets and stresses 
the importance of investor protection. As China’s stock market is an emerging market in 
transition, law and finance theories that have been developed and tested in historical and 
cross-national contexts can shed light on the development of China’s stock market and 
the evolution of market regulation.  
Stock market regulation aims to curb securities irregularities and protect investors. 
This study explores the causes of securities irregularities and related white-collar crimes 
within Chinese domestic and global contexts. Crime-as-choice theories are applied in this 
study to link the theoretical analyses of the causes of securities crimes to the laws, 
policies and practices governing the stock market. This study employs historical, 
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documentary and policy analyses, case analyses, interviews, and observations of weibos 
and blogs to address the research questions. Based on the findings, this study proposes 
some suggestions for further reform and institutional construction. To foster further 
reform also needs strong social forces. This study draws attention to the rights 
consciousness and legal awareness of public stockholders that might form a strong force 
to propel legal reform.   
Research Questions 
Based on an exploration of the development of the Chinese stock market and the 
evolution of its regulation, this study examines the institutional and social factors that 
have bred rampant securities irregularities and related white-collar crime, and aims to 
propose suggestions for ways to contain securities irregularities and strengthen investor 
protection. The following research questions will be addressed.   
(1) What are the effects of laws and policies governing China’s stock market, 
and how have these changed over time? For example, how did state policies and 
programs initiate China’s stock market? How did laws and policies influence the 
operation and regulation of China’s stock market? Did the loopholes in laws and policies 
related to the Chinese stock market supply lures to potential offenders? Did relevant laws 
and rules provide sufficient investor protection and strict measures against offenders? 
(2) How is China’s stock market regulated? For example, are the 
implementation and enforcement of laws and rules effective? Is government external 
oversight credible? Is internal corporate governance effective? What roles did securities 
firms and other intermediaries play in investor protection? What factors negatively affect 
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the regulation of China’s stock market? What mechanisms might further strengthen 
market regulation and protect investors?  
(3) What have been the experiences of retail stockholders in stock trading, and 
how do they perceive stock market regulation?  For example, how did retail stockholders 
conduct stock trading? Did they view their stock trading as gambling in a casino? How 
did they view insider trading, manipulation, misrepresentation, and other securities 
irregularities? How about legal awareness and rights consciousness of public 
stockholders? 
Data and Research Methods 
 Historical, documentary and policy analysis, case analysis, interviews, and 
observations of weibos and blogs are employed in this study to address the research 
questions. My data sources consist of: (1) historical data on the development of China’s 
stock market and its regulation, both in terms of legislation and practice; (2) interviews 
with 40 retail stockholders, each of whom has more than ten years of experience in stock 
trading, in two Chinese cities, Shenzhen and Haikou; (3) online statements and comments 
of 30 well known Chinese economists, law scholars, financial commentators, lawyers, 
and securities experts in Sina weibos (microblogs) and blogs. 
To collect historical data, I firstly use the official websites of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE), the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), and the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). In China, there are only two stock exchanges, that is, 
the SSE, established on 26 November 1990, and the SZSE, established on 1 December 
1990. These two stock exchanges are governed by the CSRC. The CSRC, established on 
12 October 1992, is a ministry-level unit directly governed by the Chinese State Council 
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to regulate China’s securities and futures markets. The official websites of SSE, SZSE, 
and CSRC have posted historical and current data on listings on the stock market, listed 
companies, trading and membership, market information, and relevant laws and rules. 
These sources depict the development of China’s stock market and its regulation. From 
these websites, I can see laws, regulations, judicial interpretations, departmental 
regulations and provisions, and SSE and SZSE rules from 1990 to the present. I also 
reviewed media reports and remarks in the China Securities Journal, Securities Times, 
Wall Street Journal and other financial newspapers and portals in Chinese and English to 
enhance my understanding of the background of the development of China’s stock 
market. Further, I reviewed scholarly works to get deeper understanding of the 
development and regulation of China’s stock market.  
  To explore changes over time in the operation and regulation of the Chinese stock 
market, I review the policies and programs that were implemented to initiate the stock 
market and the key laws and policies that have influenced China’s stock market at 
different stages. As I proceed, I attempt to highlight the policies, programs, and practices 
that supplied lures to potential offenders. Then I conduct historical, documentary and 
policy analyses, and study cases of securities fraud and related white-collar crime. 
Through the analyses of significant cases in different periods, I investigate the relevant 
laws and their enforcement of securities crimes, and identify the weaknesses in 
legislation and law enforcements. This examination allows me to propose suggestions to 
reduce securities crimes and irregularities and strengthen investor protection. 
To explore retail stockholders’ experience in stock trading, their views about 
securities crimes (insider trading, manipulation, financial reporting fraud, illegal 
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consultation, and so on), and their opinions about the stock market regulation, I 
conducted interviews with twenty stockholders in each of two Chinese cities (Shenzhen 
and Haikou). The two cities have witnessed stockholders’ enthusiastic involvement in the 
stock market since its initiation. Shenzhen, since becoming the first special economic 
zone in China, has been one of the largest economic centers in China. Haikou is the 
capital city of Hainan Province, which was the largest special economic zone in China in 
the 1980s. But as the focus of developmental policies shifted, Haikou is no longer an 
economic center in China today. Currently, Haikou is famous for the high quality of its 
natural environment, and people here are living relatively slow and cozy lives compared 
to those in Shenzhen. In order to adopt a historical approach, I selected interviewees who 
had more than ten years of experience in stock trading. The interviewees in Shenzhen 
consisted of 8 females and 12 males; the interviewees in Haikou consisted of 10 females 
and 10 males2.  
 I began interviewing stockholders with whom I already had an acquaintance so 
that I could gain access, and then I used a loose snow-ball approach to identify other 
respondents. Although the interviewees were a very small portion of Chinese retail 
stockholders and findings cannot be generalized to the all retail stockholders, their 
experience and views could reflect some features of the Chinese stock market regulation 
and the social atmosphere around it. The interviews were semi-structured. I prepared a set 
of questions to ask, but I followed the interviewees and adjusted my questions as the 
interview progressed. The interviews were conducted as relaxed conversations. I talked 
with the interviewees in the tea house, or took phone interviews if we were not available 
                                                           
2 See Table 1 (the description of the interviewees’ age, education level, and profession) in Appendix A. 
8 
 
to talk face to face. The length of an interview was flexible. An interviewee even talked 
with me in a tea house for a whole afternoon. He seemed to like sharing his stories of 
stock investments and his thoughts about high-profile cases. Compared to a teahouse 
meeting, a phone interview was much shorter, averaging about thirty minutes. All the 
interviews covered almost all the questions I prepared. I audiotaped the interviews or 
took notes if the respondent preferred not to be recorded electronically. In the analysis, 
these interviews with retail stockholders are coded in the form of “FS01” or “MH01.” 
The first letter indicates the respondent’s gender, M refers to male, and F refers to female; 
the second letter indicates the city, S for Shenzhen, and H for Haikou; the third number 
indicates the order of the interviews.   
 I also collected online comments regarding the regulation of China’s stock 
market from Sina weibos and blogs. In the last two years, I followed Sina weibos of 30 
known Chinese economists, law scholars, financial commentators, lawyers and securities 
experts to collect data from their messages related to the regulation of the stock market 
and the control of securities crimes. They also have blogs that I used for source material. 
But their weibos provide information on a wider range of topics and have more up-to-
date information. The use of weibo in China has grown very fast. Through the internet, 
weibo users can share their views and words anywhere at any time. Compared to blogs 
that usually consist of formal articles, weibos provide an easier, faster and more equal 
form of communications. Sina weibo is one of the largest microblog service providers in 
China. By 2012, Sina weibo had more than 500 million registered users (Xinhuanet.com, 
2013), including a great number of scholars and stars of other circles, for which the 
service provider confirmed their identities and marked them with a golden letter of “V” 
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(VIP) following their names in weibo. The experts I followed in my study use their real 
names in weibo, thus I ensured that the comments reflect their own thoughts. And from 
their discussions, I observed different views about recent issues involving stock market 
regulation.  
Increasingly, researchers are collecting data from online forums, weibos, blogs, 
and other internet sources (Chung, 2008; Hartford, 2000; Keohane and Nye, 1998; 
Kluver, 2005; Liang and Lu, 2010; Lim, 2007; Liu and Halliday, 2009). Based on his ten 
years of study, Yang Guobin (2013) argued that Chinese internet activists became a 
strong force to foster social, cultural, and political change in China. In the study of 
reforms of China’s Criminal Procedural Law (CCPL), Liu and Halliday (2009) collected 
online written discussions related to the CCPL and the practice of defense lawyers from 
the official internet forum of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA). In a footnote 
in their article, Liu and Halliday (2009) describe that “official censorship and even self-
censorship is surprisingly restrained… lawyers on the forum spoke openly and 
forthrightly, and often very critically, about almost every aspect of legal practice, the 
courts, the police, the concentration of political power, and the absence of rule of law or 
democracy” (p. 916-917).  I reviewed these experts’ weibos every day for two years, and 
wrote down their comments by hand. The main themes of their comments included 
discussions on the fundamental defects of the Chinese stock market, the process of 
making laws governing the stock market (e.g., Professor Cao Fengqi was one of the 
drafters of the Chinese Securities Law and other laws), the role of securities firms, the 
weaknesses in the stock market regulation, the adoption of registration system for stock 
issuance and listing in the near future, and suggestions about further reforms. Their 
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comments are very open and critical, which displayed the great enthusiasms to urge legal 
reforms for the development and regulation of China’s stock market. These online 
comments and discussions provided useful sources for my study.   
 My dissertation will consist of seven chapters. In Chapter 1 (Introduction), I 
describe the research context, research questions, and data and research methods of this 
study. In Chapter 2 (Literature Review and Theoretical Framework), I review law and 
finance theories that have been developed and tested in historical and cross-national 
contexts to explore the construction of regulatory mechanisms; then I review scholarships 
of white-collar criminology, especially crime-as-choice theory; I also discuss the growth 
of rights consciousness of Chinese public stockholders.  In Chapter 3, I go over the 
development of China’s stock market and policies and practices of market regulations 
before the 2004 State Council’s Nine Opinions. Then I review the development of 
China’s stock market regulation after the publication of the 2004 State Council’s Nine 
Opinions in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I describe and discuss the interviews of public retail 
stockholders in my study. In Chapter 6, I explore the institutional defects of China’s stock 
market, the weaknesses of the stock market regulation, and propose some suggestions for 
further reforms. Chapter 7 is the Conclusion.     
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Reflections on Financial Regulation in the Wake of the 2000s Global Financial 
Crises 
 In the wake of the financial crises early in the 21st century, scholars launched 
discussions on regulatory patterns and the role of state power in financial market 
regulation. As Florian Saurwein summarizes (2011, p. 335), starting from the 1970s, the 
patterns of political steering of economy and society in Western countries shifted “from 
government to governance (Rhodes, 1996; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), from 
hierarchical to a cooperative form of government (Mayntz, 2009, 2003), from an 
interventionist/positive state towards a regulatory state (Moran, 2002; Majone, 1996, 
1999), and even a postregulatory state (Scott, 2004).” But the financial crises, causing 
damage to the real economy and affecting people on a very large scale, weakened 
confidence in market and self-regulatory mechanisms (Saurwein, 2011). The exposure of 
serious financial fraud, such as the Madoff case, demonstrated that regulation had been 
ineffective and again drew attention to the weaknesses in investor protection within the 
social context of financialization.   
 Scholars (Dorn, 2010; Hagan, 2012; Riles, 2011; Shover and Grabosky, 2010; 
Shover and Hochstetler, 2006) critiqued the deregulation movements resulting from the 
underlying political philosophy of neo-liberalism that prefers private/self financial 
regulation to public regulation. In contrast to this major perspective, Arup (2010) argued 
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that the global financial crises were not just because of deregulation caused by neoliberal 
policies; instead, the collusion of corporate and state power led to the financial crises. 
From a global perspective, Arup (2010, p. 363) argues that the collaboration of corporate 
and state power in the US and the UK shaped the financial market regulation around the 
world. The financial crises indicated the feature of crony capitalism due to erosion of the 
economic rule of law, which let the elites grab huge economic and political benefits 
through rigging the market while ruling out opportunities for the common people 
(Ramirez, 2013). Dorn (2010, p. 26) calls for “democratization of financial regulation,” 
which was based on the perspective that the healthy development of the financial market 
is a public good. Criticizing the view that financial market regulation was just a technical 
issue, Dorn (2010) argues that government authorities responsible for the public should 
take charge of financial market regulation and put the regulation under democratic 
oversight. But due to the difficulty in changing “the culture of elites,” Arup (2010) was 
pessimistic about the likelihood that financial regulations would be adequately reformed. 
Dorn (2011, p. 441) also showed his disappointment that the collusion of public 
authorities and large corporations and interest groups still led to “a continuity in, or even 
a deepening of, private steering of regulatory rule making.”  
 In spite of the differences among the discourses, these discussions pointed to how 
to adjust the regulatory power relationship and realize the effective financial regulation to 
serve the interests of the common public. China seemed unaffected by the global 
financial crises since it was not open to the global financial markets. But as some experts 
challenge, China’s bailout of four trillion yuan in response to the global financial crises, 
with lax regulation aggravated by corruption of government officials and interest groups, 
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had negative effects on its domestic financial markets and real economy (Chen, 2011; 
China.com, 2014; Liu, 2012). This paralleled the effect of bailouts of banks in the 
Western states as described by Dorn (2011, p. 428), where states became “targets of a 
mixture of financial speculation and genuine fears and uncertainties over their financial 
health.” Recently, the Chinese president, Xi jinping, launched a series of attacks on 
corrupt high-ranking officials, including provincial governors, ministers, military 
generals, and even including several vice premier-level state leaders. These cases 
revealed that these government officials and their relatives actually controlled a bunch of 
listed companies and received huge benefit from power-money trading with many 
companies (China Funds Daily, 2014). The scandals showed clear evidence that the 
Chinese stock market became a platform for systemically transferring interests to the 
political and economic elites. This calls for an urgent need for further reform to adjust the 
power relationship and correct the failure of Chinese stock market regulation. As the 
Chinese stock market is an emerging market in transition, law and finance theories based 
on abundant historical and comparative studies of financial market regulation across 
various countries would shed light on political and legal reform for China’s stock market. 
Law and Finance Theories 
 Researchers find that the legal system regarding investor/shareholder protection 
has great effects on the growth of capital markets (Chen, 2003; Coffee, 1999, 2001; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV), 1997, 1998, 2000). Weak 
investor/shareholder protection will hinder further investments or misallocate investments 
since investors would like to take dividends and not take the risk of continuing 
investments (LLSV, 2000). Poor investor protection also lowers corporate valuation 
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(LLSV, 2002). Comparing investor protections (legal rules and enforcements) across 49 
countries, LLSV (1997) found that securities markets were more developed in countries 
with stronger investor protections. A legal system providing outside investors (minority 
shareholders and creditors) with strong protections against expropriation by insiders 
(controlling shareholders and managers) will encourage investors to continue investments 
in stocks and bonds, and thus will promote the growth of capital markets. This 
reemphasizes the central theme of corporate governance to protect outside investors 
against expropriation by insiders.  
 The research of La Porta and colleagues set off an upsurge of study in the field of 
“law and finance.” As La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) conclude, investor protections are 
strongest in common-law countries (represented by the US and the UK), in German-civil-
law countries and Scandinavian-civil-law countries they are in the middle, and they are 
weakest in French-civil-law countries. And French-civil-law countries had the least-
developed capital markets. In summary, the common law system gives stronger 
protection to minority investors/shareholders against expropriation by controlling 
shareholders than does the civil law system. The studies of La Porta et al. drew attention 
to the impact of legal origin and raised discussions on different families of law in 
connection with securities regulation and investor protection. But some scholars doubt 
the determinative importance of legal origin and emphasize law implementation and 
enforcement of transplanted laws (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, 2003; Pistor, Raiser, 
and Gelfer, 2000). And some disagree with La Portal et al.’s argument that securities 
market development in common law countries depends on formal laws providing strong 
investor protection (Cheffins, 2000; Coffee, 2001). After studying the history of stock 
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markets in the US and the UK, Coffee (2001) found that before the 20th century the legal 
system in these two countries did not provide minority shareholders with strong 
protection, and formal laws lagged behind the development of securities markets. As the 
securities markets developed, the growth of public stockholders/investors urged legal 
reforms for stronger investor protection.  
 Review of early securities market regulation in advanced economies. The 
development of US securities market regulation was driven by the desire to attract 
foreign funds for railroad and other capital-intensive industries in the late 19th century 
(Carosso, 1970; Coffee, 2001). In the early railroad industry, it was common for 
controlling shareholders to manipulate stock prices, even legitimizing their violation of 
minority rights by bribing judges and legislatures (Gordon, 1988; Rock, 2001; Coffee, 
2001). Legal mechanisms against securities fraud were hindered by the limited scope of 
laws, judicial corruption, and especially the weak enforcement of laws (Friedman, 2005; 
Banner, 1998; Coffee, 2001). To attract foreign investors, the US securities market 
improved corporate governance systems and increased self-regulation through exchanges 
(Michie, 1987; Coffee, 2001). On the one hand, to gain the trust of foreign investors and 
ensure the safety of investments, US investment banks spearheaded by J.P. Morgan 
represented clients to protect their interests and built mechanisms into corporate 
governance structure to realize their representation. For example, a common practice was 
for investment banks to send representatives to the issuer’s board, and then this became 
institutionalized in the corporate governance system. This effective means of investor 
protection increased the stock values of the firms. Moreover, the rise of corporate 
mergers increased the size of listed companies and thus led to dispersed ownership.  
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 On the other hand, the New York Stock Exchange also played an important role 
in promoting corporate governance and investor protection (Seligman, 1995; Ripley, 
1927; Coffee, 2001). The small-sized NYSE provided restrictions on membership, a high 
cost of entry, relative freedom to get outside capital, fixed brokerage commissions, and 
conservative policies in listing stocks, which resulted in high trade volumes, high-quality 
members, and a good reputation (Michie, 1987; Coffee, 2001). The NYSE also promoted 
disclosure rules and modern financial reporting standards before the US federal securities 
laws went into effect in 1933 (Hawkins, 1986; Ripley, 1927). Moreover, the NYSE 
prohibited listing nonvoting common shares and ensured voting rights of minority 
shareholders, and thus restricted controlling shareholders from expropriating minority 
shareholders (Seligman, 1986; Ripley, 1927). Through such means, the NYSE promoted 
dispersed ownership and fostered “shareholder democracy” (Coffee, 2001, p. 38). As 
scholars conclude, a concentrated ownership system tends to have low disclosure, lack of 
transparency, and weak protection for outsiders, so the market cannot play an active role 
in corporate governance, and this constrains further development of stock markets 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Lang, 2010; LLSV, 1997). In contrast, a dispersed 
ownership system could avoid the abovementioned risks, and encourage strict disclosure, 
transparency, market disciplinary mechanism, and thus promote strong stock markets 
(LLSV, 1997; Coffee, 2001).    
  In summary, the self-regulation based on oversight by the NYSE of its listed 
firms and the self-bonding mechanisms between US investment banks and stock issuers, 
increased dispersed ownership and promoted a strong liquid stock market before formal 
legal mechanisms were developed in the US (Coffee, 2001). While the NYSE played an 
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active role in self-regulation of the US stock market, the London Securities Exchange 
(LSE) adopted a laissez-faire approach and began to monitor the quality of stock issuers 
in the wake of a series of scandals in the 1920s (Michie, 1987). Despite the prevailing 
political philosophy of social democracy in the US in the 1930s and the leftist trend in the 
UK in the 1960s, neither government actively intervened into the securities markets 
(Coffee, 2001; Michie, 1987). Following economic development and securities market 
growth, self-regulation in the two countries fostered the establishment of legal 
mechanisms to maintain dispersed ownership. It was financial development and the 
consequent struggles of massive public shareholders as a growing political force that 
propelled legal reforms for investor protection (Coffee, 2001).   
 While the US and the UK governments’ inactive involvement helped the 
development of securities markets, the French and German governments’ intrusive 
interventions curbed the growth of their early securities markets. In contrast to NYSE and 
LSE as private bodies, the Paris Bourse was a state-administered monopoly, and its 
agents were officially appointed by the government (Poser, 1991; Goldman, 1992; Coffee, 
2001). Under strict control of the government, the Bourse had no real owners, and thus 
lacked the incentive to develop. As Coffee (2001) argues, the French pattern of 
paternalist government control did not let self-regulation grow in the early French stock 
markets, while as mentioned above, in the US the government’s inactive involvement 
provided room for the growth of self-regulation in the securities industry. Although the 
government strictly controlled the Bourse, the French securities market still had a poor 
reputation for low quality issuers and lack of transparency (Nunes et al., 1993; Coffee, 
2001). This was attributable to the ineffective governmental supervision and lack of self-
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regulation. The German securities market regulation in the 19th century reflected the 
conflicts between the German government and the emerging middle class that favored the 
stock market (Brophy, 1998; Coffee, 2001). The German government promoted liberal 
lending by banks and decreased the use of the stock market (Baker, 1970; Coffee, 2001). 
In the 1890s, heavy taxes on securities transactions and the 1896 Stock Exchange Law as 
punitive regulations further damaged the German stock market (Brophy, 1998; Coffee, 
2001). The state’s antagonistic policies and legislations led to the disruption of German 
stock market (Baker, 1970; Coffee, 2001).  
 Based on the historical analyses, Coffee (2001) reconsiders the relationship 
between laws and securities market development as the theme of LLSV studies, and 
concludes that the development of securities markets appeared to follow a “crash-then-
law” cycle (Partnoy, 2000; Banner, 1997), in which formal legal mechanisms usually 
developed after market crashes. Since the 1960s, major European countries began to copy 
the US legal and formal mechanisms (e.g., strict legislations, SEC-like regulatory agency, 
and strong enforcement), and self-regulation exchanges similar to the NYSE (Goldman, 
1992; Coffee, 2001). At the end of the 20th century, European stock markets developed 
quickly in terms of the number of listed companies, market capitalization as a percentage 
of GDP, and equity capital raised through IPOs; in addition, concentrated ownership is 
fading in European countries (Coffee, 2001). Based on the comparative studies, Coffee 
(2001) also critiques the “path dependence thesis” of Bebchuck and Joe (1999) that 
applies a political explanation for the corporate governance and ownership and argues 
that political tradition would constrain the growth of securities markets in European 
social democracies. The various origins of legal differences seem not to be the critical 
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reason for different developmental levels of securities markets. The transplantation of 
legal mechanisms for stock market regulation in European countries appeared to follow 
what Coffee (1999) called functional convergence.     
 Studies on transitional economies. Law and finance scholars showed great 
interest in securities market regulation in transitional economies and reflected on how 
legal transplants work on securities markets in these countries. Coffee (1999) compared 
the Czech and Polish experiences of securities market regulation in the process of 
privatization in the 1990s. These two countries were analogous in terms of economy, 
geopolitics, history, and culture. The Czech adopted a fast approach to privatization and 
made little effort in securities market regulation. But a few years after its initial 
prosperity, the Czech securities market experienced sharp declines and then collapsed 
(Green, 1999; Coffee, 1999). The failure of the Czech securities market was the 
consequence of deregulation that led to the absence of transparency, lack of incentives to 
restructure investment funds, rampant insider trading, and serious tunneling phenomena, 
among other market abuses, which ruined the confidence of foreign and domestic 
investors (Thiel, 1998; Coffee, 1999; Rouwenhorst, 1999). 
  In contrast, Poland adopted a slower and more cautious approach to privatization 
(Estrin, 1999). Although the Polish and Czech substantive corporate laws were very 
similar, based on the German civil law system, they adopted different paths to securities 
regulation. Poland applied strict disclosure standards, ownership transparency rules, 
takeover regulations, and established a regulatory agency like the US SEC (Estrin, 1999; 
Coffee, 1999). To monitor the securities markets and protect smaller shareholders, Poland 
created state investment funds to control the privatized firms and serve as the only 
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agencies for citizens’ investment of voucher certificates (Estrin, 1999; Coffee, 1999). At 
the same time, Poland prohibited the establishment of private investment funds and 
forbade citizens’ direct investments in stocks of newly privatized firms. The strong 
securities regulation and investor protection led to the more successful stock market in 
Poland in terms of liquidity, market performance, resistance to outside financial crisis, 
and so on (Coffee, 1999). 
 Russia’s experience of privatization was another demonstration that deregulation 
led to securities market failure (Fox and Heller, 1999; Coffee, 1999; Black, Kraakman, 
and Tarassova, 1999). In the process of privatization, the majority of stocks of privatized 
firms were assigned to the insiders, especially incumbent managers, who became 
controlling shareholders through buying shares from minority shareholders, thus forming 
highly concentrated ownership structures. In addition to controlling shareholders, local 
governments looted privatized firms in the absence of effective regulation (Fox and 
Heller, 1999). Furthermore, the underdeveloped legal system and worsened 
macroeconomic condition in Russia at that time aggravated the problems of securities 
regulation and investor protection (Black et al., 1999). Following the study of La Porta et 
al. (1998), Pistor and her colleagues (2000) examined legal protection of investors in 24 
transitional economies. They also find that in transition, incumbent managers often took 
control over the state-owned enterprises and then grabbed the ownership in the absence 
of state oversight during the process of privatization. Consequently, outside investors had 
to bear the risks of being expropriated by the incumbent managers. Another prominent 
problem was that the government based on the residual state-ownership often intervened 
into decision making of companies.   
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 Although transitional countries usually attempted wholesale legal transplants from 
advanced market economies, especially from the US, empirical data showed that the legal 
transplants often failed since transplanted laws could not be adapted well into local 
conditions and lacked strong enforcements (Pistor et al., 2000). Berkowitz et al. (2003) 
also posited that the process of legal transplantation is more significant than its legal 
origins. Pistor et al. (2000) studied the content and enforcement of the corporate law in 
six countries that transplanted laws from other countries, and compared them to those of 
origin countries. They found that the evolution of the corporate law in these countries 
was different from that of the origin countries. The more important problem was the 
enforcement of transplanted laws. As scholars emphasize, the law in action is more 
important than the law on the books in promoting investor protection (Pistor et al., 2000; 
LLSV, 2000). Even with sufficient laws transplanted from advanced market economies, 
weak legal institutions and enforcements in transitional economies still could not provide 
strong investor protection. Transitional economies need to adapt transplanted laws to 
their own conditions and establish their own legal orders for effective enforcement (Pistor 
et al., 2000; Coffee, 1999; Berkowitz et al., 2003).  
 Studies on East Asian cases. Claessens et al. (2000) have examined 2,980 listed 
companies in nine East Asian economies and have found high concentrations of control 
by large families everywhere except in Japan, as more than two thirds of these companies 
were controlled by a single shareholder each. The big families usually accomplished the 
control via pyramid structures, cross-holdings, and other means (Claessens et al., 2000, p. 
82; Lang, 2010). For example, in Hong Kong, the largest 15 families held corporate 
assets worth 84.2% of the GDP in 1996. In contrast, in the US the 15 richest families had 
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wealth worth only 2.9% of the GDP in 1998 (Claessens et al., 2000, p. 108-109). The 
highly concentrated ownership would result in poor corporate governance and would 
restrain legal reforms for investor protection (Claessens et al., 2000; Lang, 2010; Coffee, 
2001). Without adequate protective mechanisms, minority shareholders had to bear high 
risks of being looted by the insiders, especially in market declines. The Asian financial 
crisis around 1997 exposed weak securities market regulation and poor corporate 
governance (Johnson et al., 2000; Lang, 2010). Studying securities markets in 25 
economies during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Johnson et al. (2000) have concluded 
that weak investor protection and ineffective law enforcement contributed to the capital 
market collapses. The problems of corporate governance and market abuses revealed in 
the Asian Financial Crisis were similar to those in the US in the 1920s (Coffee, 2001). 
These studies of Asian economies showed evidence of “crony capitalism” in that large 
families had close connections with the government and exerted great influence on 
economic policies and legal systems (Claessens et al., 2000; Lang, 2010).   
 Case studies of China. Chen (2003) provided China’s case as evidence for 
Coffee’s (2001) “crash-then-law” pattern. In an emerging market like China’s stock 
market, market growth comes before legal reforms. As observed by Chen (2003), the 
constituency of stockholders that have a common interest and easily measured damages 
caused by securities fraud would form a powerful force to foster legal reforms for 
investor protection and change China’s legal tradition. This “crash-then-law” model was 
seen in the 1993-1996 bear market that forced the CSRC to apply more aggressive 
administrative sanctions to attack securities offenses, and then again in the 2001-2003 
bear market that urged legal changes to allow civil litigation against securities fraud 
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(Chen, 2003). The “crash-then-law” perspective does not deny the importance of legal 
regulation to securities market development, but addresses the time sequence of the 
emergence of legal and formal regulation and market development in the early stage of 
stock markets. To further develop stock markets, legal protection of investors should be 
improved. As Chen (2003) concluded, the “law-then-growth” pattern is applied in a more 
mature securities market, while “crash-then-law” or “growth-then-law” model is shown 
in an emerging market.  
 Pistor and Xu (2005) investigated China’s emerging stock market and found that 
it performed much better than those in other transitional economies, especially in terms of 
listed companies’ capacity to raise funds. But China’s performance in formal laws about 
shareholder protections and law enforcement was below average for transition economies 
(Pistor et al., 2000; Allen, J. Qian, and M. Qian, 2005; Pistor and Xu, 2005). Pistor and 
Xu (2005) argued that administrative governance based on the quota system, which 
started in 1992, was an effective means of regulation in the absence of formal legal 
mechanisms in the initial stage of China’s securities markets. As they stated, China’s 
experience was a good example that when the legal rules are not sufficient to govern the 
stock market, administrative regulation is an efficient supplement to court rulings since 
the administrative agencies can investigate and punish wrongdoings timely. But 
mechanisms should be set to curb power abuses by the administrative regulator. They 
also emphasized that China must develop formal legal regimes to meet the need of 
securities market growth in the long run. 
 Local Chinese scholars also follow La Porta et al.’s studies to test law and finance 
theses within the Chinese context. Shen Yifeng et al. (2004) applied the indices used by 
24 
 
La Porta et al. to measure China’s investor protection and concluded that Chinese 
legislation on investor protection has been strengthened gradually, which fostered the 
development of the stock markets. Pi (2010) conducted comprehensive analyses on the 
data from different Chinese provinces from 1995 to 2005 and concluded that without 
considering governmental actions, improvement in the legal system has positive effects 
on financial development through increasing the growth of financial intermediaries and 
financial marketization. Although Pi found that the government helped foster financial 
development in the early stage of economic transition, the study does not deny LLSV’s 
conclusion that strong legal protection will promote securities market development. The 
Chinese stock market has become one of the largest in the world, but China’s financial 
system is still dominated by an inefficient banking system that mainly served state-owned 
enterprises without placing the priority on loan repayment and investment return, and 
stock prices and investor actions could not reflect the real values of listed companies 
(Walter and Howie, 2011). Allen et al. (2005) investigated Chinese listed companies and 
other private enterprises. They applied the measures of investor protection and indices 
used by LLSV to compare China with the 49 countries in LLSV’s study. They found that 
China was in the middle of common law countries and German civil law countries in 
terms of investor protection legislations; but China was far below the average level in 
LLSV’s study in terms of law enforcement (such as rule of law, corruption, among 
others). Compared to India and six other big developing market economies, China’s 
index of corruption was the worst. Through this study, Allen et al. (2005) found that 
private enterprises used informal financing channels based on connections and reputation 
and implemented corporate governance based on competition. These informal 
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mechanisms rooted in Chinese society helped reduce firms’ pressure to raise funds and 
improve corporate governance, contributing to the fast growth of China’s economy. Thus, 
Allen et al. concluded that China’s case was an exception to LLSV’s thesis. 
 Allen et al. (2005) conducted case studies on China’ s two famous private 
enterprises, Wahaha and SiTong, and investigated corporate governance of state-owned 
enterprises listed in stock exchanges. They found that corporate governance in private 
enterprises was better than that of state-owned listed enterprises. But some Chinese 
scholars argue that private enterprises grew faster than state-owned listed companies, not 
because of informal mechanisms used by the former, but due to the poor performance and 
corporate governance of the latter (Pi, 2010). Although this argument conflicts with the 
conclusion of Allen et al., they reached an agreement that state-owned listed companies 
did not do well in performance and corporate governance. This is consistent with Lin 
Yifu’s (2002) finding that SOEs listed on stock exchanges for more than five years were 
not better than those not listed in terms of performance and corporate governance. The 
Chinese government initiated stock markets to collect funds, introduce modern enterprise 
systems, and improve the corporate governance for state-owned enterprises. But Lin 
Yifu’s (2002) research found that the stock market did not achieve the goals of state-
owned enterprises reform, specifically improving their performance and corporate 
governance.    
 Implications for China’s securities market regulation. Law and finance 
theories provide economic justifications for investor protection and display a general 
frame for securities market regulation (LLSV, 1998; Pistor et al., 2000). 
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 Crash-then-law vs. law-then-growth. Coffee’s (2001) “crash-then-law” pattern 
has implications for transitional economies; even with weak legal institutions, securities 
markets still can grow through improving corporate governance and self regulation by 
stock exchanges. The self-regulation mechanisms for minority investor protection arose 
under the circumstances that competition and innovation were effective (Coffee, 2001). 
When the market crashed, the state under the pressure of public investors made laws and 
formal mechanisms to improve investor protection. Self-regulation systems such as stock 
exchange rules could be the functional substitute before the establishment of formal legal 
mechanisms for minority investor protection. But strong formal legal protection is the 
precondition for a fully fledged market (Coffee, 2001). Public investors through common 
struggles for rights protection formed a powerful political force to propel legal reforms. 
The 1930s federal securities laws in the US and the 1940s Company Act Amendments in 
the UK were the outcome of securities market development and the struggling of public 
investors as a growing political force for stronger protection (Coffee, 2001).   
 As studies show, the “crash-then-law” pattern was seen in transitional economies. 
For example, the Czech Republic enacted legal reforms to strengthen investor protection 
after its stock market collapsed as a consequence of scandals that ruined investors’ 
confidence (Coffee, 1999; LLSV, 2000). China also saw the “crash-then-law” pattern in 
two long bear markets (Chen, 2003). Although Coffee (2001) provides evidence 
inconsistent with the LLSV’s assertion that the emergence of dispersed ownership and 
liquid market depends on strong legal protection of minority shareholders, he does not 
deny the importance of law on securities regulation and argues that strong legal 
protection of minority investor rights is the prerequisite of a mature securities market. 
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Coffee (2001) just tends to define law in a broader sense, not confined to formal laws as 
narrowly defined in LLSV’s study. Regardless of which direction the causality goes 
between financial development and legal reform, the point is that a good legal system 
with strong investor protection can promote financial development. 
 The “crash-then-law” pattern can be used to address the hot debates in China on 
whether the securities market with serious scandals should be closed and then reopened 
when the legal environment is ready. The legal reform for securities market regulation 
evolves to meet political, economic, and social changes. It will be an evolving process of 
learning, doing, and adjusting for market regulation. With the market growth, the 
development of legal consciousness of public investors in China will be the critical force 
to propel legal reforms.  
 Formal convergence vs. functional convergence. As La Porta et al. (1997) 
conclude, a common law system provides better protection for minority shareholders and 
breeds stronger stock markets than a civil law system does. For example, common law 
judges can interpret fiduciary duty broadly (Johnson et al., 2000), with the result that 
controlling shareholders have less political influence (La Porta et al., 2000), and investors 
have more rights against corporate directors (Coffee, 2001). Particularly, the US allows 
class-action as a grievance mechanism for public shareholders (La Porta et al., 1997). But 
it is not necessary to accomplish legal formal convergence to build good regulation of 
securities markets (Coffee, 2001). As LLSV (1998, p. 18) stated, they use the index of 
legal origin just as “a proxy for the law’s general stance toward outside investors.”  
 Like the civil law system, the Chinese legal system based on statutory laws will 
encounter legislative lag, which made it difficult to deal with emerging problems. And 
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judges lack independence and flexible discretion to handle cases against securities market 
abuses. Moreover, law enforcement often faced resistance from administrative 
intervention, local protectionism, and corruption. For China’s emerging securities market 
in transition, it is a feasible way to achieve functional convergence in implanting laws 
and building enforcement mechanisms aiming to strengthen investor protection. 
Corporate governance reform for investor protection will face opposition from major 
firms, controlling families, and other interest groups that exert political influence on 
reform. LLSV (2000) suggested applying enforceable rules and regulations in the existing 
political and social contexts. The 1930s US securities law reform is a successful example, 
which combined supervision by the powerful SEC with self-regulation by private 
intermediaries to enforce strict accounting standards and disclosure rules.  
 Political ideologies vs. legal determinants vs. economic preconditions. Mark Roe 
(2000) argued that the political tradition accounted for concentrated ownership and 
hindered securities market development in European social democracies.  As the political 
tradition of social democracy placed more importance on high employment than profit 
maximization, firms were forced to use more capital and resources for other 
constituencies. To counteract high managerial agency costs imposed by political 
pressures, concentrated ownership is adopted to avoid expenses from management 
oversight and information disclosure. Bebchuck and Roe (1999) held a path-dependency 
view and argued that high private benefits from control over the company would cause 
the controllers to restrain the forming and maintaining of dispersed ownership. Coffee 
(2001) thought that Roe’s (2000) political-precondition thesis, Bebchuck’s (1999) path-
dependency perspective, and LLSV’s (1998) legal-determinant view have in common the 
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idea that the development of liquid stock markets depends on the legal or political ways 
to protect outside investors. Coffee showed historical evidence inconsistent with the 
above theories. As Coffee (2001) found, from the end of the 19th century until the 1930s 
in the US and the 1960s in the UK, both countries lacked strong legal protections for 
outsider investors, but dispersed ownership grew and made private corporations become 
publicly owned. Thus, Coffee (2001, p. 22) concludes that the relationship between law 
and finance is “reciprocal and interactive.” 
 Furthermore, Coffee (2001) drew attention to broader political traditions and 
social contexts that affected legal institutions and in turn were forged by legal institutions. 
As Coffee (2001) pointed out, the difference between the common law system and the 
civil law system is that the former was friendlier to private action and encouraged self-
regulation, which helped breed stronger securities markets in the US and the UK. In the 
US in the late nineteenth century, insufficient laws, judicial corruption and weak 
enforcement drove people to resort to arbitration and self-regulation (Gordon, 1988; Rock, 
2001; Friedman, 2005; Banner, 1998; Coffee, 2001). Decentralized power and flexible 
common laws helped foster a market economy and the growth of stock markets. 
  In this century, openness to trade, cross-border capital flow, and mass 
privatization propelled the development of stock markets in Europe (Coffee, 2001). 
China is also experiencing these economic changes and has adopted a gradual approach 
to decentralization in economy. But reforms often encountered resistance from pre-
existing institutions and old influences. More attention should be paid to the “path 
dependence” (North, 1981) that comes from a long tradition of Confucian cultures 
(laying stress on family, connection, etc.) and the legacy of the socialist planned economy 
30 
 
system in the evolution of securities market regulation (Pi, 2010). Allen et al. (2005) 
found personal connections and reputation could serve as informal mechanisms helpful 
for economic development, e.g., fund collection based on connections could reduce the 
capital pressure of firms. But “connection” also exerts negative influence on the 
regulation of securities market. Those with connections to relevant government officials 
or corporate insiders would get inside information and could grab huge profits from stock 
trading, and then formed interest groups in the stock market. The Chinese stock market 
was criticized as a “connection market.” The interest groups formed in the stock market 
even used their connections to affect legislators, regulators, and courts, and would 
restrain legal reforms in order to maintain their interest (Pi, 2010).  
 Moreover, due to the legacy of the socialist public ownership system, the 
government has also served as the controlling shareholder for the listed state-owned 
enterprises. When the interests of state-owned enterprises represented by the government 
conflicted with the interests of private stockholders, the regulators as governmental 
departments and the courts lacking independence were often put in an embarrassing 
position in dealing with the matters. In the meanwhile, stock markets accumulated 
institutional contradictions (Jiang and Xu, 2006). The coexistence of old and new 
institutions in the gradual reform would result in dilemmas in regulation. For example, in 
state-owned listed companies, the rule by the party committee system conflicts with the 
rule by shareholder meetings or the board of directors system provided by the Company 
Law. China needs to set laws to delineate rights and duties of parties in the market, to 
give more room for stock exchanges and self-associations to make private laws and self-
regulation to check the state power (Y. Lu, 2008; Pi, 2010; F. Cao, 2014c). At the same 
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time, the Chinese stock market should follow market principles and the modern 
enterprise system should be fully established to improve corporate governance (Y. Lu, 
2008; Lang, 2012; Pi, 2010).    
 Self-regulation vs. formal regulation. Law and finance perspectives place 
importance on formal laws and regulation in securities market development and 
economic growth. But as La Porta et al. (2000) stated, some “law and economics” 
perspectives doubt the necessity of formal legal regulation of financial markets since 
investors and entrepreneurs are bound to their contracts and bear the risks of contract 
violation, so the market only needs judicial enforcement of contracts as a grievance 
mechanism (Stigler, 1964; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). These scholars felt that the 
self-bonding system was based on companies’ incentives to increase stock values, thus 
companies had to fulfill fiduciary duties and comply with investors’ contracts; and 
learned parties were more competent than regulatory agencies to make financial contracts 
to meet specific circumstances (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stigler, 1964).  
 In the age of Reagan politics, the market fundamentalism that called for unbridled 
markets “rationalized and enabled white-collar crime as acceptable and expected in the 
life of a market” (Hagan 2012, p. 2). Regulation was even regarded as a negative effect 
on markets, which resulted in the deregulation movements and the policies preferring 
self-regulation or self-discipline (Friedrichs, 2007; Hagan, 2012; Joseph Stiglitz, 2010: 
xiii; Williams, 2008). Doubts about the “regulatability and governability” of markets also 
contributed to deregulation movements (Williams, 2008, p. 485). Some scholars argue 
that stock exchanges should be superior to the government in market regulation 
(Mahoney, 1997). Although the US’s and the UK’s early experience show that a private 
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bonding system and self-regulation would be a functional substitute in the absence of 
adequate legal protection of minority investor rights, securities markets could not fully 
develop without strong legal mechanisms to reduce risks of market crashes and maintain 
public investor confidence (Coffee, 2001). The limitations of self-regulation are that 
without effective competition, stock exchanges as private bodies lack strong incentives to 
sanction their own members, and they are incompetent to investigate, punish, and enforce 
their rules. In addition, even a strong self-regulation system often needs the support of 
state regulation in its enforcement.  
 Without a public regulatory agency, minority investors need to go through the 
difficult process of damage claims by themselves and cannot afford costly actions and 
enforcements. As the securities market has grown to a huge scale and faces more 
complex situations, the limitations of self-regulation have become more pronounced. 
Further, serious consequences caused by rampant fraud urge the development of formal 
legal mechanisms to determine violations and enforce more severe criminal penalties and 
punitive fines against offenders (Coffee 2001). As LLSV (2000) point out, debates over 
whether the market, administrative regulation, or criminal sanction is the most efficient 
way to protect investors distract from the greater need to implement comprehensive 
regulation of securities markets. It’s the combination of well-functioning private 
contracting, self discipline, administrative regulation, and legal rules that can help make 
good capital markets 
 Governmental regulation vs. statist intervention. A strong governmental 
regulation is necessary for governing securities markets, but the problem is how to exert 
appropriate regulation while avoiding excessive intervention. Analogous to European 
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countries, China’s political tradition of paternalism characterizes the governance of its 
financial system, including securities market regulation. Like those in European countries, 
banks and financial intermediaries in China are state-controlled and subject to political 
pressure, and thus cannot guarantee strong protection for minority shareholders. As 
scholars pointed out, concentrated ownership was adopted to maintain the control by 
existing interest groups based on the collusion of the politically and economically 
powerful, while dispersed ownership arose as the private sector grew without excessive 
statist intrusion (Claessens et al., 2000; Coffee, 2001; Lang, 2010). 
 China’s securities markets seem a counterpart to those in France in the late 
nineteenth century in terms of direct governmental intervention in deciding listings. 
Parallel to Germany’s bank-centered system, China’s bank system is closely controlled 
by the state and the state-owned-banks follow government instructions to provide SOEs 
with huge capital resources. This kind of bank-centered system made stock markets less 
important in fundraising. Germany’s antagonist attitude toward securities markets was 
driven by scandals in the commodity market that made the government regard securities 
trading as gambling (Coffee, 2001). France’s excessive state intervention and Germany’s 
antagonism interrupted the securities market development (Coffee, 2001), which is a 
lesson for China on how government exerts appropriate intervention in securities market 
regulation.  
  Government regulation is an efficient and effective way when the legal system 
and the judiciary are weak in transition economies, which is demonstrated by the contrast 
between Poland and the Czech Republic (Coffee, 1999; LLSV, 2000). China’s quota 
system was also a good example of administrative regulation in the absence of formal 
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legal mechanisms in the early stage of the securities markets (Pistor and Xu, 2005). But 
government regulation should be used to curb market abuses and securities fraud, while 
the government should not be actively involved in the direct decisions of stock trading 
and other economic activities. Otherwise, when the government is both an player and 
referee in the market, it could hardly remain neutral and guarantee strong protection for 
outside investors.  
 Insiders vs. outsiders. Investor protection is a central theme of law and finance 
studies. It is critical to deal with the relationship between insiders and outsiders. In other 
words, the task is to protect outsider investors against expropriation by insiders. Conflicts 
of interest between insiders and outside investors result in agency problems (Berle and 
Means, 1968; Jensen, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Conflicts in a company with 
dispersed ownership usually occur between managers and minority shareholders, and in a 
company with concentrated ownership usually happen between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders (LLSV, 2000). Insiders often loot outside investors through 
“tunneling,” which refers to the transfer of assets, capital, resources, and opportunities of 
a company to its insiders at the expense of its minority shareholders/outside investors 
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2001).  
 Tunneling includes self-dealings (dealings between the insider and the company) 
at below-market prices, extremely high salaries for top managers, guarantees for the 
insider’s companies, diluting shares, and using insider information in financial 
transactions (Johnson et al., 2001). Majority shareholders and managers, through their 
control over the board or shareholder meetings, made self-dealings the legal actions of 
the corporation and would not take responsibility for the self-dealings. On the other hand, 
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minority shareholders were denied access to information of self-dealing transactions, 
excluded from decision making, exposed to risks of being expropriated, and lacked relief 
mechanisms. China’s securities markets saw rampant tunneling revealed in scandals.  
 In market economies, courts use the duty of care and duty of loyalty (fiduciary 
duty) to judge whether a transaction constitutes tunneling (Johnson et al., 2001). But the 
“business judgment rule” is often applied as a defense for self-dealing transactions. The 
duty of loyalty is aimed at conflict of interest and doesn’t allow the management to profit 
themselves at the expense of shareholders and investors. But the civil law jurisdiction 
strictly relies on statutes while the common law courts handle self-dealing transaction 
cases based on the general principle of fairness to minority shareholders/investors.  Even 
in developed economies, tunneling is common and often legal. But in recent years, 
advanced civil law countries have promoted stock markets with stronger minority 
protections in order to attract foreign capital and boost technology development. For less 
developed countries, the 1997 Asian crisis warned the governments of legal failures that 
accommodated tunneling and impeded securities market regulation, thus negatively 
affecting economic growth (Johnson et al., 2000). 
 In Asian countries with the same cultural background of Confucian tradition, 
“connection” still exerts great influence on securities markets. The 1997 Asian financial 
crisis revealed poor corporate governance and weak law enforcement in financial market 
regulation. In market declines, minority shareholders were expropriated more seriously 
than under conditions of market increases. With political power as their protective 
umbrellas, big families via concentrated ownership system controlled firms and 
expropriated public shareholders. This close connection between the political elite and 
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big families characterizes the so-called crony capitalism in Asian countries. Chinese 
economists also warned that China is approaching crony capitalism since the collusion of 
the politically and economically powerful formed interest groups to control the national 
economy (Wu, 2000; Lang, 2010). 
 Research concludes that interest groups exert great negative effects on financial 
development (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Vested interest groups tend to hinder financial 
development, especially in economic recessions. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argued that it 
would be a good way to weaken the power of vested interest groups by enhancing 
innovation, openness, and competition in the market. Beck et al. (2001) pointed out that 
compared to a centralized political structure, a decentralized, open, and competitive 
political structure could work better to reduce the impact of interest groups and enhance 
long-term financial development. In transitional economies, legal reform will confront 
more difficulties from vested interest groups. Interest groups that benefit from 
privatization, often at the expense of the public, tend to maintain the status quo and lack 
motivation for legal reforms (Hoff and Stigliz, 2001). Especially for stock markets, big 
families would like to resist legal reforms that would strengthen minority protection and 
reduce expropriation by insiders. To prevent the formation of crony capitalism and 
achieve economic justice, it’s critical to improve corporate governance and strengthen the 
protection of public investors.    
 How to strengthen investor protection, especially for minority shareholders, is 
central to improving corporate governance of listed companies and advancing legal 
reforms to foster stock market development. To improve the legal protection of public 
investors, we cannot neglect the broader context that shapes institutional arrangements 
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for stock market development, regulation, and investor reaction. China’s stock market 
was initiated to serve state-owned-enterprise reforms. The stock market acted as a buffer 
for conflicts from different groups, and public investors bore the cost of reforms (Y. Lu, 
2008; Pi, 2010). Especially, power-money trading under the administrative examination 
and approval system and the weak supervision mechanisms resulted in hidden rules in 
China’s stock market. A series of scandals ruined the reputation of regulators and the 
confidence of investors.  
 In summary, law and finance theories can inspire China to establish the notions of 
investor protection, comprehensive regulation, and effective enforcements, and this will 
provide valuable implications for legal transplants. First, before the implementation of 
strong formal legal mechanisms, self-regulation through exchanges would be a good 
substitute to manage securities markets. Second, competition in open and transparent 
markets based on strict disclosure rules and listing standards will help strengthen self-
regulation and corporate governance. Third, legal transplants will be ineffective if we just 
copy the common law rules and the government still actively intervenes in economic 
decision-making in the private sector. Finally, market development will foster growth of 
publicly dispersed shareholders as a political force struggling for rights protection.  
 Improvement of securities regulation needs comprehensive reform in legislation, 
the judiciary, and enforcements. Surrounding the central point of investor protection, the 
critical question is to balance the dynamics among the state, market, and participants in 
regulating securities markets. Market mechanisms should operate through self-regulation 
by the stock exchanges and associations in an open and transparent market with effective 
competition and innovation (Coffee, 2001). The last and the most important point is that 
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the state should be the last resort for regulation and it should focus on fighting against 
market abuse, fraud, and crime.  
White-Collar Criminological Analyses of Securities Crimes 
  Defining securities crime: the concept of white-collar crime. Given ambiguous 
perceptions of securities crime, a discussion of the broader concept of white-collar crime 
should be helpful. White-collar crime was originally defined by Edwin Sutherland (1983, 
p. 7) as “approximately a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social 
status in the course of his occupation.” White-collar crime was brought forward to draw 
more attention to wrongdoings of persons with relatively high social status whose 
injurious behaviors are often ignored or tolerated by society. In this sense, white-collar 
criminology places more importance on equality and fairness in applying the law to 
constrain the advantaged from violating the rights of the disadvantaged. 
The academic community has widely supported Sutherland’s broad concept of 
crime. For example, Raymond Michalowski (1985, p. 317) concurred with Sutherland, 
arguing that criminology’s subject matter should include “analogous social injuries” that 
refer to “legally permissible acts or sets of conditions whose consequences are similar to 
those of illegal acts.” Another way to give an expansive definition of white-collar crime 
is to adopt the sociological concept of deviance that Robert Merton (1938) introduced in 
his work, Social Structure and Anomie. Further, the concept of white-collar crime has 
been expanded to include corporate and state crimes or elite deviance (Cullen, Cavender, 
Maakestad, and Benson, 2006; Ermann and Lundman, 2002; Hagan, 2012; Simon, 2006).  
 Previous studies revealed that white-collar crimes or elite deviance cost more than 
street crimes, but the economically and politically powerful were less vulnerable or 
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immune from criminal punishments (Cullen et al., 2006; Hagan, 2012; Reiman, 2007; 
Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman, 2007). This unfairness in the application of the criminal law 
to street crimes and white-collar crimes was embedded in the political and social context. 
In the book Who Are the Criminals, Hagan (2012) explores how the politics framed 
social attitude and shaped criminal policies toward street crimes and suite crimes. As 
Hagan (2012) points out, the age of Reagan politics framed “the fear of the streets” (p. 
137) and “the freeing of the suites” (p. 168), and led to excessively severe attacks on 
street crimes and lax regulation over white-collar crimes. Especially for the financial 
market, the belief in the free market led to the reduction of governmental oversight and 
the preference of self regulation by the financial sector. It resulted in the 
decriminalization of financial crimes and lenient treatments to financial wrongdoers 
(Hagan, 2012). This also concurs with Chambliss’ (1975, p. 165) assertion that “crime is 
a matter of who can pin the label on whom, and underlying this socio-political process is 
the structure of social relations determined by the political economy.” 
As Sutherland (1940, p. 6) argued, “an unlawful act is not defined a criminal by 
the fact that it is punished, but by the fact that it is punishable.” The narrow legalistic 
definition of crime fails to explain the process of criminalization, reflect the transitory 
nature of the criminal law, and to consider political and social contexts that affect the 
legal treatment of criminal behavior and offenses (Jones, 2009). China’s stock market is a 
newly developing capital market and has grown fast in the institutional transition 
characterizing contemporary China. The expansive definition of securities crime, as a 
subfield of white-collar crime should be applied to reflect the transitory legal system in 
China. And the expansive definition will highlight the institutional and social factors that 
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account for the discrepancy between the lenient legal treatment and serious consequences 
of white-collar offenses in China’s stock market.  
From the historical perspective, the definition of securities crime has transformed 
over the past twenty years, reflective of the larger transformation of the Chinese legal 
system. When the stock market was first established, China lacked specific criminal laws 
to regulate its activities. This began to change in 1997, when the Chinese Criminal Law 
was revised and specific articles were provided to identify securities crimes. The first 
criminal case of a securities offense occurred in 1998, although statistical reports show 
that the China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) investigated and punished a 
great number of securities frauds since it was established in 1993 (Liao, 2008). If a 
narrow legalistic approach is applied, many of the securities offenses that occurred before 
specific laws were established would fall outside the scope of “crime.” In addition, 
securities offenses have evolved many new forms with the rapid development of 
information technology. Due to the lag of legislation, the existing statutory criminal laws 
cannot identify all serious securities offenses. 
Even with passage of specific laws, the regulatory agencies still tend to adopt 
administrative punishment to deal with securities offenses in China (Lang, 2003; Li et al., 
2008; Liao, 2008; Zhao and Mu, 2008; Zhao and Yang, 2006). Members of the corporate 
and state elite often exert their power to influence the enforcement of laws. As Lang 
(2012) claimed, among 227 cases of insider trading that he researched, 61 cases were 
placed on file for investigation and only 16 (7 percent) cases were transferred to the 
criminal investigation agency. By considering the institutional and social factors that 
affect the legal treatment of white-collar crime in China’s stock market, I identify the 
41 
 
subject matter of my study as including what is statutorily defined as crime by existing 
criminal law, civil and administrative law violations, and analogous social injuries, which 
cause serious damage to stockholders and harm the operation of China’s stock market.    
Close attention should be paid to the crimes committed by the economically and 
politically powerful that damage the interests of vast numbers of retail stockholders. But 
my study will not be limited to upper-class white-collar crime. With information 
technologies, even offenders who are not corporate or government elites can obtain the 
power of discourse to affect the interests of large-scale stockholders. For example, there 
were cases of illegal provision of consultations on stock trading (Meng, 2009). In these 
cases, offenders presented themselves as Stock Sages and provided consultations for 
stockholders. They often used the internet as a platform to spread so-called inside 
information and predictions, profiting from these consultations. Some of these offenders 
were just ordinary people without proper qualifications required for securities consultants. 
In another word, these offenders did not commit securities crimes within their legal 
occupations although they presented themselves to others as experts. These cases of 
“Stock Sages” also reflect the speculative culture of China’s stock market.  
In addition, the subject matter of my study will include individual and corporate 
or government deviance. In fact, it is often hard to decide whether the crimes were 
committed by offenders in the pursuit of corporate profits/government policies or 
personal benefit, and these two often overlap (Cressey, 1995; Shover and Hochstetler, 
2006). Corporate insiders often exploit their control of listed companies to conduct 
activities violating the interest of the companies. In the initial stage of the Chinese stock 
market, the government excessively intervened into stock transactions and even 
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manipulated the stock prices in order to fulfill political goals. This made it harder to 
define the boundary of securities irregularities.   
 Interpreting securities crimes: crime-as-choice theories. In Crime and 
Punishment, Becker (1968) designs an economic utility model applying economic 
analysis of choice to address the allocation of resources and punishments to law 
enforcements. Becker’s approach assumes that a person will commit a malfeasance if the 
expected benefit he/she obtains from it exceeds the benefit obtained from other activities 
at the same cost. According to Becker’s analysis, an increase in the probability of 
conviction or the punishment would increase the cost and decrease the benefit expected 
from an offense, and thus would tend to reduce offenses. Adopting a broad concept of 
crime, Becker (1968, p. 170) views crime as “an economically important activity or 
industry.” In his study, Becker (1968) points out that omission of many white-collar 
crimes led to an understatement of damages crimes cause to society, and especially 
argues that white-collar crime should receive more attention. 
 In tune with Becker’s choice perspective, some scholars have proposed “crime-as-
choice” theory as a framework for explaining white-collar crime and identifying means of 
preventing the recurrence of these offenses (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006; Shover and 
Grabosky, 2010). Using crime-as-choice theory for interpretations of white-collar crime 
concurs with the culturally and practically dominant notion that crime is a “choice” 
(Shover and Grabosky, 2010). The majority of explanations of white-collar crime are 
essentially choice theories since they usually place importance on criminal opportunities 
(Benson and Simpson, 2009). For example, anomie-strain theory suggests that crime is 
committed due to the inaccessibility of institutionally approved means and the 
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availability of illegitimate opportunities (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). Ronald Clarke (1980) 
proposes the approach of “situational crime prevention” that views crime as the outcome 
of choices and aims to reduce the opportunity for crime.  
Crime-as-choice theory adopts the element of rational-choice theory that 
emphasizes deterrence for crime control, but rejects its assumption that criminal choices 
are rational (Shover and Grabosky, 2010). Rational-choice theory is not only an 
important way to explain and predict criminal behaviors, but also provides a basis for 
making policies to minimize criminal choices (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Felson and 
Clarke, 1998; Weisburd, 1997; Shover and Hochstetler, 2006). Economic offenses are 
thought to be the most rational of crimes (Cornish and Clarke, 1986). White-collar 
criminals generally behave more rationally than street offenders since their conduction is 
usually based on careful decision making (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006, p. 120). But the 
deterrent approach for crime control advocated by rational-choice theory has been 
applied principally to street crime and not to white-collar crime (Cohen and Simpson, 
1997; Cullen et al., 2006; Hagan, 2012; Shover and Bryant, 1993; Shover and Hochstetler, 
2006).  
In fact, white-collar crime has caused more loss than has street crime, but the 
legal system is lenient toward white-collar crime compared to the legal treatment of street 
crime (Cullen et al., 2006; Hagan, 2012; Reiman, 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman, 
2007). Serious white-collar criminal activities were often handled with civil procedures 
or administrative regulation (Cullen et al., 2006; Hagan, 2012). This seemed violate the 
principle of fairness and justice, thus more severe deterrence measures should be applied 
to deal with white-collar crime. One of the main reasons was the difficulty in proving 
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white-collar crimes. Through the examination of the cases of 452 persons charged by the 
federal government with insider trading in the US during the 1980s, Szockyj and Geis 
(2002) found the difficulty in proving guilt and using criminal punishments. The 
legislation confusion and uncertainty of punishment also led to ineffective regulation and 
the increase of white-collar crimes (Passas, 1990; Reichman, 1993). For this reason, the 
expansive concept of white-collar crime should be adopted and appropriately harsh 
penalties are necessary for fighting against white-collar crime.  
More importantly, the state’s apparent indifference and negligence have 
contributed to white-collar crime epidemics. For instance, the scandals associated with 
the savings and loan institutions in the US in 1980s were due to the loosened oversight 
that resulted from the deregulation movement (Cullen et al., 2006; Hagan, 2012). The 
internal regulation of corporations or organizations is often ineffective without strict 
external supervision since corporate ethics codes generally place priority on the corporate 
interest, but are negligent with respect to the obligations to comply with the law, protect 
the public interest and ensure the safety of employees (Cullen et al., 2006; Shover and 
Hochstetler. 2006). The processes of conducting irregularities by corporations and 
organizations often showed systemic flaws and “the normalization of deviance” 
(Vaughan, 1996). Thus, credible external regulation is necessary, but it often fails to keep 
up with the growing supply of lure, as new government economic programs emerge 
without sufficient oversight (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006). The state’s disinterest in 
white-collar crime and the lack of support for research on it also reflect the biases of the 
powerful (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006).   
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 The global economic recession early in the 21st century caused policy makers and 
scholars to pay more attention to white-collar crime epidemics that contributed to the 
outbreak of this financial crisis. In a special issue in Criminology & Public Policy, 
Shover and Grabsky (2010), in their article “White-collar Crime and the Great Recession” 
again propose crime-as-choice theory to explain white-collar crime. Shover and 
Grabosky (2010, p. 430) highlight five causal variables (offender pool, lure, external 
oversight, internal oversight and self-restrain, and criminal opportunities) in analyzing 
sources of white-collar crime. 
 Exploring causes for securities crimes: the Chinese case 
 Cultural factors. As Merton (1938, p. 676) argues, individual appetites were 
“culturally induced” in societies that stressed the ultimate cultural goal of pecuniary 
success. White-collar crime can be attributed to a particular mode of reaction to the 
challenge of this cultural goal--“innovation.” In other words, people accept the cultural 
goal of acquiring material wealth but reject the institutionally approved means (Merton, 
1938; Passas, 1990). Coleman (2006) also argues that certain psychological traits are 
encouraged by the general culture of competition in capitalist economies. Shover and 
Hochstetler (2006, p. 63) define three cultural components of the middle and upper class 
that account for the occurrence of white-collar crime as “normatively unbridled 
competition, a pervasive sense of arrogance, and an ethic of entitlement.” McBarnet 
(2010, p. 14) described “a culture of circumvention” in the financial markets as law “is 
simply a nuisance, an obstacle to be overcome, a material to be worked with and 
reshaped to one’s advantage, a challenge in a regulatory cat and mouse game” (p. 80). 
Arup (2010, p. 12) emphasizes that in exploring the reform for financial regulation, 
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scholars should pay more attention to the culture of elites who displayed the “culture of 
irresponsibility” that means holding power without taking responsibility for the 
community and the public (Sennett, 2006).   
China is on the path of so-called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In 
some aspects, Chinese market socialism appears as the early phase of capitalism, the 
period of primitive accumulation of capital. At the beginning of the economic reform 
period in China, Deng Xiaoping brought forward the famous “white cats and black cats” 
theory, which means that it does not matter whether it is a black cat or a white cat, a cat 
that catches mice is a good cat. The popularity of this concept helped free people from 
old ideas and sparked economic reform and opening-up policies in China. But at the same 
time, this economic pragmatism also invoked the twisted notion that if you can get rich 
you are successful, regardless of the means taken to get there. This situation is similar to 
what Merton (1938, p. 681) describes as “the-end-justifies-means doctrine becomes a 
guiding tenet for action when the cultural structure unduly exalts the end and the social 
organization unduly limits possible recourse to approved means.” 
While traditional and socialist values have to at least some extent collapsed, a new 
morality has not been established yet. The social condition of contemporary China 
appears as what Emile Durkheim (1952) called “anomie,” that is a state of normlessness 
as the consequence of weak social regulation that could not restrain individual aspiration 
during the sudden economic upheaval. Robert Merton attributes the state of anomie to 
“the lack of coordination” of the cultural goals of pecuniary success and the 
institutionally approved means to achieve the goals (1938, p. 682). Merton’s explanation 
is also applicable to the cause of anomie in contemporary China. Prevalent corruption, 
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food quality problems, substandard constructions, and other white-collar crimes paint a 
picture of what Karstedt and Farrall define as “market anomie” that refers to “an erosion 
of legal norms, moral standards and trust, culminating in a climate of mutual suspicion 
and rampant moral cynicism” (Karstedt and Farrall, 2007, cited in Jones 2009, p. 131). 
The white-collar crime epidemic associated with China’s stock market provides a 
window to see this market anomie caused by the interest-driven offenders.  
  The supply of lure. The concept of the supply of lure is key to crime-as-choice 
theory. As Shover and Grabosky (2010) emphasized, states can become important 
suppliers of white-collar criminal lure by implementing policies and programs, such as 
tax incentives, low-interest loans, subsidies, and other forms of access to public funds. 
The lack of accordingly strict regulation would let potential offenders exploit these 
policies and programs. For example, the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)’s approval of use of mark-to-market accounting schemes supplied lure to Enron 
and other individuals and corporations to make false financial statements with this 
method (McClean and Elkind, 2003; Shover and Grabosky, 2010). Entrepreneurs can also 
be important providers of white-collar criminal lure. In recent decades, Wall Street 
investment banks devised financial instruments, such as credit default options and 
derivatives trading, which fostered financial fraud and criminal exploitation (Shover and 
Grabosky, 2010; Hagan, 2012).  
The US stock market can be taken as an example. As Shover and Hochstetler 
(2006, p. 35) described the situation, “the rapid infusion of money into stocks along with 
widespread demand for speculative opportunities is a profound economic change, 
because eager but naive investors are lure. Just as street hustlers target those who seem 
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out of place or confused, investment counselors and firms look to attract these ‘under-
informed investors’ (Levitt, 2002, p. 43), some of whom rely solely on their purchase 
recommendations.” Furthermore, the globalization of the securities market makes easy 
access to vast numbers of potential victims of financial frauds (Shover and Hochstetler, 
2006). In sum, the liberal state policies, new technologies, growing private-sector 
services, and globalization of financial transactions can be major contributors to the 
increase of lure and its changing forms (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006, p. 29-45; Arup 
2010). Indeed, as Shover and Hochstetler (2006, p. 48) asserted, “lure production is a 
thoroughly political process, and inequality is a major constraint at every step.”  
Similarly, China’s stock market can be regarded as a lure supplied by the Chinese 
government. The Chinese government initiated the stock market in an attempt to collect 
funds for state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and facilitate the reforms of SOEs. While the 
Chinese government gave enterprises and those working in business preferential policies 
to encourage them to enter into the stock market and access public funds, relevant laws 
and effective oversight were not established. Some corporations entered into the stock 
market by means of false registration and financial reporting fraud. Insider trading and 
market manipulation are common practices in China’s stock market. Without credible 
protection, vast numbers of retail stockholders become victims of securities crimes and 
other related white-collar crime.   
 Governmental regulation. Newman (2005, p. 472-473) put forward capture 
theory, positing that regulatory agencies change from guardians for public interest to 
associates with business interests due to the transformation of political conditions. In The 
Power Elite, C. Wright Mills (1957) used the term “revolving door” to describe a 
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circulation of personnel back and forth between corporations and government agencies, 
which increased the influence of corporations on government. Due to the revolving door 
phenomena, regulators continued to hold the perspectives of corporation for whom they 
worked, which could not lead to fundamental reform for financial regulation (Tsingou, 
2010). Interest groups also captured the regulatory agencies in the wake of financial 
crises, hindering the further reform (Bo, 2006). Political corruption, lax enforcement, and 
conflicts of interest all constitute criminogenic regulatory structures that impaired the 
external oversight against corporate or elite deviance in the US (Szasz, 1986). 
On the other hand, the deregulation movements begun in the age of Reagan 
politics also resulted in weak external oversight that led to the increase of white-collar 
crime in the US (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006; Cullen et alt., 2006; Hagan, 2012). The 
underlying logic of deregulation movements is market fundamentalism that prefers self-
regulation to governmental regulation (Friedrichs, 2007; Joseph Stiglitz, 2010, xiii; 
Williams, 2008). With market fundamentalism prevailing, the relationship between law 
and the markets was even seen as “exogenous and mutually exclusive” (Williams, 2008, 
p. 481). The Bush administration overruled the Glass-Steagall Act and withdrew 
requirements of capital adequacy for some financial transactions. For example, the 
Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000 exempted many financial derivatives 
from regulatory supervision (Greenberger, 2010; Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Arup, 2010; 
Hagan, 2012). In this sense, deregulation movements also bred a criminogenic 
environment. Snider (2000, p. 172) shows her concern that in a laissez-faire world 
“corporate crime can ‘disappear’ through decriminalization (the repeal of criminal law), 
through deregulation (the repeal of all state law, criminal, civil and administrative) and 
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through downsizing (the destruction of the state’s enforcement capability).” The 
overexpansion of the financial market with serious frauds led to the “casino economy” of 
the US (Calavita and Pontell, 1990; Leopold, 2009; Phillips, 2006). Ultimately, this 
weakened external oversight contributed to the 2008 financial crisis in the US (Leopold, 
2009; Prechel and Morris, 2010; Berger, 2011; Shover and Grabosky, 2010). 
 Arup (2010) even argued that the collusion of corporate and state power, not 
merely deregulation movements driven by the political philosophy of neo-liberalism, led 
to the financial crises. In the name of innovation, financiers made financial derivatives 
and increased risks to the market. Regulators knew and encouraged these high-risk 
practices, even enacting legislation to confirm them (Stiglitz, 2009). In addition to the 
impact of the political philosophy of market fundamentalism, political donations from 
financiers exerted great influence on the lawmakers (Talbott, 2009). Furthermore, the US 
and Western European governments shaped the policies of international financial 
organizations and press liberalization on Asian economies in the crises and did not allow 
them to bail out local business, causing huge damage (Arup, 2010).  
China’s stock market was founded in the institutional transition from a planned 
economy to market economy. The Chinese government plays dual roles in the stock 
market (Zhao, 2006). On the one hand, it is the supervisor in charge of oversight of the 
stock market. On the other hand, it is the most important participant in stock trading since 
it controls the listed state-owned enterprises. Securities companies were established 
jointly by the government, state-owned banks, and trust corporations. Listed state-owned 
companies prioritized capital collection and often ignored the rules of the stock market. 
Investment companies closely related to the government often took advantage of their 
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access to government policies that were not yet publicly disclosed to conduct insider 
trading and manipulate stock prices (Zhao, 2006). The intertwined relationships between 
the government, listed companies, and investment companies bred criminogenic 
regulatory structures in China’s stock market. The circulation of personnel back and forth 
between regulatory agencies and securities firms and investment companies showed the 
phenomenon of “revolving door” and exemplified “capture theory” in stock market 
regulation in China (Newman, 2005; Mills, 1957; Zhao and Mu, 2008). 
 Moreover, criminal laws were lenient to securities criminals and have not exerted 
sufficient deterrence to potential offenders (Lang, 2003; Li et al. 2008; Liao, 2008; Zhao 
and Mu, 2008; Zhao and Yang, 2006). Take the case of illegal manipulation of the stock 
price of Zhong Ke Venture as an example. This case affected more than 20 provinces in 
China and the amount involved surpassed 5.4 billion yuan. But according to the criminal 
law, the maximum penalty for the crime of illegal manipulation of the stock market is 
only five-years of imprisonment. In the court inquiry, the responsible party admitted that 
before he committed the crime he carried out sufficient legal consultations to determine 
that it was worth doing. That is, the crime was committed knowing the worst he would 
receive could be a maximum of five-year imprisonment if his criminal activities were 
discovered (Zhao and Yang, 2006). The Ford Pinto case also showed an example that 
lenient sanctions could not curb white-collar crimes (Cullen et al., 2006). Knowing the 
car design defects that might cause fuel leakage and result in lethal dangers in rear-end 
collisions, Ford executives decided not to recall and fix the design problems since the 
prices they would pay for deaths and injuries caused by Pinto crashes would be less than 
the costs they needed to fix the design problems (Cullen et al., 2006). Ultimately, the 
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Ford Pinto case caused Ford Company to pay huge punitive damages and recall the cars, 
which was regarded as “a sign of the times” of the movement against white-collar crime 
(Cullen et al., 2006, p. 165).  
 When China’s stock market was initiated, China lacked specific laws and did not 
recognize the regulatory control necessary for the prevention of securities crimes. Unlike 
the logic underlying the approach of self-regulation or voluntary compliance adopted in 
the U.S., the Chinese government resorted to the rule of virtue and self-control that are 
rooted in both traditional Confucian value and socialist ideology. Although the Chinese 
government enacted particular laws after the outbreak of serious securities crimes, actual 
law enforcement proved challenging in the face of increasing corruption and local 
protectionism. Indeed, the privileged class prefers this semi-market economy that allows 
them to loot the market for personal gain while maintaining the authoritative regime. 
 Internal restraint. Sutherland’s differential association theory is illustrated in his 
study of white-collar crime, and demonstrates how individual actors learned techniques, 
motives, and rationalizations from their fellow workers or supervisors in their own 
companies or from others in the same industry (Sutherland, 1983). Through interviews 
with retired managers of Fortune 500 corporations, Marshall Clinard (1983) found that 
corporation personnel were often driven by pecuniary interest and ignored ethical 
standards. Shover and Hochstetler (2006, p. 72) argue that the culture of work 
organizations, “fluctuations in the business cycle,” “market uncertainty,” and the 
pervasive belief that credible oversight is lacking are critical factors for internal oversight. 
Researchers found that performance pressure and the criminogenic cultural conditions led 
to the increase of criminal choices (Shover and Hochstetler 2006, p. 119). This 
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criminogenic corporate culture has roots in the broad social contexts that attach little 
stigma to white-collar criminals. For example, research found that those engaging in 
insider trading felt little guilt and their family and friends did not forsake them. The 
obstacles preventing them from reintegrating into society were few (Shover and 
Hochstetler, 2006). Within these criminogenic cultural conditions, self-restraint does not 
often work. Sykes and Matza (1957) developed neutralization theory which argues that 
most offenders tend to employ self-rationalizations or justification to account for their 
actions in order to neutralize their feeling of obligation to follow the law and respect for 
conventional values. White-collar criminals often use techniques of neutralization to 
interpret their behaviors in “non-criminal terms” (Benson and Simpson, 2009, p. 141).  
In China, the stock market is viewed as a big casino. As Chinese popular culture 
shows, Chinese people are enthusiastic about gambling. There is a series of Chinese 
movies describing the magical stories of “casino heroes.” This kind of “casino culture” 
associates very little moral stigma with securities offenders. Moreover, as Lang Xianping 
(2009) states, Chinese culture has its own defects, such as speculative mentality, reckless 
character, and a rigid way of thinking, which hinder the likelihood that entrepreneurs will 
comply with rules and build self-restraint.  Failure to identify a group of offenders and 
victims would facilitate the neutralization of the moral stigma and result in a 
contradictory value system (Berger, 2011). To seek profit while ignoring regulations is 
prevalent in the securities industry. For a long time, insider trading and market 
manipulation were viewed as common activities in the operation of the stock market. 
Numerous reports in financial journals revealed that offenders conducted these illegal 
actions as customary practices in stock trading and imitated each other.  
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In summary, the implementation of rules for stockholder protection often meets 
resistance from institutional arrangements that are often the products of the collaboration 
between the government and interest groups to loot public investors, from business 
operational mechanisms that seek maximization of corporate benefits and ignore public 
investor interest, and from internal cultural influences that attach little stigma to securities 
offenders. To reduce the kind of cultural defects that hinder compliance with rules and 
enforcement of laws requires comprehensive engineering to cultivate legal awareness and 
rights consciousness for the ruling elites and common people, and ultimately form a 
healthy legal environment.  
Rights Consciousness of Chinese Public Stockholders 
The theories mentioned above, e.g., Dorn (2010) and Arup’s (2010) suggestion of 
a democratic approach to financial regulation, Coffee’s (2001) historical discourse of 
shareholder democracy, the conception of white-collar crime based on checking elite 
deviance, and so on, indicated the significance of rights consciousness and civic 
participation in fostering legal reform for financial market regulation. In China, the 
emerging stock market encountered undeveloped legal mechanisms, which is in urgent 
need to cultivate legal/rights consciousness of public investors and form a force to 
facilitate legal reforms.  
 Rights consciousness became a hot topic for scholars during the last two decades 
as the rise of collective protests in China caused wide attention. Collective protests in 
contemporary China were often viewed as signals of rising rights consciousness (Cai, 
2008; Chen, 2000; Guo, 2014; O’Brien and Li, 2006; Xia and Guan, 2014; Yang, 2013). 
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Especially in the era of the internet, online activists were regarded as a growing force for 
democratization, and Chinese government’s responsive stance toward online complaints 
also helped promote its legitimacy (G. Yang, 2013). Inconsistent with this kind of 
accounts, Perry (2008, p. 47) argued that the collective protests in contemporary China 
showed “rules consciousness” rather than “rights consciousness.” As Perry defines, rules 
consciousness indicates a demand for enforcement of existing laws and central policies, 
rather than challenging the legitimacy of state power and calling for participation in 
making laws (Li 2010, p. 4). Perry (2008, p. 46) articulated that these Chinese protests, 
often using words seen in political slogans and allowed officially, are “an affirmation 
rather than an affront to state power.” Perry also argued that the underlying motives of 
protests in contemporary China were not very different from those of rebels in the 
imperial China. Based on the protest statements of Anyuan retirees that Perry analyzed, 
Li (2010) made a different interpretation, suggesting that the protesters showed doubts 
about the central authorities and they just used a safer approach to claim their legal rights. 
Li Lianjiang (2010) argued that the mass protests in contemporary China transcended 
what Perry (2008) called rules consciousness and actually signaled the rising right 
consciousness.  
 As T. H. Marshall assumed, citizenship rights (civil, political, and social rights) 
are achieved through collective struggles of autonomous individuals and realized through 
institutionalization of rights (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992; Foweraker and Landman, 
1997, p. 1; Guo, 2014, p. 242-243). Citizenship rights consciousness is a process (Isin, 
2012) and status (Marshall and Bottomore,1992). According to the categories defined by 
T. Janoski (1998, p. 30), civil rights refer to passive rights, e.g. property rights, 
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procedural rights, and so on; political rights refer to active rights, e.g. the right to vote, 
the right to participate, and so on. As Perry (2008, p. 38) stated, different from that of the 
Anglo-American tradition, the conception of rights in Chinese political philosophy has 
been primarily concerned with social and economic rights including “the rights to 
subsistence and development” as the central point. The Chinese conception of rights 
tends to mean demands for specific benefits. The claims of Chinese stockholders show 
this kind of demand for specific economic interest. The collective stockholder struggles 
seem like what Guo (2014, p. 424) defines as “passive collective resistance,” applying 
legal procedures and other legal methods to claim their rights. 
 Studies on collective actions in contemporary China found that people were at 
first driven by their specific individual interest to participate in collective actions, and 
then the participation fostered their rights consciousness and led to democratic practices 
(Cai, 2008; Chen, 2000; O’Brien, 2006; Xia and Guan, 2014). As Xia and Guan (2014, p. 
418) argue, the self interest-oriented participation in the public sphere might be the main 
approach to fostering rights consciousness and cultivating democratic values in China, 
due to the shortage of cultural and traditional legacies for active participation in the 
public sphere. This self interest-driven approach applied to the collective actions of retail 
stockholders in China. Since stockholder claimants have common interest in stock 
investments and often have concretely measurable damages from securities offences, they 
are easily to join together and form public debates in fighting against securities crimes 
and frauds (Chen, 2003). Chen (2003, p. 451) argued that in China “capital markets are 
perhaps the most conducive to the formation of a politically powerful constituency and 
hence more aggressive legal change.”  
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 Public retail stockholders in China have grown to encompass a very large group, 
estimated to exceed one hundred million people (CSRC, 2014), and the majority of retail 
stockholders can be regarded as middle class in China. Rampant securities fraud, often 
resulting from the corruption of government officials and corporations, caused huge 
damage to stockholders and provoked their demands for right protection. Given the 
institutional defects, their claims for protection of economic benefits from stock 
investment often could not be realized through existing mechanisms. It needs further 
political reform and institutional construction to transform the role of the government, to 
prevent the collusion of the political and economic elites, and to reallocate benefits 
among market participants. This kind of passive collective resistance by stockholders 
would ultimately turn to foster active collective struggles for political rights.  
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S STOCK MARKET AND POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES OF MARKET REGULATIONS BEFORE THE STATE 
COUNCIL’S NINE OPINIONS 
Introduction 
 The stock market in the PRC was initiated within the context of the economic 
reform that has followed a gradual and pragmatic mode. In order to avoid strong 
resistance, the post-Mao government made an effort to find “blank spots” outside the 
original planned economic system and “new economic growth points” inside the original 
system to carry out reform experiments, and then gradually pushed ahead the 
establishment of a market economy to take the place of the old system (Wu, 2008; Y. Lu, 
2008, p. 9). This approach was also shown in the process of setting shareholding system 
that began with village and township enterprises, urban collective enterprises and then 
state-owned enterprises (Y. Lu, 2008). With the setting of a shareholding system, the 
desire to collect funds to solve the problem of capital shortage and establish the modern 
enterprise system called for the establishment of the stock market. At the end of 
December 1990, the P.R. China’s stock market was officially opened as the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SSE) were established.  
 In the beginning, the central government adopted risk-prevention macro policies 
over the stock market, while local governments developed concrete measures for the 
operation of the stock market. Local governments adopted policies and even actively 
participated in buying and selling stocks to intervene in rising and falling market (Kan, 
2010; Z. Wang, 2010; Y. Lu, 2008). The government’s intervention with the stock market 
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fostered speculation, manipulation and corruption in the stock market. A series of 
scandals, e.g., the Champaign case and the Shenzhen 8/10 event, facilitated the 
establishment of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Xinhuanet.com, 
2012). Then the central government made rules and developed state-controlled 
institutions to establish its leadership in regulating the stock market. 
  In 1995, the serious irregularities in speculation on 327 treasury-bond futures led 
to the closing of the financial products futures market in China. Furthermore, this event 
propelled the central government to centralize the regulatory power over the securities 
market and decrease the local governments’ influence on the stock market. The central 
government often influenced the stock market through adjusting new stock issuance, 
capital scales, stamp tax rates, stock transaction rules, and publishing articles in the 
mouthpiece media (Y. Lu, 2008). In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the regulation 
of the stock market concerned the central government. Serious securities frauds, e.g., the 
cases of Qiong Minyuan and Hong Guang, fostered creation of the Securities Law. The 
Chinese Securities Law was enacted on 12 December 1998, and became effective on 1 
July 1999, thereby nationally unifying regulation of the securities market. 
 Facilitated by the central government, the stock market rose swiftly on 19 May 
1999 and remained bullish for about two years. The exposure of a series of scandals, 
including the Zhongke Venture, Yi An, Yin Guanxia, East Electronic, and Jin Tian cases, 
shattered the miracle of the long bull market. Although the central government unified 
the market regulation and enacted related laws, this regulatory pattern did not improve 
the external oversight over the stock market. The serious scandals ruined the confidence 
of investors in the stock market and raised criticisms by scholars. Wu Jinglian’s “casino 
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theory” (2001) and Lang Xianping’s challenge about fraudulent schemes by the listed 
companies raised heated discussions and greatly influenced the Chinese stock market.   
 The rampant market abuses exposed the institutional defects of the Chinese stock 
market. Acting as a compromise between the reformers and the hardliners, the design of 
the split share system3 helped the passage of the proposal of establishing a shareholding 
system for state-owned enterprises and for listing them on the stock market. But this split 
share system hindered the stock market’s realization of the function of value discovery 
and caused problems of corporate governance. Ten years after the initiation of the stock 
market, the government made efforts to reduce non-tradable shares, but the attempts 
failed since its plans did not gain the support of investors. In addition, serious IPO fraud 
also revealed the dark side of the quota and approval system. In the very early stage, the 
quota and approval system was adopted to avoid over-heated stock issuance and 
fundraising (Pistor and Xu, 2005). But the excessive power of relevant officials and non-
transparent administrative operations bred corruption. These institutional defects coming 
from the previous planning economy system showed the influence of “path dependence” 
on the operation and regulation of the Chinese stock market (North, 1981; Bebchuck and 
Joe, 1999; Wu, 2001; Y. Lu, 2008, 2010). 
 The crazy speculation of stockholders reflected people’s thirst for wealth and 
success that was suddenly released after being oppressed for decades under the planned 
economy, but it also became a lure to market manipulators and other potential offenders. 
                                                           
3As is discussed later in this chapter, the split share system refers to the coexistence of tradable shares (individual 
shares) and non-tradable shares (state shares and institutional shares). Keeping the shares of state-owned assets, a state-
owned enterprise could issue additional shares to the public and only the set of shares that were issued to the public 
could be listed in the stock market. Only about 30 percent of shares of the listed company, called individual shares (Ge 
Ren Gu), were issued to the public and were listed as free-flowing shares on the stock exchanges; the majority (about 
70 percent) of the shares of the listed company was retained as state shares (Guo Jia Gu) and institutional shares (Fa 
Ren Gu) and could not be traded on the stock exchanges (Lu, 2010; Kan, 2010; Guthrie, 2012). 
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The high-profile cases brought stockholders risks and raised their rights consciousness. 
The struggles for interest protection indicated the growth of this consciousness. The case 
of Zhou Zhengyi was an example of how public opinion exerted pressure on the 
regulatory and judicial system. The emergence of civil compensation mechanisms also 
indicated a step forward in protection of stockholders.   
Stock Trading before the Establishment of a Planned Economy in the PRC 
 The history of stock trading in China traces back to the Qing Dynasty. Established 
in 1872, the China Merchants Steamship Company was the first joint-stock enterprise in 
China. The company issued stocks to the public to raise funds for developing the national 
industry. In 1882, the first Chinese stock trading company, Ping Zhun was opened in 
Shanghai (Yuan 2008). But only one year later, Ping Zhun Company was closed due to a 
turmoil caused by stock trading (Du, 2002). After that, there was no formal agency for 
stock trading in China until foreign businessmen organized a market named “Shanghai 
Shares Public Place” in 1891. A formal stock exchange in Shanghai was established in 
1905. After the Qing Dynasty collapsed, the Bei Yang Government enacted the Law of 
Securities Exchanges in 1914, allowing stock transactions. This was the first Chinese law 
on securities. In 1929, the Kuomintang Government enacted the Law of Exchanges. 
Although the Chinese stock market experienced ups and downs as times changed, 
Shanghai realized the prosperity of stock trading and was recognized as the Oriental 
financial center in the 1930s (ibid).  
 What is less well-known is that in the 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
government opened banks in the Red Zone they occupied, issuing bonds and stocks to 
collect funds to develop the local economy and support their army (T. Ba, 2001). Right 
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after the CCP took power, the government made relevant regulations—the Interim 
Measures for the Regulation of Securities Trading, the Measures for Brokers to Apply for 
Registration, the Measures for Delivery, and the Regulation of Stock Listing (X. Yu, 
2009). But these regulations lapsed soon due to subsequent socialist movements. In the 
early 1950s, the CCP government eliminated the stock market in the PRC. Once the CCP 
began building a socialist planned economy, the Chinese population was taught that “a 
stock market” was an arena for cruel capitalist competition and plundering.  
The Establishment of Shareholding System and Stock Issuance 
 In the late 1970s, the post-Mao government decided to carry out economic 
reforms to increase productivity and improve the people’s overall living conditions. To 
reform the old planned economic system, the post-Mao government adopted a path of 
gradualism and pragmatism to build a market economy. As Deng Xiaoping described 
metaphorically, the Chinese government has been “feeling stones to cross the river.” 
China’s economic reform began with economic decentralization, which meant the central 
government conceded some economic autonomy and interest to local governments and 
enterprises (Coase and Wang, 2012; Guthrie, 2012; Y. Lu, 2008). The economic 
decentralization gave local governments incentives to develop the economy, created 
competition among enterprises, and pushed local governments and enterprises to take 
responsibility for their activities. 
 As China’s economic reform was initiated in the rural areas, the seeds of the 
shareholding system also emerged in the countryside (Y. Lu, 2008). After the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in 
1978, the Household Responsibility System replaced the commune system in rural areas 
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and gave individuals incentives to increase productivity for personal benefit. As a result, 
the rural economy grew and individuals accumulated personal wealth. In the subsequent 
process of rural industrialization, the transformation of former communal enterprises 
faced a shortage of funds, and investments from the central and local governments could 
not meet the demand. Village and township enterprises began to collect funds in a way 
that allowed private investors to be shareholders of the enterprises. Then the central 
government put forward policies and administrative measures to encourage peasants to 
invest in rural enterprises. In July1983, Bao An Joint Investment Company, the first 
shareholding company in a rural area, was established. The majority of this company’s 
registered capital came from individual peasants living in Bao An County in Shenzhen 
(Yuan, 2008; Y. Lu, 2008).  
 In the meanwhile, some urban enterprises began to issue stocks to collect funds. It 
is said that the earliest stocks were issued by Chengdu Industrial Exhibition Trust 
Company in 1980 (Yuan, 2008). In 1984, the China National Economic Reform 
Commission published policies that allowed urban collective enterprises and small state-
owned enterprises to collect funds from their employees, and the employees could share 
benefits of the enterprises according to the proportions of their capital investments (Y. Lu, 
2008). Local governments began to experiment with a shareholding system in enterprise 
reforms. In July 1984, instructed by the Shanghai government, the Shanghai Branch of 
the China People’s Bank brought forward Provisional Regulations on the Administration 
of Issuing of Stocks, which allowed new collective enterprises to issue stocks. According 
to this regulation, those experimenting with issuing stocks in the early years were 
collective enterprises. In July 1984, Beijing Tian Qiao Department Store Joint Stock 
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Limited Company was established and issued three-year-term “stocks” to the public 
(Yuan, 2008; Y. Lu, 2010). These stocks with an associated term were really more like 
bonds.  In November 1984, Shanghai Fei Le Audio Company, the first shareholding 
company in Shanghai was established, issuing 10,000 shares of stock with the face value 
of 50 RMB per share (Kan, 2010; Y. Lu, 2010; Yuan, 2008).  
 Scenes of issuing stocks in public places are often described in books on the 
history of PRC’s stock market. The initial public offering of Shanghai Yan Zhong Joint 
Stock Company is one such example. Shanghai Yan Zhong Joint Stock Limited 
Company was a subdistrict-office-run collective enterprise. It planned to issue 100,000 
shares of stocks to collect 5,000,000 RMB (the face value of 50 RMB per share) in 
January 19854. The location for the issuing was at Shanghai Jing’an District Stadium. 
Concerned that the stocks might not sell out, Yan Zhong Company provided an apartment 
and other promotional incentives—buyers would get numbers for purchasing stocks (one 
number per share) which would make them eligible for a drawing with big prizes. 
Attracted by the promotions, huge crowds of people poured into Shanghai Jing’an 
District Stadium (Kan, 2010).  
  During this period, theorists began to search for a theoretical basis from Marxist 
works to justify the establishment of a shareholding system. In 1984, over twenty 
graduate students of the finance institute established by the People’s Bank of China 
worked together to write an article, “Discussions on the Strategy of China’s Financial 
Reform,” which first put forward the idea of initiating stock markets in the PRC (Y. Lu, 
2008; Z. Wang, 2010). In 1985, another article, “Socialist Society Needs Capital Markets,” 
was published in World Economic Herald. This article claims that socialist China needs 
                                                           
4 In January 1985, 1 USD equaled 2.8 RMB 
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capital markets including stock markets, which through transferring property rights can 
concentrate funds in the industrial domains that could produce the highest economic 
benefits. Actually, transactions of land and enterprise ownership were common 
phenomena in rural areas; they were also common in Guangdong and other coastal areas 
where state-owned enterprises collected funds from collective units and individuals. Thus, 
the establishment of the securities market was just a way to acknowledge the existing 
property rights transactions (Ding, 1985).   
 Interestingly, in July 1985, James Tobin, an important American economist and 
Nobel Prize winner, stated in a famous conference that China would not be ready to open 
stock markets for at least twenty years (Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010). Although it still 
remains to be seen whether Tobin’s suggestion was right, the Chinese government did not 
stop exploring the feasibility of opening stock markets in the near future. In November 
1986, a Sino-US conference on financial markets was held in Beijing, which the Chinese 
media titled “Wall Streeter Brings Financial Markets to the People’s Great Hall in 
Beijing” (Ruan, 1986). After the conference, Deng Xiaoping gave the then president of 
the New York Stock Exchange a share of the Fei Le Company. This was probably the 
first foreign transfer of stock in the PRC and demonstrated the Chinese leader’s support 
for Chinese enterprises issuing stocks (Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010). In March 1988, a 
number of overseas Chinese scholars submitted suggestions regarding advancing the 
legalization and regulation of a Chinese securities market. 
 Since the mid 1980’s, the central government launched a series of policies to 
foster building a shareholding system in large-medium state-owned enterprises across the 
fields of industry, commerce, real estate, and finance. In 1986, Shanghai Zhen Kong 
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Electronic Devices Joint Stock Company became the first large state-owned enterprise 
that experimented with a shareholding system in Shanghai. Zhen Kong Company issued 
stocks worth 50 million RMB; thus, its capital was comprised of state-owned, collective, 
and private capital (Y. Lu, 2008). Although thousands of businesses issued stocks, most 
stocks were not publicly tradable. In September 1986, Jing An Securities Department of 
Shanghai Trust and Investment Company (owned by China Industry and Commerce 
Bank) was opened, becoming the first stock trading agency in the PRC. At its opening, 
there were only two listed tradable stocks, issued by Shanghai Fei Le Audio Company 
and Shanghai Yan Zhong Company, respectively. Nevertheless, the opening of Jing An 
Securities Department announced the return of stock trading that had been suspended for 
37 years in China (Kan, 2010).  
 However, since the stock market in a real sense was not formed and stock prices 
remained the same for a long time, it was not easy for investors to profit from stock 
trading. As a result, the passion for stock trading lasted only a short time. In 1987, the 
reformed Bank of Communications became the first national state-owned joint-stock 
commercial bank. The first professional securities firm, the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone Securities Firm, was established in Shenzhen (Z. Wang, 2010). In 1988, Shenyin 
Securities Company, Wanguo Securities Company, and Haitong Securities Company 
were established in Shanghai; as a result, the early over-the-counter (OTC) market for 
securities transactions was formed (Kan, 2010; Y. Lu, 2008; Yuan, 2008). By the end of 
1988, an estimated 16,000 shareholding enterprises emerged in China, collecting funds 
surpassing 60 billion RMB through stocks (Y. Lu, 2008). 
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 In its national congress held in September 1988, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) confirmed its resolution to further develop a shareholding system in enterprise 
reforms and pointed out: “…shareholding system with public ownership remaining 
predominant is not privatization, but to transform the abstract ownership to the concrete 
one…”5 But the central government showed hesitation about when to open a formal stock 
market, although the local governments actively prepared for the establishment of a 
formal stock market to meet the need to develop enterprises. At that time, the dual-track 
price system (a coexistence of state fixed price and the market price) caused economic 
chaos and social unrest, e.g., speculation and forcing up of prices. Moreover, 
conservative hardliners began political debates on anti-capitalist liberalization. This led 
the central government to rein in the opening of formal stock markets (J. Zhang, 2001).  
 Unexpectedly, a political tumult became the catalyst for the central government’s 
decision to open stock exchanges. After the outbreak of the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
Event6, Western countries imposed political and economic sanctions against China. The 
Chinese central government and the CCP decided to adopt some measures to show their 
stance of continuing economic reform to regain positive recognition by the international 
community (Y. Lu, 2008; Kan, 2010). At the end of 1989, in a meeting regarding 
financial reform in Shanghai, Zhu Rongji, the then mayor of Shanghai, emphasized the 
priorities of the government to invite foreign banks and establish a stock exchange in 
Shanghai (Kan, 2010). At this meeting, the Shanghai government decided to open a stock 
exchange in December 1990 when the chairwoman of the Hong Kong Trade and 
                                                           
5 See “Data Base of All National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party” in official website of People’s Daily 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65385/4441840.html 
6 In June 1989, the Chinese government used force to crush the student movement that began at the Tiananmen Square 
in Beijing. 
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Development Bureau would visit Shanghai. This measure was supported by the central 
government. At the same time, the Shenzhen government was also actively preparing the 
opening of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
The Emergence of Large-Scale Black Markets of Stock Trading 
 By 1990, Shanghai had eight tradable stocks issued by local companies, and 
Shenzhen had five (Kan, 2010; Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010; Yuan, 2008). The 1989 
Tiananmen Square Event caused stock transactions to decline greatly; thus, about sixty 
percent of tradable stocks lay idle in the securities company (Kan, 2010). The central 
government’s decision to further economic reform and open stock exchanges again raised 
people’s passion for stock trading and boosted the stock prices. The Shanghai Branch of 
the China People’s Bank worried that the overheated stock trading would cause trouble 
and give hardliners a reason to oppose the opening of stock exchanges. To curb the sharp 
rise of stock prices, a notice from the Shanghai Trust Investment Company of the Bank of 
Industry and Commerce established a delay of delivery date, set limits for stock prices 
going up or down, required investors to show their IDs, and informed investors of the 
risks of the stock market. The Shenzhen government also took measures to calm down 
stock trading (Yuan, 2008) 
 But the measures did not restrain the overheated stock trading. Due to the 
provision of limits for stock prices going up or down, the selling of stocks in official 
agencies could not match the desire for purchasing stocks. The imbalance of stock selling 
and purchasing, combined with speculation by some investors, led to formation of a 
large-scale black market for stock trading.  Take the Dian Zhen Kong stock as an 
example. In official securities agencies, its listed price was 110 RMB, while its black 
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market price exceeded 400 RMB (Yuan, 2008; Kan, 2010). Especially in public places 
around the official securities agencies, scalpers (in Chinese called “yellow cows”) were 
standing in roads to solicit passersby to participate in stock trading. Sometimes, the 
crowds in this black market even caused traffic jams. To fight the black-market 
transactions, official securities agencies provided rules for stock transfers, e.g. both the 
buyer and seller must show their ID. But scalpers bribed the staff of some securities 
companies to ignore the rules in dealing with stock transfers. This was also a main reason 
why black-market stock trading was rampant. There were cases in which a departmental 
chief and members of the staff of Haitong Securities Company were arrested for 
accepting bribes from scalpers (Kan, 2010). The black market lasted until the opening of 
the stock exchange, which announced the beginning of a formal stock market in the PRC. 
The Establishment of Formal Stock Markets and the Split Share System    
 The heated ideological debates on the nature of the stock market, whether it was 
socialist or capitalist, had interrupted the process of establishing the formal stock market. 
At that time, the primary consideration for those supporting the establishment of a stock 
market was how the proposal to open stock markets could be passed, rather than what the 
stock market should be (Y. Lu, 2008). As a compromise between the reformers and the 
hardliners, a split share system was adopted; that is, keeping the shares of state-owned 
assets, a state-owned enterprise could issue additional shares to the public and only the 
set of shares that were issued to the public could be listed in the stock market. Only about 
30 percent of shares of the listed company, called individual shares (Ge Ren Gu), were 
issued to the public and were listed as free-flowing shares on the stock exchanges; the 
majority (about 70 percent) of the shares of the listed company were retained as state 
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shares (Guo Jia Gu) and institutional shares (Fa Ren Gu) and could not be traded on the 
stock exchanges (Y. Lu, 2010; Kan, 2010; Guthrie, 2012). In December 1990, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was opened for business. The Shenzhen government 
decided to start the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in December 1990 while trying to get the 
central government’s approval. In mid-1991, the central government permitted the 
opening of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Local Government’s Intervention into the Stock Market  
 In the beginning of the formal Chinese stock market, the central government 
seemed to stay behind the scenes, while the local governments managed the two stock 
exchanges. Local governments, enterprises, and individual investors were highly 
motivated and assumed active roles in running the stock market. The central government 
adopted risk-prevention macro policies over the stock market. Local governments and 
stock exchanges adopted concrete measures for the operation of the stock market. A 
unified national stock market did not appear at that time. 
 In January 1991, the Shenzhen government established the Stock Market 
Regulation Fund to prevent radical rises or falls of the stock market (Y. Lu 2008). The 
Fund’s capital came from the stamp tax on stock transactions, issuing shares at a 
premium, fund interest and other revenues. The Shenzhen Municipal Finance Bureau, the 
Municipal Commission for Economic Restructuring, and the Municipal Supervision 
Bureau assigned representatives to take charge of the Fund. When the stock market was 
down that year, the Shenzhen government carried out a secret bailout plan. Under 
instruction by the Shenzhen government, the SZSE managed the stock of Shen Fa Zhan, a 
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major stock that was regarded as a sensitive barometer of the stock market. Using 200 
million RMB from the Stock Market Regulation Fund and other institutions, including 
money from Shen Fa Zhan Corporation, the SZSE bought huge volumes of Shen Fa Zhan 
shares and thus raised its price. At the same time, the Shenzhen government decreased 
the rate of the stamp tax on stock transactions. The measures successfully regained the 
confidence of stock investors and boosted the stock market. The Stock Market Regulation 
Fund was the first government-led fund to step into the stock market. With the Fund, the 
Shenzhen government participated in buying and selling stocks to adjust market indexes 
and to intervene in market rises and falls. 
 As admitted later by Yu Guogang, general director of this bailout plan and vice 
general manager of the SZSE, this bailout plan did not follow economic principles; rather, 
saving the nascent stock market was the foremost priority at that time (G. Yu, 2000). The 
government might have taken this kind of measure with a good intention, but its actions 
of centralizing huge amounts of money to boost some stock prices violated the principle 
that the stock market must reflect the growth of the real economy and realize the best 
allocation of capital. The government also set a bad example for market manipulators to 
rig the market by applying huge amounts of money to boost the stock prices. In this 
bailout, Shen Fa Zhan Corporation (under instructions by the government) used its 
money to raise its own stock prices. Usually, it is not lawful for a company to use its 
money to buy its stock to raise its stock price. But at that time, there was not a law or 
regulation prohibiting this kind of action, and the government was eager to raise the stock 
market by boosting the Shen Fa Zhen stock. The bailout also created an image that the 
government would not let the market fall. Although the bailout caused the market to rise 
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in a short time and seemed to regain investors’ confidence quickly, the approach the 
government adopted to affect the market created a grey zone for market abuses and 
irregularities. In the long run, it was not good for the healthy development of the market 
and the formation of rational investors.   
People’s Thirst for Stocks  
 In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited a few southern Chinese cities to show his 
support for the reformers. His speeches in this famous southern tour reconfirmed that 
China should stay on the path of economic reform. He mentioned his attitude toward the 
stock market as follows: 
Are securities and the stock market good or bad? Do they entail dangers? Are they 
peculiar to capitalism? Can socialism make use of them? We allow people to 
reserve their judgment, but we try these things out. If, after one or two years of 
experimentation, they prove feasible, we can expand them. Otherwise, we can put 
a stop to them and be done with it. We can stop them all at once or gradually, 
totally or partially. What is there to be afraid of? So long as we keep this attitude, 
everything will be all right, and we shall not make any major mistakes. (Deng 
1993, p. 373) 
 Deng’s address has been regarded as ammunition for reformers interested in 
experimenting with the securities industry. This confirmation that the economic reform 
policies were accepted by the central government fueled the fever for stock investment. 
According to a survey organized by Shanghai Fudan University in early 1992, 79.35% of 
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individual investors expressed an interest in buying stocks but were unable to obtain them, 
and 83.62% of stockholders showed an interest in purchasing more stocks but were 
unsuccessful due to the insufficient supply of shares available for purchase (Yuan, 2008). 
Although the Shanghai government had already carried out an adjustment tax on the 
income from stock by individuals in 1991, this measure did not curb people’s thirst for 
stocks. 
The Champaign Case 
 The first financial fraud in the PRC’s stock market was the Champaign case. 
Shenzhen Champaign Industrial Corporation was one of the only five companies listed on 
the SZSE when it was opened at the end of 1990, and also the first Sino-foreign joint 
venture listed on the PRC’s stock market. Early in February 1990, Champaign Industrial 
made its initial public offering (IPO) with a share price of 10 RMB. In a short time, 
Champaign Industrial appeared as a star in the nascent stock market (Xinhuanet.com, 
2010). On 10 March 1991, Champaign’s board of directors publicized its 1990 financial 
report, posting the pre-tax profit of about 32 million RMB, 29 times the profit of 1989 
(Yuan, 2008).   
 On 7 April 1992, the People’s Bank of China Shenzhen Branch requested the 
creditors of Champaign to send their representatives to help check the company’s 
finances, clarify its profit, and set repayment plans. At the same time, authorities blocked 
Champaign’s accounts and detained two of its managers. On 4 May, the Shanghai 
Securities News announced this event. Actually, the authorities had begun to investigate 
Champaign for its financial misstatement and unreasonable capital outflow at the end of 
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1990. But it took more than a year before Champaign’s scandals were exposed to the 
public. After the authorities adopted measures, Champaign filed a suit against the 
People’s Bank of China Shenzhen Branch and Shenzhen Municipal Administration for 
Industry and Commerce in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court for restricting the 
personal freedom of Champaign’s managers. The Intermediate Court made a judgment 
that the police had the legal right to put the managers in detention for the investigation. 
Champaign then appealed to the Guangdong Provincial High People’s Court.  
 On 15 June 1992, the Wall Street Journal published the article “One of China’s 
Listed Firms Faces Crisis,” exposing the story of Peng Jiandong’s fortune (Wall Street 
Journal, 1992). Peng Jingdong, founder and president of Champaign, obtained a huge 
fortune from the transactions of Champaign and its stock issuance to public. As revealed, 
Champaign made a profit of only $287,000 in 1989, but that same year, Peng Jiandong 
purchased a two-million USD house in Sidney. This young upstart and his 28-year-old 
wife lived in this luxury home with Rolls Royces and servants. Champaign also 
purchased a pasture in Australia in 1989, but this pasture lost Champaign $396,735 by the 
end of 1990. After Champaign made its IPO in February 1990, it entered the fields of 
textile, trading, and real estate, earning a profit of $6.4 million that year. An executive of 
Panco (an institutional shareholder of Champaign) admitted that a large proportion of 
income of Champaign in 1990 came from stock trading. Champaign did not give 
dividends to stockholders in 1990. But the same year, Peng Jiandong bought a HK$44 
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million7 (about 5.64 million USD) seaside house in Hong Kong. In 1991, Peng Jiandong 
obtained Australian citizenship.  
 Confronted with the authorities’ measures against it, Champaign asserted that it 
was investigated because it had rejected some government officials’ requests for its 
shares. Champaign also publicized in Hong Kong and foreign media that it encountered 
official harassment, and asked for “international interventions” to protect its interests 
(Wall Street Journal, 1992; Xiao, 2010). On 20 June 1992, the People’s Bank of China 
Shenzhen Branch announced the conclusion of its investigation, stating that Champaign 
broke the law severely. As the investigation found, Panco transferred foreign currency 
worth more than 100 million RMB8 owned by Champaign to the affiliated companies. 
The same day, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Shenzhen Branch sued 
Champaign for its overdue bank loans of 200 million RMB and 3 million USD. A few 
days later, Champaign encountered another suit filed by the Agricultural Bank Shenzhen 
Branch for its overdue bank loan of 5 million USD. On 7 July 1992, Champaign stock 
was suspended on the SZSE.  
The Outcome of the Champaign Case 
 On 9 March 1993, the Shenzhen government formed a special group to guide the 
restructuring of Champaign. The public stockholders pinned their hopes on the 
government. The special group concluded that from 1987 to 1991, Champaign changed 
its equity structure without authorization, misrepresented its capital, adjusted assets on 
financial accounts, and faked its profits. For example, as shown on its financial accounts, 
                                                           
7 In 1990, 1 USD was equal to 7.8 HK$. 
8 In 1990, 1 USD was equal to 4.76 RMB. 
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Champaign’s cumulative profit from 1989 to 1991amounted to 77,425,000 RMB. 
Actually, Champaign had great losses these three years. Champaign also increased its 
profit through illegally selling its shares on the stock market. For example, in 1990, 
Champaign sold its original shares that were under the name of its subsidiaries, earned 32 
million RMB from this transaction and recorded it as profit for the term (Wang, 2004). 
Within five years, the Shenzhen Special Zone Accounting Firm and other accounting and 
auditing firms in charge of checking Champaign’s finances issued seventy-five reports to 
verify its financial statements. After the financial fraud of Champaign was exposed, those 
accounting and auditing firms were investigated by the China National Association of 
Chartered Accountants and the government authorities, and responsible accountants and 
auditors were seriously punished (M. Wang, 2004).  
 Based on their conclusions, the special group decided to deprive Panco of its 
Champaign shares since the capital Panco invested in Champaign had not been approved 
by relevant authorities and had not been registered. The huge amount of funds that Panco 
transferred from Champaign constituted the proof of Peng Jiandong’s criminal activities. 
The shares previously owned by Panco were assigned to a state-owned enterprise, the 
Shenzhen City Construction Development Corporation, which would join the operation 
of Champaign. Thus, these shares became state-owned shares held by the Development 
Corporation. On 7 May 1993, the Guangdong Provincial High People’s Court ruled that 
Champaign should repay the overdue bank loans and pay the fines. Through the 
management of the special group, some subsidiaries of Champaign resumed production 
and operation. On 5 September 1993, hosted by the special group, a meeting of 
shareholders of Champaign Company was held to discuss significant changes of the 
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company. On 29 December 1993, Champaign was restructured and renamed Shenzhen 
Fountain Corporation (Shi Ji Xing Yuan). The Fountain Corporation took over 
Champaign’s rights and responsibilities, and the stockholders of Champaign changed 
their shares to Fountain shares. On 4 January 1994, Fountain Corporation resumed being 
listed on the SZSE.   
 On 6 November 1993, Peng Jiandong was arrested in Hong Kong, accused of 
embezzlement and illegal transfer of funds overseas, and returned to mainland China. On 
28 September 1995, Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court convicted Peng Jiandong of 
embezzlement and misappropriation (Xinhuanet.com, 2012; Xiao, 2010; Yuan, 2008). He 
was sentenced to 16 years of imprisonment and deportation due to his status as an 
Australian citizen, which meant that he would not be imprisoned. In addition, his illicit 
money of 290,000 RMB was confiscated. Peng Jiandong appealed to the Guangdong 
Provincial High People’s Court, and his appeal was rejected. After this case, Peng 
Jiandong disappeared from the public eye until 5 January 2006, when the Hong Kong 
Supreme Court rejected Peng Jiandong’s claim for compensation by the majority 
shareholder and the board of directors of Fountain Corporation.   
 The Champaign case occurring in the nascent stock market exemplified the 
typical schemes frequently employed by manipulators (Zhuang Jia) to rig the market, 
such as financial reporting fraud, insider trading, corporate reorganization, and so on. The 
authorities adopted administration-led restructuring to deal with Champaign. The listing 
of Fountain in place of Champaign purported to help the stable growth of the nascent 
stock market and protect the interest of stock investors. But listed companies with such 
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continued losses should be removed from the stock market according to relevant laws, 
such as the Provisional Regulation on Stock Issuance and Trading. The administrative 
measures to restructure Champaign and resume its listing did not follow market 
principles and violated the laws (Yuan, 2008). The administrative measures might not be 
good for the operation of Fountain Corporation. In addition, it did not help establish the 
strict regulation for companies to get in and out of the stock market. Moreover, the 
administration-led approach seemed to benefit those stock investors of Champaign, but it 
did not help investors form risk awareness that is critical to a healthy stock market.   
The Shenzhen 8/10 Event 
 In August 1992, the Shenzhen government decided to sell 5,000,000 share 
subscription application forms on 10 and 11 August. Li Hao, Shenzhen municipal party 
secretary, said the government planned to use the estimated 1 billion RMB in earnings 
from the sale of 10 million forms to build roads (Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 2008). As 
provided by the government, every person with his/her ID on hand could buy ten forms 
that entitled him/her to draw lots to get shares that would be issued in the SZSE within a 
year. Beginning on 7 August, huge numbers of people from different regions swarmed 
into Shenzhen. As reported by the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, approximately 1.5 
million people crowded into this southern city that had only 600,000 residents. Some 
even carried big sacks full of ID cards they bought in the countryside (Shenzhen Special 
Zone Daily, 2008). On 7 August, people camped out in long queues. In the afternoon of 
10 August, it was announced that the forms were sold out. Thousands of people were not 
able to purchase a form, but they did not leave and continued to wait. At the same time, 
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the speculation of forms was so crazy that forms worth 100 RMB were resold by scalpers 
for as much as 500 to 800 RMB.  
 Before long, Hong Kong media revealed the pictures featuring the corrupt 
practices in selling application forms. This publicity quickly outraged the crowd of 
waiting people. Protests broke out with slogans such as “down with corruption” and 
“demand for fairness and against cheating” (Financial Times, 1992; New York Times, 
1992). Protestors were marching toward the Shenzhen city hall. At midnight, protestors 
destroyed several vehicles, including police cars. Due to the chaos, Shenzhen municipal 
party secretary, Hao Li, hurriedly ordered the Shenzhen government to sell 5 million 
more share application forms and promised to punish those guilty of corruption. Once 
this governmental decision was announced, the crowd immediately calmed down. As 
Hao Li admitted later, the government’s policies allowing the risk-free purchase of initial 
shares and the procedures of selling forms were defective and directly responsible for the 
crazy speculation (Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 2008).   
 A few days after this incident, the Shenzhen government formed an investigative 
office that was led by the mayor and comprised of 130 government officials. Their 
investigation found that over 100,000 share application forms were held back by the staff 
of financial institutions in charge of selling forms, the supervisory personnel, and 
government officers. According to the report, 4,180 persons were engaged in various 
degrees of corruption. In the end, the central government announced that the vice mayor 
took direct responsibility for the incident and other chief officers were also implicated (J. 
Zhang 2001). The Shenzhen municipal party secretary and mayor were removed and 
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assigned to other posts. Zhu Rongji, the Chinese vice Premier, called the 8/10 event a 
“technical problem out of control” (J. Zhang, 2001).  
The Foundation of the CSRC 
 The Champaign scandal and the Shenzhen 8/10 event caused the central 
government to promptly establish the China Securities Regulatory Commission and set 
about a national unified regulation of the nascent stock market (Xinhuanet.com, 2012). 
The central government began to develop state-controlled securities companies. With 
these institutional agencies, the central government intended to take an active part in 
securities trading and establish its leadership in regulating the stock market. In September 
1992, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and 
China Construction Bank took the initiative to found three state-backed big securities 
companies: Hua Xia Securities Company, Nan Fang Securities Company, and Guo Tai 
Securities Company, each of which had registered capital of 1 billion RMB (Kan, 2010; 
Y. Lu, 2008).  
 In October 1992, the Securities Commission of the State Council was formed, 
with Zhu Rongji as the director. Its working body was the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). The CSRC adopted a quota and approval system for stock issuance 
(Pistor and Xu, 2005; Y. Lu, 2008). In accordance with economic demands and 
conditions of capital markets in the country, the CSRC determined the yearly total quota 
of stock issuance for the entire country. Then, the CSRC assigned different quotas to 
provincial regions and departments on the basis of their respective demands, status, and 
situations. Within the quota limit, provincial governments and departments recommended 
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enterprises to the CSRC. Lastly, the CSRC examined and decided whether to approve 
stock issuance by the recommended enterprises. Taking a lesson from the 8/10 event, 
stock issuance procedures were reformed; e.g., the number of share application forms for 
drawing lots was unlimited, shares subscription were applied through the trading system 
of stock exchanges, and so on.  
  Practically concurrent with the founding of the CSRC, the Fourteenth Party 
Congress in October 1992 officially confirmed that a socialist market economy should be 
established in the PRC. This signaled a victory for reformists in political and ideological 
debates and showed the central government’s resolve to develop the market economy. To 
regulate the stock market, the central government enacted the Provisional Regulation for 
the Stock Issue and Trading, Provisional Measures for Forbidding Securities Fraud, and 
Rules for Implementation of Information Disclosure of Companies Issuing Stock Publicly. 
On 13 December 1992, the State Council issued the Circular on Further Strengthening 
Macro-Management of the Stock Market. 
The First Bailout by the CSRC 
 In November 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the 
Chinese Community Party was held, finally confirming the national goal of establishing a 
modern enterprise system in China. The central government facilitated experiments with 
a shareholding system for state-owned enterprises. To help state-owned enterprises get 
out of difficult situations, e.g., capital shortage and poor performance, the central 
government drew a batch of state-owned enterprises into the stock market. This expanded 
the scale of the stock market swiftly, but the rapid expansion brought great pressure on 
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the stock market. On 30 July 1994, Xinhua News published the article “The CSRC and 
Related Departments of the State Council Adopted Measures to Stabilize and Develop the 
Stock Market.” Through this article, the CSRC announced three bailout plans: 
suspending new stock issuance and listing that year, controlling the scale of share 
allotment of listed companies, and expanding the scale of capital getting into the stock 
market (e.g., allowing securities companies to collect money and found Sino-foreign joint 
funds). Immediately responding to the bailout, each of the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
composite indexes rose by 33.46% on 1 August 1994. Financial media also 
sensationalized the rising of the stock market. Since that time, adjusting new stock 
issuance, capital scales, stamp tax rates, and stock transaction rules have become 
important measures adopted by the central government to affect the stock market (Y. Lu, 
2008). Liu Hongru, the first president of the CSRC, admitted that regulatory departments 
should build an open, just, and fair environment for stock trading and should not violate 
market principles to affect stock prices, but the CSRC stepped into the stock market 
under heavy political pressure. For example, when the SSE composite index dropped to 
300 or so, the Shanghai government was worried that crazy stock investors who had great 
losses would cause incidents and submitted an official request to the central government 
to raise the market. Out of concern about the social stability, the central government 
required the CSRC to adopt measures to raise the stock market (Zheng, 2006).  
The 327 Scandal 
 On 28 December 1992, the SSE created the treasury-bond futures market, which 
was accepted by the central government. The SSE set a low threshold for bond futures 
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investors. Investors were required to provide only 1% of the transaction value as deposit9 
(Davis and Yu, 1995). As the inflation rate exceeded 20% in 1993, the Chinese People’s 
Bank increased the interest rate for three-year bank deposits and offered inflationary 
subsidy to treasury bonds (Y. Lu, 2008; Yuan, 2008; Kan, 2010). The rate for inflationary 
subsidy would vary according to economic conditions and would be announced monthly. 
The uncertainty of the inflationary subsidy rate and the asymmetry of information 
obtained by market participants increased room for speculation on bond futures.  
 The crazy speculation of bond futures trading peaked in the 327 event that was 
called “the biggest scandal ever” in Chinese securities market (Davis and Yu, 1995). 
Bonds 327 were three-year treasury bonds that were issued in 1992, with a face value of 
RMB100 each and coupon rate of 9.5%, and would expire in June 1995. That meant the 
sum total of principal plus interest of each bond 327 would be RMB128.5 on the due date 
if the coupon rate remained. When bonds 327 were issued, the three-year bank deposit 
rate was 8.28%. But in July 1993, as the inflation rate exceeded 20%, the central bank 
increased the three-year deposit rate to 12.24%. If still at the coupon rate of 9.5%, the 
return on bonds 327 would be too low. Thus, it was said that the Chinese Finance 
Ministry would provide an additional inflationary subsidy to increase the return on bonds 
327, and would pay RMB148 each on the due date. Guan Jinsheng, the general manager 
of Shanghai International Securities Company (Wan Guo), did not believe this “rumor” 
because he thought the inflation would decrease in 1995, and the Finance Ministry would 
not spend 1.6 billion RMB on inflationary subsidies for bonds 327 (Yuan, 2008). He 
assumed huge volumes of new treasury bonds would be issued in 1995 (Davis and Yu, 
                                                           
9 For example, to buy futures contracts with a total face value of RMB 1 million, an investor only needed to offer RMB 
10,000. In 1994, 1 USD equaled 8.7 RMB 
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1995). Guan thought the price of futures contract of bond 327 would fall, thus Wan Guo 
acted as the biggest one of the bears shorting10 the market.  
 Guan Jinsheng was called the “Godfather of China’s securities industry” at that 
time (Yuan, 2008). He was born in the remote countryside of Jiangxia Province in China, 
and graduated from Shanghai Foreign Language University. After the Great Cultural 
Revolution, Guan was sent to Europe for advanced study and obtained two master’s 
degrees in international business and international law, respectively, from Brussels 
University in 1983. He returned to Shanghai, and a few years later was appointed as the 
general manager of Wan Guo, the first joint-stock securities company in Shanghai (Yuan, 
2008). In his first year as general manager, Wan Guo performed amazingly and became 
the leading enterprise in China’s securities industry. Its turnovers of securities trading 
skyrocketed from RMB 300 million in 1989 to RMB 1,970 million in 1990, RMB 4,610 
million in 1991, and to RMB 8,990 million in 1992. Among the 270 member firms on the 
SSE, Wan Guo was number one in terms of securities trading volume, holding 17.6% of 
the total turnover of the SSE in 1992 (Yuan, 2008). The success of Wan Guo could not be 
achieved without Guan Jinsheng’s resolute decisions. As described, Guan was ambitious 
and lacked a sense of risk (Yuan, 2008; Davis and Yu, 1995). These characters helped 
him become outstanding in this market laden with speculative craze and lack of 
regulation. But this time, he met a hard rival in trading futures contracts for bond 327. 
 The China Economic Development Trust and Investment Company (Zhong Jing 
Kai), an affiliate of the Chinese Finance Ministry, was a big bull11 in trading futures 
                                                           
10 On the securities market, bears (shorts) are investors who expect prices to fall and sell now, in order to buy later at a 
lower price and earn profit in a falling market. 
11 On the securities market, bulls (longs) are investors who expect prices to rise and buy now, in order to sell later at a 
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contracts of bond 327. Zhong Jing Kai was founded on 26 April 1988, as the only trust 
company owned solely by the Chinese Finance Ministry. The first and the only president 
of Zhong Jing Kai was the former vice minister of the Finance Ministry, and all the 
general managers of Zhong Jing Kai were officials from the Finance Ministry (Ling and 
Li, 2002). Zhong Jing Kai was regarded as nobility in the Chinese financial industry. The 
dealer of Zhong Jing Kai in bond futures 327 trading was Wei Dong, whose father was a 
professor of the Central Finance and Economics University as well as a senior advisor to 
the Finance Ministry (Yuan, 2008). On the morning of 23 February 1995, the Finance 
Ministry announced that it would increase the coupon rate for bond 327. Zhong Jing Kai 
bought huge volumes and raised the price of future contracts of bond 327 to RMB150 
each. The Liaoning Guo Fa Group, which had collaborated with Wan Guo to short the 
market, began to change its direction and buy in 327 contracts. The price of each contract 
327 rose by RMB 3.77 in only ten minutes. The SISCO was facing huge losses of RMB 
six billion. 
 Under the great pressure, Guan Jinsheng made a reckless move. In the last eight 
minutes before the market closed, Wan Guo sold 10,560,000 lots of contract 327, with 
the total nominal value of RMB 211.2 billion. The entire issue of treasury bonds 327 was 
only RMB 24 billion. The Wan Guo order went through although it far exceeded the 
contract limit of 300,000 lots set by the SSE. As the SSE said, Wan Guo made it because 
the exchange’s computer system was designed for share trading and could not detect this 
violation in bond futures transactions (Davis and Yu, 1995). The huge amount of selling 
contracts suppressed the price of contract 327 to RMB147.50 at the closure of the market 
                                                                                                                                                                             
higher price and earn profit in a surging market;  
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before the bulls could react. Wan Guo could have earned a profit of RMB 42 billion at 
this price. But at 11pm or so, the SSE announced that the trades in the last eight minutes 
were invalid for violating rules, and contract 327 closed at RMB151.30. Then Wan Guo 
was suspended and investigated for its irregularities in trading contracts 327. On 19 May 
1995, Guan Jinsheng was arrested. On 20 September 1995, the Chinese Supervision 
Ministry and the CSRC published their conclusion of the investigation on the 327 scandal, 
determining that the irregularities of Wan Guo and Liaoning Guofa Group caused the 327 
scandal. On 3 February 1997, Guan Jinsheng was convicted of embezzlement and bribery, 
and sentenced to 17 years imprisonment (Kan, 2010; Z. Wang, 2010; Yuan, 2008). 
 The 327 scandal shocked the securities market. Three days after its occurrence, 
the CSRC and the Finance Ministry jointly issued the Provisional Measures Regarding 
the Regulation of Treasury Bond Futures Trading. In the following two months, the 
CSRC, the SSE, and other relevant departments issued more than thirty administrative 
decisions about the regulation of the state bond futures market. But during this period, a 
series of irregularities still happened in the treasury bond futures market. Finally, on 17 
May 1995, the CSRC issued the Urgent Notice Regarding the Suspension of Experiments 
of Treasury Bond Futures Trading, suspending the treasury bond futures market 
indefinitely. The close of the bond futures market drove investors and speculators back to 
the share market. 
 The 327 case exposed technical problems in regulating the treasury bond futures 
market, such as the low deposit requirement, no limits for price movements, lack of 
position limit, and so on (Y. Lu, 2008). In addition, this scandal touched on the 
information asymmetry that tended to result in insider trading (Y. Lu, 2008). Whether the 
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return rate of treasury bonds would increase was determined by the decision of the 
Finance Ministry on inflationary subsidy. Zhong Jing Kai’s close connection with the 
Finance Ministry naturally caused doubts about insider trading in the 327 scandal. In 
actuality, the Finance Ministry’s plan of increasing the payment of bonds 327 was let out 
before the official disclosure. This secret was exposed by the financial media after Zhong 
Jing Kai was closed by the central government in 2002 for violating laws on a serious 
scale (Ling and Li, 2002). The official investigation on the 327 case did not mention the 
defects of the information closure system, but after this event, the central government 
changed its former ways and improved the timeliness of publication and implementation 
of the decisions regarding finance and securities markets (Y. Lu, 2008). As Yi Lu (2008) 
argues, the 327 scandal became the turning point, after which the government began to 
employ more market-oriented methods than commanding means to regulate the market. 
 Although there is no evidence to demonstrate that the 327 scandal resulted from a 
fight between the central government and Shanghai government, it indicated the conflict 
between the two. It seemed that the aggressive actions of local governments and 
irregularities of their affiliate companies challenged the authority of the central 
government. After the 327 scandal, the central government began to decrease the local 
governments’ influence and adjust the regulatory structure on the stock market. A direct 
consequence of the 327 scandal was a change of actual leadership of the securities 
industry (Y. Lu, 2008). After the 327 scandal, Liu Hongru, the first president of the 
CSRC, quit the position at the end of March 1995; the general managers of the SSE and 
the SZSE were relieved of their posts in a few months. On 21 August 1996, the State 
Council Securities Commission issued the Measures for the Management of Stock 
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Exchanges to replace the Provisional Measures for the Management of the Stock 
Exchanges published on 7 July 1993. The 1996 Measures provided that the stock 
exchanges be supervised and managed by the CSRC, and the executives of stock 
exchanges be nominated by the CSRC. 
The Central Government’s Efforts to Curb Speculation and Irregularities  
 By 1995, more than 100 securities officials and managers in Shanghai were jailed 
for bribery, embezzlement, and other illegal behaviors in the securities market (Davis and 
Yu, 1995). However, the punishments did not curb rampant irregularities in the securities 
market. Especially in the second half of 1996, the stock market rose crazily and bred 
rampant speculation. Trash stocks such as Qiong Min Yuan rose astonishingly. To rein in 
the overheated stock market, starting in October 1996 the central government issued a 
series of 12 urgent orders, known as “twelve pieces of gold-lettered plates” (Shi Er Dao 
Jin Pai), which included the Notice of Issues Regarding Regulating Actions of Listed 
Companies, Measures for the Management of the Stock Exchanges, and Notice 
Regarding Preventing Overdraw Behaviors in Stock Issuance (Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 
2010; Yuan, 2008). On 30 October, the CSRC issued the Notice on Strengthening the 
Regulation and Attacking Actions of Rigging the Market. This Notice caused the market 
to fall immediately, but could not curb the swift upturn of the market.  
 On 16 December 1996, the CSRC announced the volume of new stock issuance 
for the next year, RMB 10 billion, three times that of 1996. At the same time, with 
approval by the CSRC, the SSE and SZSE limited stock price movements; that is, the 
price of a stock could not increase or decrease by more than10% in a transaction day. The 
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Stock Exchanges also decided to implement the information disclosure system. That day, 
the People’s Daily published an article “Be Aware of the Situation of the Current Stock 
Market” by a “special guest commentator.” This article pointed out the recent swift rise 
of the stock market was “abnormal and unreasonable,” criticized the local governments’ 
intervention with the stock market, and called for a national unified regulation of stock 
market (Y. Lu, 2008). Immediately upon the publication of that article, the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai stock markets plummeted. Almost all stocks on the SSE fell down to the limit 
four minutes after the market was opened (Zheng, 2006). Zhou Daojiong, the then 
president of the CSRC, admitted years later that the “special guest commentator” in 
actuality was the CSRC, acting upon instruction by the leaders of the central government 
in an attempt to curb speculation and teach people risk awareness about stock trading 
(Zheng, 2006).  
 In mid 1997, the Chinese stock market again saw the speculative craze. Even 
state-owned enterprises and listed companies joined crazy stock speculation. The central 
government increased the stamp tax rate and enhanced the amount of stock issuance to 
curb the rampant speculation and manipulation. The State Council Securities 
Commission, the People’s Central Bank, and the National Commission of Economy and 
Trade jointly published a regulation to forbid state-owned enterprises and listed 
companies from speculating on stocks. But some companies did not obey the rule. For 
example, the securities department of the Qing Qi Group traded stocks through numerous 
stock accounts in the names of individuals; the Qing Qi Group also profited from insider 
trading12 (X. Yu, 2009). On 6 June 1997, the People’s Central Bank published a provision 
                                                           
12 The CSRC placed an administrative penalty on the Qing Qi Group in 1999 (Yu 2009). 
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to forbid bank capital to enter the stock market. But the series of measures did not curb 
the overheated stock market. 
 In June 1997, the central government through the People’s Daily publicized the 
punishments meted out to a number of presidents of local banks and securities companies 
for their irregularities in stock markets. This article was just a deliberate act by the central 
government designed to warn the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments. For example, the 
CSRC banned He Yun, president of Shen Fa Zhan, from the securities industry for five 
years because he had used the capital of Shen Fa Zhan to speculate on the stock of Shen 
Fa Zhan. At the same time, the CSRC punished the president of Shen Yin Wan Guo 
Securities Company, Zhidong Kan, for his manipulation of the stock price of Lu Jia Zui13. 
As Zhidong Kan (2010) described in his memoirs, he was just following the instructions 
of the Shanghai government to raise the stock price of Lu Jia Zui, a leading company of 
Shanghai. At that time, Shanghai and Shenzhen were competing for recognition as the 
financial center in China, thus each government tried to raise its stock market. The local 
governments’ stepping into the stock market added fuel to the overheated stock 
speculation and bred rampant irregularities. The central government was angry about the 
local governments’ aggressive actions and decided to attack them. Kan Zhidong was a 
scapegoat in this fight.  
 
 
                                                           
13 In 2002, the Shenzhen government appointed He Yun and Kan Zhidong the president and the general manager of the 
South Securities Company, respectively. The South Securities Company suffered great losses from speculation on 
stocks. After He Yun and Kan Zhidong led the South Securities Company, the company still could not make up deficits 
and continued to lose by holding the stocks of the Ha Yi Yao and the Ha Fei. As a result, Kan Zhidong was jailed for 20 
days (Kan, 2010).  
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In the Wake of the Asian Financial Crisis 
 The 1997 Asian financial crisis exposed the ineffective regulation of stock 
markets and weak corporate governance that contributed to the capital market collapses 
in Asian countries (Lang, 2010). China’s stock market was not involved in the crisis since 
it was not open to the outside world, but a series of fraud and irregularities in the 
domestic market gave the Chinese government concern about the regulation of China’s 
stock market. The State Council decided to implement revised Measures for the 
Management of Stock Exchanges, which provided that the executives of stock exchanges 
were nominated, appointed, and removed by the CSRC. Thus, the Stock Exchanges were 
placed under the direct management and supervision of the CSRC (Y. Lu, 2008).  
 To improve the quality of listed companies, the CSRC adopted a delisting 
mechanism (CSRC, 2008). On 16 January 1998, the CSRC published the Notice 
Regarding the Special Treatment Toward Stocks of Listed Companies in the Abnormal 
Period. Special Treatment policy aimed at stocks of listed companies that had difficult 
financial conditions or other abnormal situations. The letters “ST” would be placed 
before the names of these stocks to warn stock investors that the listed companies were in 
an abnormal state and investors should be cautious of investment risks. Generally, if a 
listed company had losses for the last two consecutive years, special treatment would be 
imposed on its stock and “ST” would be placed before the abbreviated name of its stock. 
If a listed company had losses for the last three consecutive years, “*ST” would be placed 
before the abbreviation name of its stock to give an early warning of delisting. On 22 
April, the special treatment policy was carried out for listed companies in difficult 
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financial situations or other abnormal situations. The Liao Wu Zi Company listed in the 
SZSE became the first listed company with ST (special treatment) shares. 
 In 1998, the Chinese State Auditing Administration audited securities companies 
across the country, and found that it was common for securities companies to illegally 
collect public funds, borrow money from other securities companies without 
authorization, and misappropriate clients’ security deposits to purchase stocks (Z. Wang, 
2010). For example, all the audited 88 securities companies had histories of 
misappropriating clients’ security deposits. The CSRC provided the securities companies 
with two ways to fix the problem of security deposits. One was to expand the volume of 
shares, then use the increased capital to make up for the misappropriated security deposits. 
Another was to use the profit earned in the rising market to fill the missing deposits. As 
Zhou Zhenqing admitted, the CSRC had no choice but to use these measures because the 
stock market would have collapsed if all the securities companies were punished for their 
irregularities (Zheng, 2006; Y. Lu, 2008).  
The High-Profile Securities Fraud (1996-1998)  
 Although the Provisional Regulations of Stock Issuance and Trading and the 
Company Law were effective, the 1996 bull market saw a surge of securities fraud. For 
example, the Hainan Min Yuan Modern Agriculture Development Company (Qiong Min 
Yuan) was the biggest dark horse in the bull market, but it turned out to be a typical case 
of misrepresentation; The Hong Guang Company case was called the biggest case of IPO 
fraud during this period. These securities frauds shocked the public and the regulatory 
department. 
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 The Qiong Min Yuan case. From 5 February 1996 to 27 February 1997, the 
stock price of Qiong Min Yuan increased from 1.5 yuan to 26.4 yuan per share, 
increasing by 1528% (Z. Wang, 2010). In January 1997, Qiong Min Yuan published its 
1996 annual report, stating that its net income reached 577 million yuan, increasing by 
1290.68 times. But on the night of 28 February 1997, it was announced that the stock of 
Qiong Min Yuan was to be suspended. Qiong Min Yuan was reported to the CSRC for 
making false financial statements. As described by Wang (2010), in response to that, 
Qiong Min Yuan even sent many workers to attack the CSRC and then the CSRC 
received an anonymous phone bomb threat.  
 On 29 April 1998, the CSRC published its investigation of Qiong Min Yuan. In 
the 1996 annual report, Qiong Min Yuan stated that its profit that year was 571 million 
yuan, but according to the investigation, 540 million of the 571 million yuan profit was 
faked. Qiong Min Yuan had seven connected companies in Beijing and eight in Hainan, 
which had no specific offices or personnel, and Ma Yuhe was the legal representative for 
most of the companies. The profit was mainly from connected transactions, which made 
it difficult for auditors to identify its real profit. Qiong Min Yuan also faked a capital 
reserve fund of 657 million yuan. From its listing in 1993 to 1997, when it was suspended, 
Qiong Min Yuan changed its accounting firms frequently, which also made it difficult for 
auditors to get complete accounting documents and judge its performance. The 
investigation found Min Yuan Hainan Company, the controlling shareholder of Qiong 
Min Yuan, had engaged in rigging the stock price of Qiong Min Yuan. Before the 
publication of the Qiong Min Yuan’s 1996 mid-year report, Min Yuan Hainan Company 
collaborated with Shenzhen Nonferrous Metals Financial Company to buy a massive 
94 
 
volume of Qiong Min Yuan shares. They sold the shares before March 1997 and earned 
huge profits (Z. Wang, 2010).    
 On 10 June 1998, Ma Yuhe, former president of Qiong Min Yuan, was prosecuted 
for providing false financial statements. The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate Court publicly 
tried this case, which was the first criminal case of securities fraud in China. On 12 
November, Ma Yuhe was convicted of providing false financial statements and sentenced 
to three years imprisonment. The related accounting firms and accountants were punished. 
As to the offense of rigging the market, the Min Yuan Hainan Company’s and the 
Shenzhen Nonferrous Metals Financial Company’s illegal profits of 66.51 million yuan 
and 66.3 million yuan, respectively, were confiscated, and they were warned and fined 2 
million yuan each (Z. Wang, 2010).  
 On 20 November 1998, the Beijing government approved the transfer of state-
owned enterprise shares held by the Min Yuan Hainan Company (38.92% of Qiong Min 
Yuan shares) to Beijing Housing Building and Development Company (Beijing Housing). 
Beijing Housing and other several companies implemented the restructuring of Qiong 
Min Yuan and changed it to a new company, Zhong Guan Cun Science and Technology 
Company (Zhong Guan Cun). Then Qiong Min Yuan was removed and Zhong Guan Cun 
was listed with the price of 37 yuan per share at the opening. The previous Qiong Min 
Yuan shares held by common stockholders were changed to Zhong Guan Cun shares 
according to the ratio of 1:1 (Z. Wang, 2010). 
 The Hong Guang case. The Hong Guang Industrial Company originated from 
the State-Owned Chengdu Hong Guang Electronic Tube Factory. In 1993, approved by 
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the Chengdu government, the Hong Guang Electronic Tube Factory and several local 
banks and trust companies jointly established the Hong Guang Industrial Company. In 
1995, the central and local governments designated Hong Guang Industrial Company as 
one of the state-owned enterprises experimenting with the shareholding system, and then 
it obtained a quota for being listed on the stock market. But actually Hong Guang 
Industrial suffered great losses at that time. As the Chinese Company Law provides, a 
company must earn a profit during the most recent three years before it is listed on the 
stock market. To get approval of the CSRC, the Hong Guang’s executives falsified 
financial documents and packed the company to meet the standards for listing. In June 
1997, Hong Guang Industrial Company was listed. Its issuance price was about 6 yuan 
per share, and its price became 14 yuan per share at the opening (Z. Wang, 2010). 
  Unfortunately, Hong Guang Industrial’s 1997 yearly report revealed its loss of 
198 million yuan. Its stockholders were trapped. In November 1998, the CSRC found that 
Hong Guang Industrial had concealed its great losses, faked its profit, and covered the 
important facts that negatively affected its operation. The CSRC punished Hong Guang 
Industrial Company and its recommender, the Guo Tai Securities Company. After the 
fraud was revealed, 11 individual stockholders from Shanghai brought civil suits against 
Hong Guang for compensation for their losses due to its misrepresentation. This was the 
first civil case in which investors sued a listed company for compensation for their losses 
as a result of its misrepresentation in China’s stock market. But the court did not accept 
the case then (Z. Wang, 2010). 
 In 1999, president He Guangyi and five other executives of Hong Guang 
Industrial Company were sentenced to imprisonment. Hong Guang became the first 
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company to receive a criminal penalty in China’s stock market. As Zaiman Wang (2010) 
described, in a media interview with He Guangyi in prison, he said that their making false 
documents for being listed was driven by “a glorious dream” to develop the enterprise. 
He said that in reality, making false documents was necessary sometimes. He also said if 
Hong Guang had cooperated with Sichuan Chang Hong Company, Hong Guang would 
have developed successfully, but unfortunately Hong Guang failed to get this chance. He 
attributed this failure to the neglect of the Chengdu government for not actively assisting 
them in their effort to cooperate with Chang Hong. 
The Enactment of the Securities Law and Other Regulations 
  The surge in securities fraud propelled the central government to make new laws 
and rules and establish mechanisms to strengthen the regulation of the stock market. In 
1997, provisions of securities crime were added to the revised Criminal Law. In the first 
half of 1998, the CSRC set up branch offices across the country. The State Council 
Securities Commission was dismissed and incorporated into the CSRC; and other 
departments’ supervisory functions over securities markets were transferred to the CSRC. 
Finally, the national unified regulation of securities market formed, with the SSE and the 
SZSE being put under the direct control of the CSRC. Then the Chinese Securities Law 
was enacted on 12 December 1998, and became effective on 1 July 1999.  
 The exposure of IPO fraud pushed for reform of the stock issuance system. A 
quota and approval system was adopted to avoid overheated investment and excessive 
fundraising and to check the quality of the applicant since efficient channels for 
information disclosure were lacking at that time. But a series of scandals, e.g. the Lan 
Tian case, revealed the dark side of the quota and approval system (Z. Wang, 2010; 
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Huang, Wu and Duan, 2007; Gu and Wang, 2004). As the power for review was 
excessively centralized and the operations of review were not open and transparent, the 
quota and approval system provided temptation to potential offenders who were not 
qualified for listing to attempt to obtain approval by bribery and other fraudulent means. 
Furthermore, the lack of an accountability system for punishing officials responsible for 
the failure of examination and approval could not deter power-money trading between 
officials and stock issuance applicants. The low quality of listed companies was often an 
outcome of the quota and approval system without effective external supervision. In 
September 1999, the Public Offering Review Committee was established, composed of 
80 members from the CSRC, other government departments, stock exchanges, and 
academia. In March 2001, the old quota and administrative approval system was replaced 
by a new approval system for stock issuance that required a joint stock company applying 
for an IPO and issuance be recommended by a principal underwriter and then voted by 
the Public Offering Review Committee independently (CSRC, 2008). 
The 5/19 Rise and the Long Bull Market  
 Due to the economic situation, the downturn of the stock market lasted two years 
after the central government adjusted the stock market in 1997. Especially in early May 
of 1999, China’s stock market fell sharply immediately upon the US bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade14. Most of China’s securities newspapers published an 
article calling for Chinese stock investors to convert grief into strength, developing a 
                                                           
14 On 8 May 1999, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was hit by five missiles from the US army during the NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia. This bombing killed three Chinese reporters and injured more than 20 employees of the 
Chinese Embassy. According to the US official account, the US army had intended to hit a Yugoslavia military agency, 
but they used an old map and then bombed the Chinese Embassy by mistake. China did not accept this explanation that 
it was an accident. The bombing outraged the Chinese public. See 
http://news.163.com/09/0508/09/58PID62D00011MTO_2.html 
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stock market that could serve the domestic economy (Wall Street Journal, 1995). Invoked 
by the advantaged policies adopted by the central government, the stock market rose 
suddenly on 19 May 1999. Because this upturn began on 19 May 1999, it has been called 
the 5/19 rise of the Chinese stock market. On 15 June, an article by the special 
commentator published in the People’s Daily asserted that the rise was a resumption of 
growth after two years of downturn (People’s Daily, 1999). This article added fuel to the 
rising stock market.  
 The 5/19 market rise did not result from improvement in the performance of listed 
companies, but was caused by government efforts. With the high stock prices and 
relatively low earnings, the high price-to-earnings ratio (PE) of the stocks signaled the 
potential risk of a stock market bubble. After about two years of upturn, on 14 June 2001, 
the Shanghai index reached 2245.44 points and then went down. On 22 October 2001, the 
Shanghai index dropped below 1515 points, and then came the longest ever bear market, 
lasting five years. The lowest Shanghai index was 998.23 points in 2005, a decrease of 
55.54% compared to the highest index in 2001. Yi Lu (2008) argued that it was not only 
a “technical revenge” from the market, but also a penalty for the government’s advancing 
its public credit.  
 Years later, Zhou Zhengqing, president of the CSRC admitted that this article 
published in the People’s Daily on 15 June 1999 was also from the CSRC (Zheng, 2006). 
By that time, the market had remained down for more than one and a half years and most 
investors were trapped in the stock market. Facing doubts about the government’s 
intervention with the stock market, Zhou Zhengqing insisted that the government take 
measures to raise the stock market out of concern for investors’ interest (Zheng, 2006). 
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He argued that it was unreasonable for the stock market to remain down for so long and 
most stock investors suffered losses. As he stated, on the one hand, the down market was 
not good for economic development; on the other hand, investors entered the stock 
market to support national economic construction, so the government should care about 
their interest.   
 But Yi Lu (2008) argued that the 5/19 rise was the central government’s scheme 
to attract a huge volume of capital into the stock market in order to fill the black hole 
caused by the irregularities of financial firms. In 1999, the central government launched 
the strictest check on the trust industry, since a large number of trust companies were 
involved in scandals in securities trading and speculation. Among 329 trust companies in 
the country, only 50 trust companies were allowed to renew their registration, and the bad 
accounts of the trust industry worth about RMB 600 billion were written off (Y. Lu, 
2008). The 5/19 market rise led to a 200% increase in the number of investors and the 
amount of investment capital increased greatly. By expanding the volume of shares and 
raising the stock prices, the government helped the financial institutions collect more 
money to make up for the huge losses caused by their irregularities, such as illegal 
speculation, misappropriating clients’ security, laundering money, and so on. The 
securities companies did not receive severe punishment for these irregular practices; 
instead, the government helped them fix their losses at the expense of the interests of the 
vast number of investors.  
 From 2000 to 2005, the total market value of China’s stock market dropped from 
about RMB 4,809 billion to about RMB 3,243 billion, decreasing by 32.6%; the 
circulated market value dropped from about RMB 1609 billion to RMB 1063 billion, 
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decreasing by 33.9% (Y. Lu, 2008, p. 111). The decrease of circulated market value was 
about RMB 545.7 billion, close to the value of the bad accounts worth RMB 600 billion 
that were written off in the reorganization of the financial industry in 1999 (Y. Lu, 2008, 
p. 111). Although the government did not admit it, the consequence of the 5/19 rise as 
shown in the subsequent long bear market and the sharp decrease of market value 
indicated that stock investors contributed a lot to the financial reform led by the 
government, at least objectively (Y. Lu, 2008). As the black hole caused by the 
irregularities of the trust companies and securities firms were filled, these companies 
were transformed into new securities firms and fund management companies. That 
allowed the reorganization of the financial industry to go through smoothly without 
risking runs on these checked trust companies and securities firms (Y. Lu, 2008). In 
addition, the rise of the stock market seemed a preparation for reducing state-owned 
shares. 
The Rampant Securities Crimes after the Securities Law (1999-2002) 
 Before the Securities Law was published, the case of Qiong Minyuan was 
regarded as the biggest scandal. But the Zhongke Venture case, the Yi An case, the Yin 
Guangxia case, and the Lan Tian case were more serious than the Qiong Minyuan case in 
terms of misrepresentation and manipulation. These series of securities frauds shattered 
the miracle of the long bull market of 5/19 rise and further damaged the trust of investors 
in the regulatory authorities. 
 The Zhongke Venture case. In the beginning of 2001, right after the sudden 
crash of Zhongke Venture stock, Lu Liang, the manipulator behind the scene, exposed the 
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inside stories to the media (Hu, Li, and Li, 2001). Lu Liang was famous for he had raised 
capital to restructure Zhongke Venture and then exaggerated its performance via media. 
Lu admitted to the media that he led a bundle of Beijing institutions to rig the stock prices 
of Zhongke Venture and other listed companies. As described in his statement, when he 
took over Kondarl (the predecessor of Zhongke Venture) in the early 1999, he got to 
know that it was a loss-generating company with faked financial statements, and he 
realized that he fell into the trap of a criminal gang and would soon become one of these 
offenders (Hu, Li, and Li, 2001). Lu and the institutions continued covering the truth and 
raised the stock prices to trap public investors and make the company a money-drawing 
machine. In July 1999, Lu established Zhongke Venture in Beijing, and its president was 
Liu Yuming who was the vice director of the high-tech research center of the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. From 1999 to 2000, the institutions led by Lu Liang controlled 
Kondarl and other several listed companies and made them a net for drawing money on 
the stock market, which people called the Zhongke Clique. The Zhongke Clique 
manipulated the stock prices of China-West Medicine, Suibao Heat Electricity, Lai Steel, 
and other listed companies (Hu, Li, and Li, 2001).  
 But when the manipulators ran out of funds at the end of 2000, the stock price of 
Zhongke Venture fell sharply, and its market capitalization decreased by about 5 billion 
yuan. Then the scandal of Zhongke Venture was exposed and the regulatory authorities 
began to investigate it. According to the investigation, from November 1998 to January 
2001, the majority shareholder of Kondarl (then Zhongke Venture) and accomplices, with 
funds of about 5 billion yuan raised from the public, used about 1,500 stock accounts 
under different names to buy and sell the shares without actual change of ownership. In 
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this way, they held about 55.36% of the whole tradable shares of Zhongke Venture, and 
caused its stock price to rise by more than 1000% (Hu, Li, and Li, 2001).  When its stock 
price fell, public retail investors suffered losses.  
 In June 2002, the case of Zhongke Venture came to trial. This case was regarded 
as the biggest of the Chinese stock market frauds at that time, which involved 120 
securities departments across more than 20 provinces and involved 5.4 billion yuan. In 
2003, the court made judgments against the responsible persons. For example, the 
Shanghai Shi Ye Company was fined 23 million yuan for rigging the stock prices; Ding 
Fu Gen and other five persons were sentenced to imprisonment, from two years and two 
months to four years, and fined 100,000 to 500,000 RMB. But they were just operators 
instructed by Lu Liang (China Securities Investor Protection Funds, 2010). Lu Liang, the 
key figure in this case, disappeared and still has not shown up. 
 The case of Yi An Science & Technology. While public stockholders were still 
shocked by the Zhongke Venture scandal, another big scandal, the Yi An Science & 
Technology case was exposed (J. Li, 2001). On 23 April 2001, the CSRC 
administratively sanctioned four consulting firms for rigging the stock price of Yi An 
Science & Technology, confiscating their illegal earnings of 449 million yuan and fining 
them 449 million yuan, which set a record high in fines for securities fraud (J. Li, 2001). 
According to the CSRC’s investigation, in October 1998, the four consulting firms took 
control of Shen Jin Xing Company (the predecessor of Yi An Science & Technology), an 
underperforming listed company and soon increased its stock transaction volume and 
boosted its stock price. At the same time, the Yi An Group, with Luo Cheng as its 
president, took Shen Jin Xing as a shell company to enter into the stock market. The legal 
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representative of two firms was Luo Zhongmin, Luo Cheng’s driver, and another firm’s 
legal representative was Luo Dongmei, Luo Cheng’s niece. Following the 5/19 rise in 
1999, a series of good news about Shen Jin Xing, e.g., corporate asset restructuring, 
investment and so on, was released. The four consulting firms held the majority of the 
whole tradable shares of Yi An Science & Technology through 627 individual accounts 
and three enterprise accounts and boosted its stock, earning 449 million yuan from selling 
more than 30 million shares at high prices (J. Li, 2001). After the peak, the stock price of 
Yi An Science & Technology fell sharply, and then public retail stockholders suffered 
great losses.    
 One year after the trial of the Zhongke Venture case, the Yi An Science & 
Technology came to trial. On 25 September 2003, the court made a judgment against five 
defendants. The former vice CEO and the CFO of the Yi An Group, Li Hongqing and 
Luo Jianzi, were sentenced to imprisonment of three years and six months and fined 
500,000 RMB respectively for rigging the market (China Securities Investor Protection 
Funds, 2010). But similar to the Zhongke Venture case, the key role in the scandal, Luo 
Cheng, former president of the Yi An Group, escaped and still has not shown up. The 
case of Yi An Science & Technology again shocked the regulatory authorities and 
propelled the publication of the Supreme People’s Court’s Circular on Issues Regarding 
the Acceptance of Civil Compensation Cases on Misrepresentation in the Securities 
Market. 
 The Yin Guangxia case. The case of Yin Guangxi, exposed in 2001, was called 
the Chinese Enron incident (Ling and Wang, 2001). In June 1994, the Yin Guangxia 
Company was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the first listed company from 
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the Ningxia Hui Nationality Autonomous Region. The president of Yin Guangxia was the 
former head of the Science and Technology Department of Ningxia Provincial 
Government. From the end of 1999 to the end of 2000, the stock price of Yin Guangxia 
increased by 440%, and increased by eight times compared to the price before the 5/19 
rise. On 1 March 2001, Yin Guangxia announced that it signed an agreement with a 
German company for exporting extracted products in the coming three years, with the 
total amount worth 6 billion yuan. Two journalists from the Finance and Economics 
Magazine doubted the miracle of Yin Guangxia, and after more than one year’s 
investigation, they discovered the fraudulent scheme of Yin Guangxia. On 3 August 2001, 
the CSRC began to officially investigate Yin Guangxia and suspended it from the stock 
exchange. According to the investigation, from 1998 to 2001, Yin Guangxia provided 
false sales income of more than 1 billion yuan and false profit of more than 770 million 
yuan. After one month’s suspension, Yin Guangxia returned to the stock exchange in 
September 2001. It faced numerous claims for compensation. For example, the Shanghai 
Jin Tian Cheng Law Firm received more than 1,100 investors who submitted claims for 
compensation of over 40 million yuan for losses caused by Yin Guangxia’s 
misrepresentation. On 23 April 2002, the CSRC fined Yin Guangxia 600,000 yuan, and 
ordered it to correct the false statements. Based on the decision of the CSRC, the court 
began to hear civil compensation cases against Yin Guangxia15.  
 On 16 September 2003, the court sentenced Tianjin Guangxia’s president and 
chief financial officer, Dong Bo, to three years’ imprisonment for providing false 
financial statements and fined 100,000 RMB; the other responsible corporate executives 
                                                           
15 On 25 May 2005, the court decided that Yin Guangxia must compensate the retail stockholders a total of 5.4 million 
shares (Chinese Securities Investors Protection Fund Limited Company 2010).   
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were sentenced to imprisonment of less than three years each for providing false financial 
statements and were fined from 30,000 to 80,000 RMB each. The two partners of the 
Shenzhen Zhong Tian Qin Accounting Firm were sentenced to imprisonment of two 
years and six months, and two years and three months, respectively, and fined 30,000 
RMB each (Ling and Wang, 2001).    
 The Case of East Electronic Company. Shortly after the Yin Guangxia case, 
another serious scandal involving East Electronic Company was revealed (W. Yang, 
2003). East Electronic Company was listed on the SZSE in 1997, and its principal 
underwriter was the famous China Economic and Development Trust Company (Zhong 
Jing Kai), the winner in the 327 event. Before May 2001, East Electronic Company was 
called the best Chinese listed company and the listing of its internal staff shares created 
more than 800 millionaires in the company. In four years after its listing, its stock price 
increased by over 6,000%. But from July 2001, its stock price began to dive sharply. Its 
abnormal transactions caused the CSRC to investigate it. In April 2002, East Electronic 
Company’s 2001 yearly report revealed its real performance. According to the 
investigation, the corporate executives provided false financial statements for four years. 
From April 1997 to June 2001, East Electronic Company earned profits of 1.7 billion 
yuan from cashing staff shares and other stock transactions, of which 1.6 billion yuan was 
included as its income from the main business in the financial statements through 
fabricating sales contracts and invoices. In December 2002, the court sentenced three 
corporate executives to imprisonment for providing false financial statements.  
 Zhong Jing Kai was involved in the manipulation of the stock of East Electronic. 
On 26 July 2002, the general manager of Zhong Jiang Kai, Jiang Jizeng was arrested for 
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rigging stock prices of East Electronic Company. The defense lawyers argued that the 
increase of East Electronic stock price resulted from the 5/19 rise. Jiang Jizeng also 
pleaded that he was not guilty since he had no idea about the activities of rigging the 
market. He claimed he had adopted measures to restrict the right to finance of the 
company’s departments and unify the company’s fund management, which annoyed 
some people and resulted in his being punished (W. Yang, 2003).  
 The Lan Tian case. A scholar’s report revealed another big scandal, the Lan Tian 
case in 2001 (Huang, Wu, and Duan, 2007). Having a quota of 30 million public tradable 
shares given by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, the Lan Tian Company was listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in June 1996. It was called the first stock of Chinese 
Agriculture. Actually, in November 1999, the CSRC published its conclusion that Lan 
Tian provided false application documents for listing. This raised public discontent and 
some appealed for severe punishment against Lan Tian. But astonishingly, Lan Tian was 
only fined one million yuan, and its president was fined only 100,000 yuan. The light 
punishment did not deter Lan Tian from continuing misrepresentation. Lan Tian’s yearly 
reports showed that from 1996 to 2000, its income from the main business increased from 
468 million yuan to 1.84 billion yuan (growing by 293%), and its net profit increased 
from 59.3 million yuan to 432 million yuan (growing by 628%). Doubts were raised 
about its income and profits, but some agricultural experts and officials expressed they 
trusted Lan Tian’s performance (Z. Wang, 2010).  
  On 23 October 2001, a short report by Liu Shuwei, a scholar in the Chinese 
Central University of Finance and Economics, revealed the fraudulent scheme of Lan 
Tian. Analyzing Lan Tian’s financial statements, Liu Shuwei concluded that Lan Tian 
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was only dependent on bank loans for its survival. This report also cited the description 
of Su Zhengbin, a journalist of the Guangdong and Hong Kong Information Daily, who 
investigated the production base of Lan Tian and doubted its performance. Liu Shuwei 
sent this report to the Financial Internal Reference, a confidential publication for the 
central government’s finance committee, the central bank and relevant high-ranking 
officials. Surprisingly, the president of Lan Tian, Qu Yongyu, knew of this article and 
went to Liu Shuwei’s office to scold her (Huang, Wu, and Duan, 2007). Then Liu Shuwei 
sent her detailed analyses to relevant departments. In December, Lan Tian sued against 
Su Zhengbing and Liu Shuwei for defamation.  
 Upon the pressure of media and public opinion, the CSRC and the public security 
department investigated Lan Tian, and soon ten executives of Lan Tian were arrested in 
January 2002. According to the investigation, Lan Tian fabricated profits of about one 
billion yuan; with the false financial statements, Lan Tian and its connected companies 
gained bank loans of more than three billion yuan (Huang, Wu, and Duan, 2007). At the 
end of 2003, the executives of Lan Tian were sentenced to imprisonment of one and a 
half years to three years for providing false financial statements and making false 
registered capital. In November 2004, the former president of Lan Tian, Qu Zhaoyu, was 
sentenced to imprisonment of two years. Several officials of the Chinese Ministry of 
Agriculture were involved in the Lan Tian scandal. They bought internal staff shares of 
Lan Tian and earned profits from sales of the shares. At the end of 2005, 83 investors 
sued Lan Tian for compensation for the losses caused by its misrepresentation. This 
initiated numerous civil cases against Lan Tian (Z. Wang, 2010). 
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 Summary of the case analyses. These high-profile cases show some common 
features and reveal the institutional defects that obstructed the regulation of the stock 
market. First, the quota and administrative approval system for issuance bred serious 
corruption (Ling and Wang, 2001; Z. Wang, 2010; Huang, Wu, and Duan, 2007). The 
Lan Tian case was an example, involving officials of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. 
The excessive centralized power of administrative authorities in the quota and approval 
system, and the lack of transparency of pre-issuance review gave room for rent-seeking 
abuses. The potential huge profit from fundraising in the stock market drove corporate 
executives to bribe the authoritative officials in charge of recommendation and review for 
IPOs and listing.  
 Second, the arrangement of internal staff shares produced a temptation to 
potential offenders (Z. Wang, 2010; W. Yang, 2003). Since the IPO price of a company 
was always much higher than the price of its internal staff shares, holding internal staff 
shares meant an opportunity to earn huge profit when they were listed. Internal staff 
shares were often given to officials in return for their help with IPOs and listing. The Lan 
Tian case is an example. The officials or their relatives bought internal staff shares, not 
feeling that they were receiving bribes. In this way, the companies could transfer the cost 
of bribery to stock investors. In the common interest, the officials made efforts to help 
companies obtain approval of IPO and issuance. After the IPO, the internal staff shares 
could be listed in the stock market without restrictions. For example, the listing of the 
East Electronic Corporation made millionaires of more than 800 people holding internal 
staff shares. This was a great lure to corporate executives and employees holding internal 
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staff shares. As a result, they worked harder at making the company get listed on the 
stock market than improving the company’s performance.  
 Third, in these cases, the increases in stock prices often occurred during the 5/19 
market rise. This let the manipulators use the excuse that the increases in stock prices 
were the outcome of the market trend rather than manipulation (W. Yang, 2003). For 
example, the general manager of Zhong Jing Kai argued that the increases in stock prices 
of East Electronic were due to the 5/19 market rise. During sharp changes of the stock 
market, securities fraud and crimes increased. The 5/19 market rise caused by the 
government increased speculation and produced opportunity to manipulators and insider 
traders. 
 Fourth, a single case often involved different types of securities fraud and crimes, 
such as misrepresentation, rigging the stock prices, and so on. Manipulators often boosted 
the stock prices after the companies released good news or provided false financial 
statements. And insiders would take advantage of the undisclosed information to buy or 
sell the stocks in advance. For example, the East Electronic Company involved crimes of 
misrepresentation, manipulation, and insider trading. The manipulators of Zhongke 
Venture provided false financial statements and then boosted the stock prices.  
 Fifth, the securities frauds were often implemented through the cooperation of 
different parties, especially the cases of manipulation. For example, the Zhongke Venture 
case involved 120 units, more than 1500 accounts, and more than 5.4 billion yuan. This 
scandal in fact was the work of Zhongke Venture, individual manipulators, securities 
companies, other institutions, and even local governments (Gu and Wang, 2004). The 
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case of Yi An Science & Technology was also the work of different units to conduct 
manipulation and tunneling. These serious scandals showed the crazy fundraising and 
speculation in the stock market. The ineffective external regulation and the absence of 
internal corporate supervision gave way to potential offenders.       
 Last but not least, the companies and the persons responsible for the securities 
fraud and crimes received light criminal penalties. In these cases, the responsible persons 
received imprisonment of less than three years, and the fines imposed on them were also 
small compared to the losses they caused to the investors. The light criminal penalties 
seemed not in accord with the rule of fairness and would not deter potential offenders. 
For example, the CSRC’s light penalties against the IPO fraud of Lan Tian did not deter 
its continuing financial reporting fraud. And it was noted that the criminal investigations 
and corresponding restriction measures were not started in a timely manner, which gave 
those involved time and opportunity to escape. The Zhongke Venture case and the Yi An 
case exemplified this trend. In addition, due to their close relationship with the 
government, the collapses of the companies and persons would be interpreted as their 
failure in the political strife, since the securities irregularities were common in the market. 
Thus, fewer stigmas were attached to the securities crimes and criminals.      
Funds Scandals 
 On 14 November 1997, the State Council Securities Commission issued the 
Provisional Measures on the Management of Securities Investment Funds. Starting in 
1998, the central government made efforts to establish fund management companies as 
state-controlled institutional investors to improve the structure of investors in securities 
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markets (CSRC, 2008). As publicized, securities investment funds were introduced from 
mature Western mature stock markets. Investors buy fund shares and entrust them to fund 
management companies, and fund managers operate the funds for securities investors. 
The government expected that fund management companies would help bolster the stock 
market since they tend to operate stock trading in a legal and moderate manner. The 
development of securities investment funds became important for the central government 
to realize its political goals and effective regulation of the securities market (Y. Lu, 2008). 
 But in 2000, a series of scandals of fund management companies was disclosed. 
At a working conference of the National People’s Congress about the draft of the Law on 
Securities Investment Funds, Cheng Siwei criticized fund management firms that often 
conspired to manipulate stock prices and caused retail investors to lose in the stock 
market (Yuan, 2008). Subsequently, an article “Inside Stories of Funds: A Report 
Regarding the Analysis of Actions of Funds,” published in Finance and Economics 
Magazine in October 2000, shocked the securities industry and regulatory authorities 
(Ping and Li, 2000). This article was based on a report by a staff member in the 
inspection department of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and was submitted to the State 
Council. The article revealed that fund management companies acted like unscrupulous 
speculators, employing matched orders16, affiliated transactions, insider trading, and so 
on to manipulate the stock prices. It argued that fund management companies did not 
play a role as a market stabilizer, but instead aggravated speculation and irregularities in 
the stock market. Immediately upon its publication, ten funds management firms jointly 
published a statement in important securities newspapers, arguing that the securities 
                                                           
16 Matched orders means that according to agreement, the parties act as buyer and seller in trading some stocks at the 
pre-arranged prices in order to make an illusion in the market and affect the stock prices.  
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investment funds had the strictest supervision and most open system compared to other 
investment firms in China. The fund management companies also claimed that the article 
“Inside Stories of Funds” spread baseless rumors and slandered the funds industry, and 
they reserved the right to sue the author and the magazine (Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010). 
But interestingly, the subsequent investigation by the CSRC found that eight of the ten 
fund management firms had committed irregularities in securities trading (Z. Wang, 
2010).   
Scholars’ Critiques on the Regulation of the Chinese Stock Market 
 Exposure of a series of securities frauds caused scholars to criticize the regulation 
of the Chinese stock market. The most famous was Wu Jinglian’s “casino theory”17. In an 
interview by the Chinese Central TV in January 2001, Wu Jinglian stated that the 
Chinese stock market was worse than a casino since some players could see others’ 
playing cards and acted fraudulently to rig the market; in this sense, the Chinese stock 
market was an unruly casino. His talk created quite a stir in the stock market. According 
to an online survey organized by the Sina.com, of over 30,000 people surveyed, 77.4% 
showed support for Wu Jinglian (Z. Wang, 2010).  
 Lang Xianping was another economist whose criticisms on the regulation of the 
Chinese stock market were influential in these years. Lang Xianping became known for 
his article “The De Long Clique: the Fundraising Model of Quasi-Family Business in 
Chinese Stock Market” published in April 2001. In this article, Lang Xianping (2001) 
discussed the predatory fundraising in the stock market by the De Long Clique, referring 
to the companies controlled by the Xinjiang De Long Company. For a listed company in 
                                                           
17 See at http://www.cnstock.com/index/zhuangti/zggs20zntbbd/jdrwjdrw/201011/965874.htm 
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the Chinese stock market, the price per share of non-tradable shares was often much 
lower than that of tradable shares. For example, in 2000, the average price of enterprise-
owned shares for transfer was about 13% of the average price of tradable shares. Since 
non-tradable shares represented the majority of all shares of a listed company, one can 
control the listed company with low cost through obtaining non-tradable shares. After 
controlling the listed company, the holding company often made a series of investments, 
equity transfers, and allotments, which were seen as good news and thus boosted the 
stock price. And then the holding company earned huge profits when the stock price rose.   
 As described by Lang Xianping, the De Long Clique accumulated wealth in a 
short time through the mechanisms mentioned above, e.g., making investments and share 
allotments after it controlled a listed company. In fact, the investments were mainly 
associated transactions; share allotments boosted the stock price, but common investors 
did not get any profit. During the three years before 2001, Xinjiang Tun He, He Jin 
Investment, and Hunan Torch, the three listed companies controlled by Xinjiang De Long, 
increased in share price by 1,100%, 1,500%, and 1,100% respectively (Lang, 2010, p. 47). 
In addition, through the listed companies, the De Long Clique also controlled or affected 
some securities companies and financial institutions, which helped it rig the market. Lang 
Xianping pointed out that this model of predatory fundraising hurt the interest of minority 
investors. Lang suggested the rule of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant should 
be adopted in the civil compensation mechanisms to better protect minority investors. 
Lang Xianping’s incisive critiques won support of public investors, and he was called 
“Lang Regulator” by the media. In 2004, the De Long Clique collapsed and its 
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irregularities were exposed, which demonstrated the analyses of Lang Xianping were 
correct.   
Attempts of State-Owned Shares Reduction 
 As Wu Xiaoqiu argued, the problems of the Chinese stock market mainly resulted 
from the share-split structure (X. Zhang, 2004). Wu Xiaoqiu argued that the growth of 
the capital market is critical to the development of the Chinese modern financial system, 
which serves the continuing development of the economy, solves the risks during the 
development, and lets investors share the wealth as economic development is achieved 
(X. Zhang, 2004). The share-split structure adopted in the early stage of shareholding 
reform became an obstruction to the healthy development of the Chinese stock market 
and the improvement of corporate governance. Under the share-split structure, shares 
sold to public investors and listed on stock exchanges (about only 30% of the whole 
shares) were tradable, while other shares were non-tradable. As the majority of shares 
were not listed and not traded on stock exchanges, the stock market could not realize its 
function to improve resource allocation and reflect value for listed companies (F. Cao, 
2011; Teng, 2006; Quan and Li, 2009; S. Wang, 2010; R. Li, 2005). In addition, the 
share-split structure was inconsistent with the international common practices and did not 
help fit the Chinese stock market into the global market. 
 Moreover, the share-split structure caused problems in corporate governance. The 
share-split structure resulted in disparity in pricing and unequal rights for shareholders. 
Non-tradable shares as the majority of the whole shares of a listed company were often 
held by one or several units as controlling shareholders. With the abstract or unclear 
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ownership of the state-owned enterprise, the insiders or the management of the holding 
company controlled the listed company, and non-tradable shares holders could not 
participate in its oversight. Taking advantage of the concentrated control over the listed 
company, the insiders or the management could tunnel the company through related 
transactions, making false financial documents, and in other ways damage the interests of 
public stockholders (Z. Wang, 2010; Quan and Li, 2009; Yan, 2006; He, Yang, and Liang 
2006; W. Xie, 2005). Since the majority of shares were non-tradable, even if the listed 
company performed badly, its holding company (controlling shareholder) could not be 
changed by market-oriented measures; e.g., the majority of shares were traded in the 
stock market and then the right of control over the listed company was changed (Yan, 
2006). The rigid ownership structure hindered the listed company from improving 
performance and corporate governance. In addition, state-owned shares or legal person 
shares were often sold at low prices through one-on-one negotiations. Without 
transparent operations, some could obtain control over the listed company at a low cost 
by buying large numbers of non-tradable shares. After controlling the listed company, 
they could take advantage of the listed company to collect funds for themselves and 
exposed minority investors to risks (Z. Wang, 2010; Quan and Li, 2009; Yan, 2006).  
  To solve the problems of the share-split structure, the government attempted to 
reduce state-owned shares by selling them in the stock market. On 6 December 1999, 
some officials of the Finance Ministry stated that the measures to reduce state-owned 
shares would be issued. China Jialing Company and Guizhou Tyre Company were pilot 
companies in reducing their state-owned shares by selling the shares to their existing 
public investors (Y. Lu, 2008). On 12 June 2001, the State Council issued the Provisional 
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Measures on Raising Social Security Funds Through Sales of State-Owned Shares. 
According to the Measures, in the IPO and secondary offerings, a listed company with 
state-owned shares should sell its state-owned shares worth 10% of the proceeds of 
public offerings; the state-owned shares should be sold at market prices and the proceeds 
should be submitted to the National Social Security Fund (CSRC, 2008). The reduction 
of state-owned shares caused the stock market to fall sharply. On 28 January 2002, the 
CSRC announced the proposal for state shares reduction. According to the proposal, the 
price of fully circulated shares would be determined after experiments. Then the holders 
of non-tradable shares should compensate the holders of tradable shares for the price 
differentials. Finally the non-tradable shares would go into the market for trading. Upon 
announcement of the proposal, the stock market fell sharply (Z. C. Chen, 2005). The 
CSRC immediately suspended the proposal of state shares reduction.  
 On 24 June 2002, the Ministry of Finance and the CSRC suspended the 
Provisional Measures on Raising Social Security Funds Through Sales of State-Owned 
Shares and suspended reduction of state-owned shares in the A shares market. The 
downturn of the market reflected the potential pressure of market expansion caused by 
the state shares reduction that the supply of shares might exceed the demand. On the 
other hand, it reflected the concern of public investors that they would not get appropriate 
compensation for the reduction of state-owned shares (Gu and Wang, 2004; Z. C. Chen, 
2005). Since the holders of state-owned shares had obtained the shares at very low prices, 
if the state-owned shares were traded at market prices that were much higher than the 
original prices, the holders of state-owned shares would gain huge profits at the expense 
of public investors. Moreover, public investors worried that the holders of state-owned 
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shares, as the majority shareholders, would manipulate the stock prices and transfer risks 
to retail stockholders (Gu and Wang, 2004; Z. C. Chen, 2005). The failure of attempts to 
reduce state-owned shares was actually the outcome of the game on interest allocation 
among the government, the holders of state-owned shares, and the public investors.  
The Emergence of Civil Compensation Cases on Misrepresentation in the Stock 
Market 
 Although some listed companies and the responsible persons were punished for 
securities fraud, effective mechanisms were not established to compensate investors for 
their losses caused by securities frauds. Take the case of Hong Guang Company as an 
example. In 1998, after the Hong Guang Company was found to commit IPO fraud, some 
investors brought civil suits for compensation, but the court did not accept the suits due to 
the lack of legal basis and judicial experience. In 1999, Hong Guang Company was 
prosecuted. It was the first company in China’s stock market to receive a criminal penalty 
after the Securities Law went into effect. Its six executives were sentenced to 
imprisonment. The investors continued to claim their rights for compensation through 
judicial procedures, but they were declined five times in the following four years 
(People.com, 2002).  
 After the Supreme Court issued the Circular on Issues Regarding the Acceptance 
of Civil Compensation Cases on Misrepresentation in Securities Markets on 15 January 
2002, the court began to accept this kind of cases (Sina.com, 2002). On 24 January 2002, 
the Haerbin Intermediate Court accepted the civil compensation case against Da Qing 
Lian Yi, which was the first accepted case on compensation for losses caused by 
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misrepresentation in the stock market. On 19 April, the Jinan Intermediate Court heard a 
civil case against Bo Hai Group, which was the first civil compensation case on 
misrepresentation in the stock market that came to trial. On 11 November 2002, a stock 
investor from Shanghai, Peng Miaoqiu, reached a settlement with a director of Jia Bao 
Industrial Company, the defendant, and dropped the suit. Peng Miaoqiu was awarded 800 
yuan as compensation according to the settlement, and became the first stock investor to 
receive compensation in a civil case about misrepresentation. 
 In February 2002, the Chengdu Intermediate court accepted the civil 
compensation suits against Hong Guang Company for misrepresentation. The Guo Tai 
Securities Company and the Chengdu Fu Di Company (the successor of the Hong Guang 
Company) were defendants in this case. On 26 November 2002, the plaintiffs and the 
defendants in the Hong Guang case reached a settlement that the defendants would pay 
the compensation. In an interview by Chinese Central TV (Sina.com, 2002), the plaintiffs 
stated that they had experienced difficulty and pressure during the last four years, but 
they insisted on claiming their rights as investors, not just for money. A plaintiff also said 
it would be a long way with difficulties to go to the rule of law. Yan Yiming, who 
represented the plaintiffs in this case and was also the first lawyer who accepted civil 
compensation cases on misrepresentation in the Chinese stock market, said more than 
3,000 retail investors contacted him in attempts to bring such suits against 
misrepresentation. 
 On 9 January 2003, the People’s Supreme Court published the Regulation 
Regarding the Trial of Civil Compensation Cases Caused by Misrepresentation in 
Securities Market, providing more specific provisions for handling this kind of cases in 
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judicial procedures and introducing the rule of shifting burden of proof to the defendant. 
This Regulation indicated progress in legal protection of investors’ interest, but it was 
confined to civil compensation cases caused by misrepresentation in the stock market. It 
still lacked legal mechanisms for investors to claim compensation for losses caused by 
insider trading, market manipulation, and other securities fraud.  
The Victory of Public Opinion: the Collapse of the Richest Person in Shanghai 
 Zhou Zhengyi was called the richest person in Shanghai by 2003. In 2002, Zhou 
Zhengyi illegally acquired the right to develop Dong Ba Kuai, a real estate project in 
Shanghai. He used the land of Dong Ba Kuai as a mortgage to obtain bank loans of seven 
billion yuan, and then used part of the loans as a pledge to get a loan of one billion yuan 
from a credit union. Zhou Zhengyi used the capital to purchase two listed companies in 
Hong Kong and then let these listed companies buy the real estate project assets. With the 
help of the Bank of China Hong Kong Branch, Zhou Zhengyi obtained huge profits from 
playing capital between the real estate market and the securities market. His Nong Kai 
Group accumulated more than 20 billion yuan in only five years. Residents of Dong Ba 
Kuai were not content with the placement policies for them and protested, which led to 
the official investigation on Zhou Zhengyi. The case of Zhou Zhengyi caused the collapse 
of the head of Bank of China Hong Kong Branch, and involved many executives of banks, 
real estate developers, and local officials. In June 2004, Zhou Zhengyi was sentenced to 
imprisonment of three years for rigging the stock prices and falsifying the registered 
capital of his companies. But the light penalty aroused public discontent. Public opinion 
led to Zhou Zhengyi being arrested again in 2007, at which time he was sentenced to 
imprisonment of 16 years for bribery, providing false financial documents, and 
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misappropriation (Wang, 2010). This case showed that the public discontent with light 
penalties imposed on offenders who obtained huge profits from securities frauds at the 
expense of public interest.  
Conclusion 
 The gradual and pragmatic mode to establish the Chinese stock market brought 
institutional defects to market regulation (Wu, 2001; Lu, 2008; Wang, 2010). The first 
priority of the Chinese stock market was to collect capital for state-owned enterprises and 
then other listed companies, rather than to give stockholders channels for investment. As 
a result, not enough attention was paid to the protection of investors, especially public 
retail stockholders. The stock market gave potential offenders easy access to funds of 
public investors. Without effective mechanisms for regulation, being listed in the stock 
market meant fast capital collection for a company, without any risk. Given the huge 
potential profit, companies often made false statements to meet the requirements for 
listing. Under the quota system and then the examination and approval system, the 
relevant officials had excessive power without a strict accountability system, and the 
process of reviewing for stock issuance and listing were nontransparent. This gave room 
for government officials to trade power for money. Making the stock market a cash 
machine without strict regulation, the Chinese government became an important provider 
of temptation.  
Furthermore, the governments played important roles in some “offenses.” For 
example, in the 327 scandal, the Zhong Jing Kai Company took advantage of inside 
information from the Ministry of Finance (Y. Lu, 2008; David and Yu, 1995; Yuan, 
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2008). Given the Beijing-based background for the Zhong Jing Kai and the Shanghai-
based background for the SISCO, this scandal was regarded as a conflict between the 
central government and the Shanghai government. In the case of rigging the stock price 
of Lu Jia Zui, the Shanghai government was the backstage manipulator (Kan, 2010). The 
governments’ actions blurred the boundaries between irregularities and rightful activities 
in the stock market. The engagement of governments in irregularities in the Chinese stock 
market exemplified the assertion of Shover and Grabosky (2006, p. 48) that “lure 
production is a thoroughly political process.”  
 Notably, the famous 5/19 rise highlighted the role of the central government in the 
stock market (Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010; Yuan 2008). Although the president of the 
CSRC argued that the government raised the market with the intention to return profit to 
investors, the bull market increased fund collection and objectively helped the 
government avoid risks in restructuring the financial industry. But the government’s 
intervention again drove the stock market into a vicious circle. On the one hand, the bull 
market caused by the government encouraged speculation and gave room for 
manipulation and other securities fraud. On the other hand, the government’s choice to 
screen the faults of financial institutions did not help set up effective internal supervision 
and external regulation of the stock market.  
  Without the strict external regulation, the internal regulation was incredible. The 
lack of internal regulation mechanisms gave the corporate insiders opportunities to 
commit offenses to benefit themselves. Self regulation was lost in the moral crisis in this 
social atmosphere that money talks. For the major characters of the cases, the scandals 
did not attach serious stigmas to them. For example, Guan Jinsheng was regarded as an 
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ambitious but unlucky figure since he tried to save his company in a fight against a 
Beijing-based opponent who engaged in insider trading (Yuan, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010). 
Kan Zhidong (2010) viewed himself as a scapegoat in the political strife. The former 
president of Hong Guang Industrial stated that their use of deceptive means to become 
listed was driven by their glorious dream to develop the enterprise, but unfortunately they 
were caught. They placed a priority on achieving their own ambitions, and ignored the 
interests of common investors.  
 The speculative craze of public investors also provided temptation to potential 
offenders. The cases of manipulation showed this easily-ignited fervor. Due to the 
asymmetry of information, public retail stockholders were in a disadvantaged position 
and were exposed to risks of becoming victims of securities fraud. The government’s 
frequent adjustments and aggressive intervention made the Chinese stock market a 
policy-driven market (Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010; Yuan, 2008). Without strict 
regulation, it provided opportunities for the insider to employ inside information in stock 
trading. On the other hand, the policy-oriented market made common investors ignore the 
real performance of listed companies and count on policies or plans, and thus fostered 
speculation on stocks. Due to the nontransparent process of policy making, investors 
became obsessed with inside information. This also made opportunities for the 
manipulator to create topics or rumors to affect the market.    
 The Asian Financial Crisis caused the central government to be concerned about 
the regulation of the stock market and further centralize the regulatory power over it. A 
series of securities frauds also revealed institutional defects that hampered the 
improvement of corporate governance and the healthy operation of the stock market. 
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Without administrative transparency, the quota and approval system tended to breed 
corruption in the process of recommendation and review for IPOs and listing (Ling and 
Wang, 2001; Wu, 2008). Another conspicuous defect was the share-split structure, as 
non-tradable shares occupied the majority of the whole shares. Given that price per share 
of the non-tradable shares was much lower than that of tradable shares, some could 
control the listed company at a low cost through obtaining the non-tradable shares via 
one-on-one negotiations (Lang, 2010). This arrangement provided opportunity for 
potential offenders to conduct vicious manipulations or tunneling that hurt the interest of 
minority shareholders. A concentrated control and rigid ownership structure hindered 
improvement in corporate governance and managements via market-oriented measures. 
The government realized the defects of the share-split system and attempted to change 
the share structure (CSRC, 2008). But its failure to reduce the proportion of non-tradable 
shares suggested that the government should carry out policies consistent with the need 
of investors.    
 The series of securities fraud taking place during this period also indicated the 
ineffective enforcement of the 1997 Criminal Law and the 1999 Securities Law. Without 
institutional supports and a solid social basis, the laws on the books were not realized as 
expected (Pistor et al., 2000). Offenders often had close relationships with government 
officials, which hindered the relevant authorities in initiating investigations timely and 
punishing securities offenders severely. As listed companies were supported by the local 
governments, local protectionism often obstructed the law enforcement. In addition, the 
limitations of the existing laws were exposed in their applications. For example, the 
relevant authorities could adopt measures to restrict the suspect only after the criminal 
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investigation was filed, which provided time and opportunity for the suspect to escape. 
Some legal provisions imposed light penalties on the offender compared to the losses 
they caused to investors. This seemed to violate the rule of fairness and would unlikely 
deter potential offenders.  
 It was worth noting that the high-profile cases taught lessons to public retail 
investors and aroused their legal consciousness, particularly in regard to their rights. 
Scholars and media played important roles in revealing the dark side of corporate 
governance and providing suggestions for market regulation. In response to public 
pressure, the government reformed the issuance system, established the delisting 
mechanism, and adopted other mechanisms to improve the market regulation. The 
initiation of civil compensation cases on misrepresentation was also an important step 
forward in protection of public investors.   
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CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S STOCK MARKET REGULATION ATFER 
PUBLICATION OF THE STATE COUNCIL’S NINE OPINIONS 
Introduction 
 After three years of a bear market, the State Council published the Opinions on 
Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Development of Capital Markets (the Nine 
Opinions) on 31 January 2004. This was regarded as a milestone in the development of 
the Chinese stock market (CSRC, 2008). The Nine Opinions provided the guidelines for 
further reform and specific measures to refine market mechanisms and the regulation of 
the stock market. Following the release of the Nine Opinions, the CSRC adopted the 
sponsorship system to replace the principal underwriter recommendation for stock 
issuance and listing (CSRC, 2008). The Nine Opinions also proposed the establishment 
of a diversified capital market, fostering the opening of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprise Board (SME) and then the growth enterprise market (ChiNext). Then the 
regulatory departments carried on measures to check listed companies and clean up the 
securities industry. Also driven by the series of scandals, the Company Law and the 
Securities Law were revised in 2005. This appears to follow what Coffee (2001) calls 
“crash-then-law” pattern for the development of stock market regulation.   
 For the regulation of listed companies, tunneling conducted by the majority 
shareholder or the senior management was a serious problem. Tunneling activities 
showed as misappropriating funds of listed companies, providing illegal guarantees, 
related transactions, and so on. The case of Xichang Electric Power, the collapse of De 
Long Clique, and the case of Gu Chujun evidenced that the corporate executive or the 
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majority shareholder took advantage of loopholes in laws and regulation to grab profits at 
the expense of minority shareholders and outside investors, and effective mechanisms 
were not set to curb tunneling (Shentu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010).  
 Meanwhile, the regulatory authorities adopted a series of measures to clean up the 
securities industry as it was close to bankruptcy at that time. The case of Dapeng 
Securities Firm showed that the lack of internal regulation would produce opportunities 
for the corporate executive to control the company for his/her own interests (Ling and Yu, 
2005). Listed companies, securities firms, and fund management firms often formed a 
chain to transfer benefit, making it hard for the regulatory departments to discover 
irregularities. Rampant rat trading18, insider trading, market manipulation, and other 
securities violations in the fund industry discredited the CSRC’s efforts to develop 
institutional investors for reducing speculative craze in the stock market.  
 The Nine Opinions also promoted the non-tradable share reform to realize market 
functions of value discovery and improve corporate governance. Learning lessons from 
the previous attempts, the non-tradable share reform proceeded in a gradual way, trying 
to follow market principles and giving more consideration to the protection of public 
investors (CSRC, 2008). The implementation of the non-tradable share reform invited 
public investors to take part in making decisions on the assignment of interest of listed 
companies. But three years after the initiation of the non-tradable share reform, the 
Chinese market fell sharply in early 2008. Public investors and some experts imputed the 
market fall to the failure of the non-tradable share reform led by the CSRC. Although it 
                                                           
18 Rat trading refers to the offence that before the fund management firm buys in shares, its staff buys shares in their 
own names or those of others at a low price, and then when the stock price was raised by the fund management firm, 
the staff sells the shares at a high price to earn a profit for themselves. 
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was hard to conclude that the non-tradable share reform failed, irregularities occurred in 
the implementation of the reform and harmed the interests of investors, especially public 
retail investors.  
As discussed in this chapter, the subsequent death of Wei Dong (the key actor in 
the 327 event) and the case of Wang Yi (the former vice president of the CSRC), who 
were reported by the media to have been involved in securities irregularities including the 
abnormal listing of the Pacific Securities Company (Finance.sina.com, 2010), greatly 
harmed the image of the CSRC. The case raised questions regarding how to supervise the 
regulatory departments, e.g. the CSRC, and who should supervise them. The scandals 
caused a crisis of trust regarding the external regulation of the Chinese stock market. 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the exposure of the Goldman Sachs 
scandal drew more attention to the role of international investment banks in the Chinese 
financial market, and caused reflection on the regulation of the Chinese stock market. As 
argued by some scholars and experts, Goldman Sachs and other international investment 
banks took advantage of their influence and economic power to rig the Chinese capital 
market (Finance.ifeng.com, 2010). The inherent vulnerabilities of the Chinese capital 
market, e.g., the ambiguous rules, the lack of transparency of administrative procedures, 
the speculative craze, and so on invited speculation and manipulation by the crafty 
international investment banks (Lang, 2010). 
 The revised Company Law and Securities Law strengthened attacks on illegal 
manipulation, fabricating and spreading false information, insider trading and rat trading. 
For example, Wuhan XinLanDe became the first securities investment consultancy to be 
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punished for rigging the market through scalping transactions (H. Yu, 2008); the case of 
Yi Li Company was one of the high-profile cases of fabricating and spreading false 
information through the internet to affect the stock market in recent years (Liao, 2013); 
the case of Hang Xiao Gang Gou and other cases showed that the regulatory authorities 
strengthened attacks on activities involving insider trading. But the frequent occurrence 
of serious securities fraud still challenged the effectiveness and efficiency of the Chinese 
stock market regulation. In recent years, corporate restructuring was a hot spot in the 
Chinese economic construction, and the stocks of listed companies involving 
restructuring would be boosted. Corporate insiders and related parties often took 
advantage of inside information about corporate restructuring to trade stocks and gain 
huge profits, e.g., the case of Zhongshan Public Science & Technology and the case of 
Huang Guangyu (Liao, 2013). The case of Fat Finger error by the Everbright Securities 
Firm in 2013 again raised concerns about insider trading.  
The rampant securities fraud in the SME and ChiNext revealed the weaknesses of 
the regulation of these relatively new markets. SME and ChiNext were established to 
form a diversified capital market and reduce overheated speculation on the stock market. 
But the ineffective regulation and unsound designs, e.g., the lack of supervision over 
price setting, also attracted manipulators and speculators. The sponsors held excessive 
power in determining the listing of companies, but still the mechanisms for supervision 
were ineffective. Driven by the huge expected profit from the IPOs on the ChiNext, 
venture capital firms often bribed sponsors to acquire equity in the companies before 
their IPOs, which formed the hidden rules for IPOs on the ChiNext (Lei, 2010). The case 
of Green Land Company in 2011 (Securities Market Weekly, 2013) and the case of Wan 
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Fu Sheng Ke in 2012 (China Business Journal, 2013) shocked the market due to the 
offenders’ undaunted and reckless activities of making false statements. They again 
revealed that highly expected profits from IPO and the light penalties produced lures to 
potential offenders. The case of Hontex International on Hong Kong stock provides a 
good example of the effects of imposing severe penalties on securities offenders (Su and 
Yang, 2012).  
The frequent occurrence of securities fraud in IPOs and listings aroused a public 
outcry and pressed the regulatory department to reform the stock issuance and listing 
system. In 2014, the State Council published the Opinions Regarding Further Fostering 
the Healthy Development of the Capital Market, which is called the New Nine Opinions. 
As a critical task set in the New Nine Opinions, the registration system will be adopted to 
replace the approval system for IPO and listing in the near future. The adoption of the 
registration system needs to change the role of the government in the Chinese stock 
market. The Securities Law will be revised and corresponding legal system and 
institutional arrangements will be established to meet the needs of adoption of 
registration system (Economic News Daily, 2014, September 22). This appears to be the 
start of a new turn of “crash-then-law” cycle in the development of the Chinese stock 
market.   
The Reforms after the Nine Opinions of the State Council 
 As the Chinese stock market had remained down for about three years, the State 
Council published its Opinions on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady 
Development of Capital Markets on 31 January 2004, aiming to change the institutional 
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defects that obstructed the development of the securities market. The main contents of the 
Opinions consisted of nine aspects, thus it was called the Nine Opinions of the State 
Council (Guo Jiu Tiao). Following the release of the Nine Opinions, the Provisional 
Measures on the Sponsorship System for Securities Issuance and Listing went into effect 
in February 2004, adopting the sponsorship system to replace the principal underwriter 
recommendation system for issuing and listing securities (CSRC, 2008). A sponsoring 
institution should be a securities firm or one of the four state-owned asset management 
companies, which has a license to underwrite IPOs and has at least two qualified 
sponsoring representatives. Sponsors are in charge of checking the information of 
applicants and providing guarantees for applicants for public offerings. The CSRC 
regulates sponsoring institutions and sponsoring representatives, assesses the 
performance of due diligence by sponsors, requires sponsors to provide independent 
opinions, and looks into related transactions of applicants (CSRC, 2008).  
 Following the principle of developing a multi-layered capital market system 
determined by the Nine Opinions, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange established the Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises Board (SME) in May 2005. The establishment of the SME 
Board aimed to reduce the difficulty of small and medium-sized enterprises in financing 
and encouraged innovations (CSRC, 2008). Compared to the main board comprised of 
mainly state-owned enterprises, the SME Board was oriented towards private, fast-
growing and profitable small and medium-sized enterprises. In compliance with existing 
laws and standards, the SME Board was run independently from the main board. On 25 
June, eight new stocks went public on the SME Board, and caused heated speculation. On 
30 October 2009, the growth enterprise market (ChiNext) was officially opened to 
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encourage venture investment in China. Although its establishment received wide praise, 
a few economists, e.g., Wu Xiaoqiu, doubted the value of the ChiNext and predicted it 
would cause excessive market tremors (Netease Finance, 2009). One year after its 
establishment, the ChiNext raised more than 100 billion yuan for 131 listed companies. 
 Specifically, the Nine Opinions determined that the government would follow 
market principles to fulfill the non-tradable reform. The non-tradable share reform 
required that non-tradable shares be listed and tradable on the stock exchanges. Since the 
non-tradable share holders usually obtained the non-tradable shares at low prices, if their 
shares were listed on the stock exchanges, they needed to compensate the tradable share 
holders. In April 2005, the CSRC began to issue guidelines and conducted pilot programs 
of non-tradable shares reform of listed companies. For a listed company conducting non-
tradable reform, the non-tradable shares holders should get the consent of those holding 
tradable shares and reach a settlement on compensation for them. To pass a proposal for 
non-tradable share reform, it needed the support of two-thirds of the shareholders voting 
and the support of two thirds of non-tradable shareholders voting (CSRC, 2008).  
 To meet the need for market regulation and investor protection, the National 
People’s Congress revised the Company Law and the Securities Law in October 2005 
and put them into effect on 1 January 2006. The revised Securities Law established the 
system for securities investor protection funds and defined the civil compensation 
mechanisms for investors. To cooperate with the implementation of the amendments, the 
People’s National Congress amended the Criminal Law and revised the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law. The State Council and relevant ministries also made a series of 
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regulations and administrative rules to ensure the enforcement of the new rules and 
provisions (Gu, 2009).  
Checking on Listed Companies 
 From the end of 2004 to the beginning of 2005, ten presidents of listed companies 
failed due to scandals (Z. Wang, 2010). In November 2005, the State Council circulated 
the CSRC’s Opinions on Enhancing the Quality of Listed Companies, aiming to 
strengthen the corporate governance and standardize the operation of listed companies. 
The tunneling of listed companies by the majority shareholder or the senior management 
became a prominent problem, e.g., misappropriating funds of listed companies, providing 
illegal guarantees, and related transactions.  
 The chains of illegal guarantees. Upon the exposure of the Lan Tian scandal, the 
regulatory authorities began to pay more attention to the problems of mutual guarantees 
among listed companies and their related parties. In 2002, the CSRC issued the Circular 
on Issues Regarding Guarantees Provided by Listed Companies. In August 2003, the 
CSRC and the SASAC jointly published the Circular on the Regulation of Funds 
Between Listed Companies and Their Related Parties and the Issues Regarding External 
Guarantees by Listed Companies. In 2003, the CSRC and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) jointly investigated chains of guarantees among listed companies. 
However, the phenomena of illegal guarantees seemed not to have been curbed 
effectively. In November 2003, Xinjiang Hops Company was exposed to have had a 
floating loan of 1.5 billion yuan and provided a 1.8 billion yuan loan guarantee for other 
companies, yet its net assets were worth less than 600 million yuan. In 2004, the “Hunan 
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Hongyi Clique” was exposed to have had a total of about 3 billion yuan loan guarantees, 
of which the amount involved in suits exceeded 1.6 billion yuan. In 2006, Hebei Bao 
Shuo was exposed to have provided 1.8 billion loan guarantees, of which about 1.7 
billion loan guarantees were undisclosed (Z. Wang, 2010) 
 The Case of Xichang Electric Power was one of the high-profile cases about 
illegal guarantees. Zhang Liangbin and his brother Zhang Bin, who were regarded as the 
richest in Southwest China, exploited loopholes in laws and regulations to take control 
over the listed company (Shentu, 2008). The Zhang Brothers conducted a series of 
activities to tunnel the assets of Xichang Electric Power. Chao Hua Group (controlled by 
Zhang Brothers) and its associated companies, faked documents and made Xichang 
Electric Power provide guarantees for them. The illegal guarantees caused Xichang 
Electric Power to suffer losses of about 2.5 billion yuan and miss the chance to develop 
itself (Z. Wang, 2010; Shentu, 2008). The deputy head of Liangshan Prefecture 
government admitted that due to the lack of legal consciousness the prefecture 
government as the second largest shareholder did not exert its function to check the 
Zhang brothers (Shentu, 2008). In 2006, Zhang Liangbin was arrested. After four years of 
investigation and trials, Zhang Liangbin and his brother were sentenced to imprisonment 
of 18 years and 15 years, respectively, for misappropriating the funds of Xichang Electric 
Power. 
 The scandals about illegal guarantees were the recurring illnesses of the Chinese 
stock market. In fact, the illegal guarantees were often provided for majority shareholders 
or related parties at the expense of the listed companies. In addition, the poor risk control 
mechanisms of banks contributed to the completion of unqualified guarantees (Z. Wang, 
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2010). Due to the lack of efficient channels and technologies for information flow among 
banks at that time, banks could not get real information about borrowers and guarantors 
in time, which exposed the banks to high risks for providing loans based on unqualified 
guarantees. The chains of mutual guarantees among listed companies and other 
companies often trapped the listed companies and affected their performance. In the end, 
minority investors bore the losses caused by the illegal guarantees.  
 Illegal fundraising. The most famous event in the Chinese stock market in 2004 
was the collapse of the De Long Clique (Z. Wang, 2010). The De Long Clique controlled 
or held equity of more than 200 enterprises including five listed companies. On 14 April 
2004, the stock prices of three companies controlled by the De Long Clique, that is, 
Xinjiang Tun He, He Jin Investment, and Hunan Huo Ju, fell by 10% (the maximum 
permitted for price movements in a transaction day). This situation lasted for days, and 
their market capitalization decreased by over 10 billion yuan. It signaled the collapse of 
the De Long Clique. 
  In October 2004, after Hua Rong Asset Management Company took over the De 
Long Clique, the relevant department of the State Council publicized the debts of the De 
Long Clique, a total of 54 billion yuan, among which the debts in the field of finance 
were worth 34 billion yuan and the debts in the field of industry were worth 23 billion 
yuan (Z. Wang, 2010). According to the investigation, the De Long Clique raised tens of 
billions of yuan by illegal means through its controlled companies including securities 
companies and trust companies. At the end of 2004, Tang Wanxin, the real controller of 
the De Long Clique, was arrested for rigging the market and misappropriating more than 
50 billion yuan of listed companies. In April 2006, Tang Wanxin was sentenced to 
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imprisonment of eight years and a fine of 400,000 yuan for the crime of illegally raising 
public funds. De Long International and Xinjiang De Long were fined 5 billion yuan each.  
 Misappropriating funds of listed companies. In 2004, Lang Xianping in a 
speech at Fudan University doubted that the corporate executives of several famous 
Chinese state-owned listed companies (e.g., TCL, Haier, and Ke Long) encroached the 
state-owned assets of the companies (Hexun.com, 2014). The fight between Lang 
Xianping and Gu Chujun, president of Ke Long, caused public attention. A number of 
mainstream scholars, invited by Gu Chujun, attended a conference to show support for 
Gu Chujun. But in 2005, the CSRC investigated Ke Long and concluded that Gu Chujun 
and accomplices were suspected of misappropriating about 3.5 billion yuan of Ke Long 
funds. Gu Chujun was sentenced to imprisonment of ten years for misappropriating the 
funds of Ke Long. This famous fight between Lang and Gu again won Lang Xianping a 
good name and wide support by public investors. 
 Misappropriation of funds of listed companies often occurred in the process of 
MBO (Management Buy Out). At the end of 2004, the central government stopped MBO 
of large state-owned enterprises for the reason that it would damage the separation of 
ownership and right of management, and the current legal system was unable to curb 
encroaching state assets through MBO (Z. Wang, 2010). But misappropriation of funds 
of listed companies by controllers or corporate executives occurred from time to time. In 
September 2005, the president of Cheng Gong Holding Group, Liu Hong, was arrested 
for misappropriating 420 million yuan of Xiang Jiu Gui, a listed company controlled by 
Cheng Gong Group. The real controller of the Hong Yi Family, Yan Caihong, was 
arrested for misappropriating funds of his controlled listed companies. In March 2006, 
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Zhong Xiaojian, president of Digital Internet, was arrested for misappropriating 430 
million yuan of the listed company and illegally raising more than one billion yuan (Z. 
Wang, 2010).      
Cleaning Up Securities Firms   
 By 2004, the whole industry of securities firms in China was close to bankruptcy 
as a result of years of crazy speculation and irregular practices (CSRC, 2008; Y. Lu, 2008; 
Z. Wang, 2010). Due to the unsound external regulation and corporate governance, 
irregularities were common in securities companies, e.g., misappropriation of clients’ 
deposits, rigging the market, insider trading and tunneling by controlling shareholders 
and related parties. From 2004 to 2007, the CSRC carried out comprehensive checks on 
securities companies and restructured the underperforming ones (CSRC, 2008).  
 On 2 January 2004, Southern Securities Firm was taken over by the 
administrative authorities since it had huge losses in stock speculation (Z. Wang, 2010; 
Kan, 2010; Y. Lu, 2008). According to the investigation by the CSRC, Southern 
Securities Firm held huge volumes of Ha Medicine stock and Ha Fei stock and 
manipulated the stock prices; it also misappropriated clients’ deposit of 8 billion yuan. 
On 10 May 2005, the Southern Securities Firm was closed. On 25 January 2006, Dapeng 
Securities Firm became the first securities company that went bankrupt due to insolvency. 
By October 2006, the CSRC ruled against a total of 31 securities firms. After the 
restructuring, the industry of securities firms ended four consecutive years of losses and 
began to generate profits in 2006 (CSRC, 2008). 
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 The case of Dapeng Securities Firm. Unlike most securities companies that 
were state-owned, Dapeng Securities Firm was established as a private enterprise in 1993, 
as Xu Weigo was one of its founders. Its shareholders included Shenzhen ZhaoFu 
Company and Shenzhen JinCe Company, two private companies controlled by Xu Weigo 
(Ling and Yu, 2005). In 1999, when the stock market was rising, Dapeng Securities Firm 
became one of the top 10 securities firms in China. In May 2000, Dapeng Securities Firm 
increased its equity and 44 enterprises became its shareholders. Its ownership was 
dispersed as each of its 12 largest shareholders held 4.4% of its whole shares. As Xu 
Weiguo stated, the company’s dispersed ownership was designed to avoid risks on 
corporate governance and better protect the interests of each shareholder. But it came out 
as Xu Weiguo’s trick to control Dapeng Securities Firm for his own benefit (Ling and Yu, 
2005). Xu Weiguo established Dapeng Holding Company as he was its president, and 
then Shenzhen ZhaoFu and other shareholders transferred shares to it. Dapeng Holding 
Company obtained 20% of all the shares of Dapeng Securities Firm and became the 
largest shareholder. Through Dapeng Holding Company, Xu Weiguo controlled Dapeng 
Securities Firm and led the firm to a difficult situation (Ling and Yu, 2005).  
 From 1999 to 2001, Dapeng Securities Firm used 2.2 billion yuan to buy shares of 
Long Teng Science & Technology and held 90% of its tradable shares. Following the 
5/19 market rise, the stock price of Long Teng Science & Technology was boosted from 
7 yuan to 32 yuan per share at the end of 2001, which made Dapeng Securities Firm earn 
a profit of 800 million yuan (Ling and Yu, 2005). Led by Xu Weiguo, Dapeng Securities 
Firm continued to spend a huge amount of money in rigging the market. At its climax, 
Dapeng Securities Firm used more than 6 billion yuan in stock trading. But finally, it 
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suffered great losses of 4.4 billion yuan in stock speculation when the market was down 
(Ling and Yu, 2005). When the CSRC began to investigate Dapeng Securities Firm, Xu 
Weiguo stated that he had mental illnesses and refused to cooperate. On 14 January 2005, 
the CSRC revoked the license of Dapeng Securities Firm and closed it. On 12 January 
2006, the CSRC banned Xu Weiguo for life from the securities industry and from being 
an executive in any listed company. In September 2006, Xu Weiguo was sentenced to 
imprisonment of one year and six months for rigging the market (China Securities 
Investor Protection Funds, 2010). 
The Regulation of Securities Investment Consultancies and Stock Commentators  
 The new Securities Law specifically strengthened fighting against the activities of 
rigging the market. In 2007, the CSRC made the Guidelines to Identify Activities of 
Rigging Securities Markets, defining specific categories of activities of rigging the 
market that include scalping actions of consultancies or stock commentators. Scalping 
actions refer to consultancies or stock commentators suggesting their clients purchase 
shares before they publicly recommend the stocks, selling out the shares after the stock 
prices are boosted, and finally they share the profit with the clients.  
 Before the Guidelines were made, there were high-profile cases about 
consultancies or stock commentators that used these kinds of scalping actions to affect 
the market and earn profit. These stock commentators were called “black mouths” by the 
media. After their scalping actions were revealed, they were not punished for the reason 
of rigging the market due to the lack of legislation. For example, Lei Lijun of Guangdong 
Golden Fingers Investment Consulting Firm and Zhao Xiaoyun of East Trend Investment 
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Consulting Firm were famous “black mouths” employing scalping actions to rig the stock 
market (H. Yu, 2008). In the end, East Trend’s investment consultancy license was 
revoked because it failed to pass the yearly check. But Zhao Xiaoyun left for England in 
the early stage of investigation by the regulatory department, and he has not returned to 
China yet. Lei Lijun’s license was also revoked, but he continued to provide consulting 
services. When he was caught again, the CSRC banned him for five years from the 
securities industry. Sun Chenggang, another famous black mouth in the Chinese stock 
market, had his license revoked and was fined 2,090,000 yuan for his scalping 
transactions, but the reason given was illegal stock transactions, not rigging the market 
(H. Yu, 2008).  
 In 2007, after the Guides were made, the case of Wuhan XinLanDe again caused 
attention to black mouths employing scalping transactions. Starting from 2000, Wuhan 
XinLanDe Consulting Firm, with Zhu Handong as its president, operated stock review 
columns on 142 national and local newspapers, more than 20 TV channels, and 25 
financial websites (H. Yu, 2008). This case was about Chen Jie, its client, advised by 
Wuhan XinLanDe. In 2004, Wuhan XinLanDe began to provide consulting services for 
Chen Jie. On 17 April 2007, following Zhu Handong’s advice, Chen Jie used 60 million 
yuan to buy 9.2 million shares of East Electronics. On that day, Zhu recommended this 
stock on the media and then caused it to rise by 10% the next day. Chen sold out all his 
shares by 19 April and actually earned 7,640,000 yuan in three days. 
 An experienced investor noticed these abnormal transactions that occurred right 
after Zhu recommended this stock and reported it to the regulatory department (H. Yu, 
2008). The Shenzhen Stock Exchange immediately initiated real-time monitoring and 
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found a close correlation between the trend of the stocks and Wuhan XinLanDe’s reviews. 
On 28 May 2007, the CSRC started an official investigation on Wuhan XinLanDe and 
found Chen Jie. Then Chen and Zhu were restricted from leaving the country. In the past, 
restrictive measures would be adopted after the results of an investigation came out, 
which often gave offenders time to escape. As concluded by the investigation group, 
Chen Jie earned illegal profit of 53,850,000 RMB, of which 7,350,000 RMB was paid to 
Wuhan XinLanDe as consulting fees. Then the CSRC confiscated Chen Jie’s stocks that 
were legally frozen. On 31 October 2008, the CSRC confiscated 7,350,000 RMB from 
Wuhan XinLanDe and fined it 7,350,000 RMB, gave Zhu Handong a disciplinary 
warning, fined him 300,000 RMB, and banned him for five years from the securities 
industry. Wuhan XinLanDe became the first licensed investment consulting firms that the 
regulatory department punished for rigging the market.  
The Regulation of Funds Management Firms 
 The National People’s Congress adopted the Law on Securities Investment Funds 
on 28 October 2003, and put it into effect on 1 June 2004. But irregularities of funds 
management firms continued to plague the stock market. In 2004, the regulatory 
authorities received more than one thousand tips about offenses by funds firms, and 
decided to investigate some serious cases (Y. Lu, 2008). But since the stock market was 
very low at that time, to avoid negatively influencing the market and fund holders, the 
regulatory authorities kept the investigations low key. The official conclusions about the 
cases and how the cases had been handled were not publicized (Gu, 2009). The 
government was worried that disclosure of the cases would trigger a trust crisis about 
securities investment funds and cause a sharp fall in the stock market (Y. Lu, 2008). The 
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government’s cover-up and light penalties failed to curb rampant irregularities of fund 
management firms.  
 With a huge volume of capital at hand, funds companies often collaborated with 
stock speculators to manipulate the stock price. When the stock price was raised by the 
speculators, the funds companies purchased the shares at a high price from the 
speculators. This scheme was frequently used to transfer benefits earned from speculation. 
In addition, fund managers could easily take advantage of inside information of listed 
companies obtained in their employment. Some fund managers were punished for insider 
trading, but the exposed cases were only the tip of the iceberg (Y. Lu, 2008; Z. Wang, 
2010). Another kind of irregularity rampant in the fund industry was rat trading. Rat 
trading refers to the offence that before the fund management firm buys in shares, its staff 
buys shares in their own names or those of others at a low price, and then when the stock 
price was raised by the fund management firm, the staff sells the shares at a high price to 
earn a profit for themselves. As listed companies, securities firms, and fund management 
firms often formed a chain to transfer benefits, it was hard for the regulatory authorities 
to discover and check rat trading (Z. Wang, 2010; Gu, 2009).  
 Rat trading. Starting in March 2008, the CSRC paid more attention to rat trading. 
For example, on 27 March 2008, the CSRC punished Wang Limin for rat trading; on 8 
April 2008, Tang Jian was caught for rat trading. But these cases seemed not to deter rat 
trading in the funds industry. In 2009, the exposure of the Zhang Ye case again shocked 
the stock market. The investigation found that from 2007 to February 2009, Zhang Ye, as 
a fund manager of Rong Tong Fund Firm, took advantage of the unexposed information 
he received in his duty to conduct stock trading for Zhu Xiaomin. Zhang Ye helped Zhu 
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Xiaomin earn 9,398,400 yuan and received 2 million yuan from him (C. Zhou, 2009). On 
18 June 2009, the CSRC revoked Zhang Ye’s license in the fund industry, confiscated his 
illegal earnings of 2,294,791.90 yuan, fined him 4 million yuan, and banned him for life 
from the securities industry and being senior manager of any listed company. 
 There were disputes about how to determine the nature of rat trading. Surrounding 
this topic, the first issue is whether rat trading causes social harm and whether it 
constitutes a crime (Z. Feng, 2009; J. Ye, 2009). It seems that rat trading did not hurt 
specific persons’ interests. The question is, if a fund manager helps fund shareholders 
gain a profit, whether it is a bonus for the fund manager to earn money through rat 
trading. But the fact was that the staff of the securities industry often ignored their 
fiduciary duty and earned profit for themselves at the expense of their clients. Even large 
institutional investors, such as securities companies and funds, suffered great losses in the 
end. The reason was that vast volumes of rat trading increased the cost of securities 
investments and often made them lose at the high stock prices. Rat trading created a 
group of rich persons at the expense of the majority of stock investors who did not have 
connections and opportunities to conduct rat trading. The connection with important 
persons of the securities industry became a hidden rule to earn huge profit in the stock 
market. In a broad sense, rat trading ruined the fairness of the stock market, distorted the 
function of the capital market to optimize the allocation of resources, and eroded the 
public trust in the securities industry.  
 Another issue is what kind of crime rat trading should be designated (Z. Feng, 
2009; J. Ye, 2009). Some scholars argued that rat trading is a type of insider trading since 
information about securities investment (what stocks the fund management company will 
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buy or sell) were also undisclosed to the public when the staff began rat trading. The 
other opinion was that information about securities investment was different from inside 
information. Inside information refers to the undisclosed information that will affect the 
operation and performance of listed companies, which would cause essential influence on 
the stock prices of the listed companies. Although information about securities 
investment by fund management companies would affect the stock prices, the real 
production and performance of listed companies are the essential factors to determine the 
stock prices. After all, the operation of stock market aims to optimize the allocation of 
resources and serve the real production of listed companies, not to let some earn benefit 
from speculation. The information about what stocks fund management companies would 
choose to buy is not inside information, so rat trading is not defined as a type of insider 
trading. It is unreasonable to give rights to fund managers to exploit their positions to 
earn such “bonus” for themselves through rat trading. As to rat trading, the staff of 
securities industry actually takes advantage of their position as the agent holding public 
funds for securities investments. In fact, rat trading constitutes a breach of trust or breach 
of fiduciary duty (Z. Feng, 2009; J. Ye, 2009). 
 The disputes about the nature of rat trading made it difficult to make criminal 
penalties against this kind of market abuse (Y. Lu, 2010). In addition, the administrative 
measures taken by regulatory authorities were lenient to offenders. For the case of Jian 
Tang, the CSRC confiscated Tang’s illegal gains of about 1.5 million from rat trading, 
fined him RMB 500,000, and banned him from entering into the securities industry. 
Compared to the potentially huge illegal proceeds from rat trading, the amount of fine 
was too small to punish offenders and warn potential offenders. In addition, the provision 
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of banning entry into the market performed practically no function, since they could 
easily conduct stock trading through accounts using other names (Oriental Morning Post, 
2009).  
 Although rat trading was serious in the fund industry, the Criminal Law had not 
provided criminal penalties against rat trading until the seventh Amendment to the 
Criminal Law was made on 28 February 2009. The seventh Amendment provided rules to 
prohibit practitioners of financial institutions from using undisclosed information to 
conduct stock transactions for their own profit. Zhang Ye avoided criminal penalties 
since the seventh amendment to the Criminal Law was put into effect ten days after his 
last activity of rat trading. On 16 October 2009, the Supreme People’s Court and the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate jointly issued the Supplementary Provisions to the 
Application of the Amendment 7 to the Criminal Law, specifically defining the crime of 
using undisclosed information to trade securities. In May 2011, Han Gang, former 
manager of Chang Cheng Jiu Fu Fund Management Firm was arrested for employing 
undisclosed information to trade 15 stocks during seven months in his position (Liao, 
2013). This was the first criminal case of using undisclosed information in securities 
transactions, and Han Gang was the first practitioner in the fund industry who received 
criminal penalty for this kind of crime. One month after this case, the former Chief 
Investment Officer of Guangda Baodexin Fund Management Company was convicted of 
using undisclosed information in securities transactions. However, how to prevent rat 
trading was still a big problem due to the factors involving the complicated coordination 
of different groups in interest allocation (Z. Wang, 2010). 
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 Institutional defects of the regulation of funds. Like rat trading, other 
irregularities in the fund industry also caused concern about the regulation of this 
industry. Sponsors for stock issuance or shareholders of most fund management 
companies were securities companies, banks, insurance companies, and listed companies. 
Without strict rules for information disclosure, this structure of shareholders of fund 
management companies bred insider trading, related transactions, conflict of interest 
transactions, manipulation of stock prices and so on (Y. Lu, 2010). In addition, these 
institutional investors needed to serve the government’s goals for the securities market. 
The CSRC officially claimed that the development of institutional investors represented 
by fund management firms changed the structure of investors in the capital market, and 
the operation of funds changed the investment modes of stockholders from speculation 
and manipulation to paying more attention to fundamental analyses of listed companies 
and long-term investments (CSRC, 2008). Fund management firms became the majority 
of institutional investors. While the fund industry suffered a loss of about 1.5 trillion yuan 
for the whole year of 2008, the fund industry earned a total of only about 1.4 trillion yuan 
from 1998 to 2007 (Z. Wang, 2010).This caused public doubts about its expertise and 
capacity for generating profit. Furthermore, the exposure of rampant scandals ruined 
investors’ confidence in fund management firms.     
 Serious irregularities in the fund industry had roots in institutional defects in the 
protection of fund shareholders and the regulation of fund management companies. When 
shareholders entrusted their funds to fund management firms, they usually could not 
intervene in the managers’ operation of funds. Without effective mechanisms, fund share 
holders could hardly exert supervision over fund managers. Moreover, fund management 
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fees are not linked to the profit from securities investment. This also seemed unfair to 
fund shareholders. Thus, some fund managers maximized the profit of fund management 
companies and their own self-interest, rather than work for the best interests of fund 
shareholders. 
The Non-Tradable Share Reform 
 The government adopted a gradual way for the non-tradable reform, starting from 
pilot programs to test the market reaction and then promoting the reform on a full scale 
(CSRC, 2008). It showed the dynamics among the government, the market, and the 
public investors, exploring to reach a point to balance the interest of different parties. 
After the initiation of the reform, the non-tradable reform was basically finished within 
two years. As the CSRC (2008) claimed, by the end of 2007, 1298 listed companies on 
the SSE and the SZSE, representing 98% of the market capitalization of the whole listed 
companies subject to the reform, completed the non-tradable reform or were in process; 
only 33 listed companies did not carry out the reform. 
 After the initiation of the non-tradable reform, the Chinese stock market remained 
a bull market for three years, until early 2008 when the Shanghai stock index fell by 
about 60% from a highest point of 6,124 in 2007; the market capitalization decreased by 
about 14 trillion yuan, and more than 90% of stock investors suffered losses (Z. Wang, 
2010). Although the global financial crisis did not greatly affect China’s economy, the 
Chinese A share market performed badly in 2008. The CSRC was blamed for the decline 
of the stock market. According to a survey by the Tencent Finance website on 5 
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September 2008, about 80% respondents thought the market crash was due to the failure 
of the non-tradable share reform led by the CSRC (Finance.qq.com, 2008). 
 Some media argued that the market crash was caused by the panic that the release 
of non-tradable shares would bring huge pressure to the market and would harm public 
investors’ interests (Eastday.com, 2008). How to deal with the release of non-tradable 
shares became the focus of disputes. In an interview with the People’s Daily, Li Kun, a 
research scientist of the China National Development and Reform Commission, stated 
that non-tradable shares should be differentiated from common shares and should be 
placed in a different platform for trading; furthermore, windfall taxes should be imposed 
on non-tradable shares trading (QQ.com, 2008a). The CSRC denied that the release of 
non-tradable shares caused the market panic, and argued that the windfall tax should not 
be imposed on non-tradable shares trading since the holders of non-tradable shares had 
already given consideration to the holders of public tradable shares (QQ.com, 2008a). A 
famous financial commentator, Ye Tan, challenged the CSRC and argued that imposing 
the windfall tax would help maintain the social fairness since non-tradable shares 
contained interest that the holders obtained with a low cost in the past. According to Ye 
Tan, the CSRC favored the holders of non-tradable shares and went against its original 
intention of better protecting public investors at the initiation of non-tradable shares 
reform (T. Ye, 2008). Another financial commentator, Cao Zhongming (2008), pointed 
out that the stock market crash reflected the imbalance of interest assignment and 
appealed to change the current structure of interest assignment and place the protection of 
public investors at the center of the stock market. 
148 
 
 The largest portal of Chinese laws and legal practice published an article pointing 
out the failures of the non-tradable share reform (Zhong Gu Law Portal, 2009). The 
article mentioned that the non-tradable share reform became employed by interest groups 
to save institutional investors. For example, Bao Steel Corporation and Shanghai 
Automobile allowed institutional investors to obtain their non-tradable shares at low 
prices. During the reform, the rate of medium and small investors’ participation in voting 
for non-tradable share reform plans decreased. Thus, their interest could not be better 
protected. The consideration the companies paid to the public investors (e.g., share bonus) 
also decreased. The fall of the stock indices and transaction volumes and the failure of the 
majority shareholders’ commitment to increase their equity indicated the loss of 
confidence in the stock market after the non-tradable share reform.  
 In an interview with the Economic News Daily, Lang Xianping pointed out that 
the second and third steps of the non-tradable reform failed, and thus the interest of 
public investors was not protected well (Y. Jiang, 2008). As he emphasized, even the 
underperforming listed companies were allowed to undertake non-tradable share reform, 
which would bring lots of low quality shares to the market and increase the pressure on 
the market; more importantly, after the initiation of the non-tradable reform, the 
regulatory department’s role as an active supervisor over listed companies faded, and 
thus the insufficient regulation exposed public retail investors to risks caused by 
irregularities and crimes.  
 However, it is too early to conclude that non-tradable share reform failed. The 
decline of the stock market might have been caused by other factors that affected 
investors’ confidence, e.g., market pressures, the global situation, economic cycles, and 
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so on (QQ.com, 2008a). In general, non-tradable share reform set a legal and institutional 
frame for a stock market with fully circulated stocks. But it was worth noting the 
emergence of irregularities that damaged the interests of public investors and showed 
deviation from the goals of the non-tradable share reform.  
The Death of Wei Dong and the Case of Wang Yi 
 The year of 2008 was an eventful year for the CSRC. On 29 April 2008, Wei 
Dong, who was called the last baron on the Chinese stock market, committed suicide. As 
mentioned before, Wei Dong was the dealer of Zhong Jing Kai and played a key role in 
the famous 327 event. Wei Dong was the actual master of the Yong Jin Clique, which 
controlled some listed companies, including Jiu Zhi Tang, GuoJin Securities Company 
and others. Although his family said that he killed himself because he could not endure 
his acute depression, the media disclosed that Wei Dong was investigated by the 
regulatory departments (Eastern Daily, 2008). Subsequently, Wang Yi, the vice president 
of Chinese National Development Bank and former vice president of the CSRC, was 
investigated by the regulatory departments on 8 June 2008 and then arrested. 
  Numerous media reports stated that Wang Yi was close to Wei Dong and was 
involved in securities crimes and irregularities. The listing of Pacific Securities Company 
was one of the cases the media doubted (Economic Observer, 2008). At the end of 2007, 
Pacific Securities Company exchanged equity with Yun Da Science & Technology and 
received non-tradable shares of Yun Da at low prices. At that time, Yun Da Science & 
Technology was close to being delisted, and Pacific Securities had existed for less than 
three years with a total loss of more than 80 million yuan for the past two consecutive 
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years. Apparently, Pacific Securities Company did not qualify for listing. But it was 
astonishing that when Yun Da Science & Technology was removed from the stock 
market, Pacific Securities was listed on the stock exchange. Experts in the securities 
industry doubted the listing of Pacific Securities since it was not reviewed nor approved 
by the CSRC Stock Issuance Review Committee or the Major Restructuring Committee. 
Although the CSRC explained its listing was a special case in non-tradable share reform, 
this abnormal listing incurred public criticism (Caijing.com, 2008). The media revealed 
some original shareholders of Pacific Securities were relatives of Wang Yi or Wei Dong, 
and they obtained huge profits from its listing (Ameng, 2008). 
 However, the procuratorate charged Wang Yi for taking bribery of 11.96 million 
yuan for helping others get bank loans when he was the vice president of the Chinese 
National Development Bank. Interestingly, the large number of media reports about 
securities irregularities in which Wang Yi was involved were not ever refuted or doubted. 
Although the procuratorate’s charge did not include securities crimes that occurred 
during the period when he was vice president of the CSRC, the case of Wang Yi 
triggered a crisis of trust in the CSRC. The financial media even pointed out that the 
revolution of the Chinese stock market should have started from the CSRC (Ameng, 
2008). 
Lessons from International Investment Banks 
 It is noteworthy that Chinese enterprises had also suffered huge losses in the 
international financial market during the period of global financial crisis. For example, 68 
Chinese central government-owned enterprises suffered floating losses of 11.4 billion US 
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dollars in the financial derivatives investments by the end of 2008 (Xinhuanet.com, 2009). 
As the Vice Director of the Chinese State Asset Commission admitted, excessive 
speculation, irregular practices, deficiency of risk control, poor corporate governance, 
lack of experts, and especially fraud by international investment banks contributed to the 
huge losses (Xinhuanet.com, 2009).  
 On 6 May 2010, the Chinese Procuratorate Daily published an article discussing 
the lessons for China’s market regulation from the case of the US Goldman Sachs (Yan, 
2010). On 16 April 2010, Goldman Sachs was charged by the US SEC for securities 
fraud by conspiring with some hedge funds and investment banks to short the financial 
market. This increased market turmoil and caused investors to suffer huge losses. As 
mentioned, Goldman Sachs had designed the financial derivative products of 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) “Abacus 2007-ACI” and induced investors by 
misstatements that guaranteed stable investment return and concealed potential risks. 
Consequently, the fraud caused investors to lose more than 1 billion USD. On 10 May 
2010, the China Youth Daily published an article “Goldman Sachs’ Conspiracies in 
China” arguing that it caused more losses to Chinese enterprises and investors than to 
those in the US. 
 On 12 November 2010, the Chinese A share market dropped sharply. 
Subsequently, an article “The Sudden Fall Caused by a Report of Goldman Sachs on 12 
November” published in Hua Xia Daily on 15 November 2010 aroused severe attacks on 
Goldman Sachs. The People’s Daily (overseas version) published reviews, and then the 
vice president of the Chinese Supreme Court made a speech in a conference, implying 
that Goldman Sachs’ report emailed to its clients was responsible for the sharp market 
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decline and may have rigged the Chinese stock market. Responding to these criticisms, 
Goldman Sachs argued that the report was only about suggesting that its clients sell off 
their H shares, and it was not related to the Chinese A share market (Ifeng.com, 2010).  
 Although Goldman Sachs denied that they had shorted the market, its report was 
so precise and occurred almost at the same time as the fall of Chinese A share market that 
it caused doubts on the part of some Chinese scholars and financial commentators. Liu 
Jipeng, a professor of law and economics center of China Politics and Law University 
said that it was suspicious since Goldman Sachs engaged in too many coincidental 
activities (Ifeng.com, 2010b). Ye Tan stated that only the international and domestic big 
institutional investors could see the reports of Goldman Sachs; if they followed its ideas, 
they could take advantage of their capital and influence to greatly affect the stock market 
(Ifeng.com, 2010b). 
 Some practitioners in the securities industry described the way that Goldman 
Sachs and other leading international investment banks shorted the stock market 
(Ifeng.com, 2010b). When Goldman Sachs began to sell part of the profit-generating 
shares they held, they spread information that the stock prices would rise to attract 
investors to buy their shares at high prices. Then they would spread information that the 
stock prices would fall and used their shares to facilitate the market fall. After the stock 
prices fell, they would buy the shares and start a new run of market manipulation. 
Goldman Sachs had taken advantage of its influence, connections, and public trust to 
affect the Chinese market to earn huge profits at the expense of Chinese public retail 
investors. The leading international investment banks were familiar with the rules and 
practices of Chinese financial regulation. Their maneuvers became more and more covert, 
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so it was hard to find evidence to demonstrate they had rigged the market (Ifeng.com, 
2010b).  
 There were different voices. Hua Xia Times published an article about interviews 
with experts, arguing that Goldman Sachs was just a scapegoat for the decline of Chinese 
A share market (Fu, 2010). Actually, high inflation, adjustment of Chinese monetary 
policies, increase of the stamp tax rate, interest rate increase, exposure of scandals in the 
Hua Xia Fund Management Firm, and other factors contributed to the market fall. Dong 
Dengxin, director of financial research center at Wuhan Science and Technology 
University, said that the Chinese stock market was not open to international capital and 
Reminbi could not be freely exchanged; thus, international capital had no access to 
manipulate the Chinese stock market (Fu, 2010). In the interview, a Hong Kong expert of 
an investment bank stated that the Qualified Foreign Investment Institutions were 
occupying only a very small part of the Chinese stock market, thus they could not greatly 
affect the Chinese stock market. He also remarked that in recent years, conspiracy 
theories were very popular in explaining some market activities in mainland China, and 
they would have negative effects on the development of the Chinese stock market, e.g., 
missing a good chance to reform the price and exchange rate systems and disrrupting the 
invitation of excellent experts from foreign countries (Fu, 2010).  
Supervision over the Information Spread through the Internet 
 Early in 1992, the Securities Commission of the State Council issued the 
Provisional Measures on Prevention of Securities Fraud, providing rules against 
fabricating and spreading false information to affect the stock market. The case of Su 
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Sanshan was the first case of fabricating and spreading information to affect the stock 
market. But the Criminal Law did not provide criminal penalties against this kind of 
securities fraud until in 1997, when the revised Criminal Law added articles of the crime 
of fabricating and spreading false information to affect the stock market.  In addition, 
Article 3 of the Securities Law provides the legal responsibility of the media in spreading 
information about securities; Article 72 of the Securities Law provides rules against 
fabricating and spreading false information to affect securities markets. With the 
development of the internet, the online social media became a ground for spreading false 
information that affected securities markets. On 28 December 2000, the National 
Congress Standing Committee enacted the Decision Regarding the Maintenance of 
Internet Security, providing rules against using the internet to fabricate and spread false 
information to affect securities markets. 
 However, financial columns of large websites and online stock clubs were still 
filled with false information. False information was spread anonymously and quickly via 
the internet, which made it difficult to identify the offenders. For example, in 2008, 
amidst false information about the refinancing of stock markets, only a few unconfirmed 
rumors were cleared up quickly, causing a sharp fall of the stock market with great losses 
to retail stockholders, securities companies, funds, and other market participants (Liao, 
2013). In recent years, the case of fabricating and spreading false information about Yi Li 
Company was one of the high-profile events. In June 2011, the former president of Inner 
Mongolia Business Daily and other persons posted an online real-name tip saying that 
some corporate executives of Yi Li Company tunneled the company. This caused 
investors to sell shares and made the stock price drop sharply. Consequently, Yi Li 
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Company and its investors suffered great losses. In 2012, the offenders were convicted of 
the crime of fabricating and spreading false information to affect the stock market 
(Xinhuanet.com, 2012)19. The former president of the Inner Mongolia Business Daily 
was sentenced to imprisonment of one year and six months with a suspension of one year 
and six months, and a fine of 30,000 yuan. Other offenders were sentenced to 
imprisonment with a suspension.  
 False information might arise from different intentions. Some might spread false 
information in online forums or stock clubs to vent their grievances. Civil compensation, 
administrative sanctions or criminal penalties should be applied to those fabricating and 
spreading false information according to different circumstances (Liao, 2013). Some 
scholars even suggested that internet users be required to use their real names when 
posting their comments online (Liao, 2013), but it caused concern about infringing upon 
freedom of speech. On 13 August 2012, without any signals, the stock price of Citic 
Securities suddenly dropped by 9.1%, which also caused stocks of other securities 
companies to fall. But after more than twenty days of investigation, the CSRC concluded 
that the unexpected fall of the stocks resulted from three retail stockholders who spread 
complaints and thus caused the negative effect on the stock market. This conclusion 
raised widespread discontent. Media showed sympathy about common retail stockholders 
and said the three stockholders who complained were scapegoats (Sina.com, 2013).   
Insider Trading 
                                                           
19 The former president of the Inner Mongolia Business Daily was sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment 
with one year and six months’ probation, and was fined 30,000 yuan. Other offenders were sentenced to imprisonment 
with probation and fined.  See http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-01/19/c_122607612.htm 
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 The case of Hang Xiao Gang Gou. The revised Securities Law also aimed to 
widen the range of insider trading and strengthen its ability to attack stock transactions 
employing inside information. The case of Hang Xiao Gang Gou in 2007 was the first 
case of a crime of revealing inside information (H. Yu, 2009). According to the 
investigation, on 31 January 2007, Luo Gaofeng, deputy director of the Securities 
Department of Hang Xiao Gang Gou Company, knew that the company was discussing 
with China International Fund Company a 30-billion-yuan contract for a construction 
project in Angola (H. Yu, 2009). On 12 February, Luo revealed this inside information to 
Chen Yuxing, a former employee of Hang Xiao Gang Gou. Then Chen instructed Wang 
Xiangdong to buy about 7 million shares of Hang Xiao Gang Gou from 12 to 14 February. 
The abnormal transactions by Chen caught the CSRC’s attention. But actually, the 
information that Hang Xiao Gang Gou signed a contract for a construction project in 
Angola was false, and the CSRC would investigate it. On 15 March, Chen knew from 
Luo that the CSRC would investigate Hang Xiao Gang Gou20, and then Chen asked 
Wang to sell the shares. On 16 March, Wang sold out the Hang Xiao Gang Gou shares 
and obtained more than 40 million yuan (H. Yu, 2009). It was surprising that the price of 
Hang Xiao Gang Gou shares continued to rise even after the CSRC began to investigate it.  
 On 4 February 2008, the court sentenced Luo to imprisonment of one and a half 
years for committing the crime of revealing inside information; Chen and Wang were 
respectively sentenced to imprisonment of two and a half years, and one and a half years 
                                                           
20 On 30 April, the CSRC announced the administrative penalty against Hang Xiao Gang Gou for spreading false 
information that it signed a contract of 4.3 billion USD for a project in Angola and caused the stock price to rise by 10% 
for more than ten days. The CSRC fined Hang Xiao Gang Gou 400,000 yuan and fined the responsible persons from 
100,000 to 200,000 yuan. The public complained that the penalty was too weak and the cost for irregularities was too 
low.  
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with a probation of two years; Chen’s and Wang’s illegal earning of 40,370,000 RMB 
was confiscated and they were fined 40,370,000 RMB respectively (H. Yu, 2009). This 
case was called the biggest scandal of insider trading in the bull market. In this case, the 
insider trading was conducted by offenders outside the listed company. Before this case, 
there were a few cases about insider trading conducted by the executives of the listed 
companies. This case indicated the regulatory departments had adopted stricter measures 
to fight against stock transactions using inside information.   
 The case of Huang Guangyu. The exposure of the Huang Guangyu case was the 
most high-profile event in 2010. Born in a poor family in the countryside, Huang 
Guangyu became a legend in the age of Chinese economic reform. Huang Guangyu had 
remained No.1 among the mainland China’s list of the richest for years until 18 
November 2008 when he was put under supervision of the Beijing Public Security 
Bureau for suspected insider trading. Since 2006, Huang and his company were checked 
by the public security and tax inspection departments, but he solved the problems with 
bribery. But this time, he did not succeed, and his case exposed lots of high officials of 
Guangdong Province and the Ministry of Public Security (Luo and Yu, 2010).  
 According to the judgment of the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court, from 27 April 
2007 to 27 June 2007, Huang Guangyu, as the actual controller of the Zhongguancun 
Company, in the process of assets exchange between Zhongguancun and Pengrun 
Investment Company that he operated, instructed other people to purchase more than 9.76 
million shares of Zhongguancun via six accounts he actually controlled, with a 
transaction volume of 93.1 million yuan. When the assets exchange was announced on 28 
June 2007, the obtained profit in the six accounts was more than 34.6 million yuan. 
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During the period when Zhongguancun Company planned to purchase whole shares of 
Pengrun Real Estate for corporate restructuring, from 13 August 2007 to 28 September 
2007, Huang Guangyu instructed other people using 79 accounts to buy 104 million 
shares of Zhongguancun Company with a transaction volume worth 1.322 billion yuan. 
When the corporate restructuring was announced on 7 May 2008, the profit earned in the 
79 accounts was more than 306 million yuan. During the same period, Huang Guangyu 
instructed another group of people using 30 accounts to buy 31.66 million shares of 
Zhongguancun with a transaction volume worth more than 414 million, and gained 
profits of more than 90 million yuan. Finally on 30 August 2010, the Beijing High Court 
convicted Huang Guangyu of illegal business operation, insider trading, and bribery. For 
the part of insider trading, he was sentenced to imprisonment for nine years and fined 600 
million yuan. This case set a record in penalties for the crime of insider trading.  
 Subsequently, stockholders of Zhongguancun Company brought civil 
compensation suits against Huang Guangyu. On 20 December 2012, after three open 
trials, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court decided against the plaintiffs, determining 
that they could not demonstrate that Huang’s activities of insider trading caused their 
damage (Liao, 2013). This was the first civil compensation case against insider trading 
that the court carried out in open trials, but the stockholders failed in the end after about 
two years’ struggle. For insider trading cases, it is often a difficult problem to prove the 
causal relationship between insider trading and damage to stockholders.  
 Insider trading involving corporate restructuring. In late June 2010, the 
president of the CSRC pointed out in a speech that in the process of corporate mergers 
and acquisitions and restructurings, insider trading had become the major problem for the 
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regulation of the Chinese stock market. On 31 May 2010, the case of Zhongshan Public 
Science & Technology was exposed, and Li Qihong, the mayor of Zhongshan City in 
Guangdong Province, was arrested for insider trading. Taking advantage of being the 
mayor of Zhongshan, Li knew that Zhongshan Public Science and Technology Company 
was restructured and would be listed, and then revealed the inside information to her 
family and friends. Through the operation of other related people, Li and her relatives 
acquired illegal profit of about 20 million yuan (Liao, 2013). In 2011, Li Qihong, 
received criminal penalties for insider trading, revealing insider information, and bribery. 
On 20 November, the CSRC said that the accounts of abnormal transactions were tracked 
by the real-time monitoring system of the stock exchanges, and the scope for supervision 
expanded; e.g., all transactions of stocks of the listed companies involving restructuring 
were tracked (Y. Yang, 2010).   
 Majority shareholders earned huge profits in the bear market of 2012. The 
regulatory department strengthened attacking insider trading and punished a series of 
corporate executives and officials, e.g., Dong Zhengqing (former CEO of GuangFa 
Securities Company), Xie Fenghua (a sponsoring representative and the executive 
general manager of the investment bank of Guo Xin Securities Firm), Li Qihong (mayor 
of Zhongshan City), and so on. In 2011, the president of the CSRC, Guo Shuqing, 
emphasized that the CSRC adopted a zero-tolerance policy against insider trading. But 
insider trading seemed not be curbed effectively. In 2012, the total market capitalization 
of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets decreased by more than four trillion yuan. In 
this way, every stockholder suffered an average loss of about 80,000 yuan. But in the 
long bear market, many majority shareholders still earned huge profits from stock 
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transactions. This caused public doubts that the majority shareholders grabbed huge 
profits through insider trading (Financial Management Weekly, 2013). 
According to Financial Management Weekly (2013), in 2012, for 810 listed 
companies, 1836 majority shareholders (74% institutions, 26% individuals) sold 6.35 
billion shares of the companies at high prices when the stock prices rose, earning 66.7 
billion yuan in cash. For example, the stock price of Chuan Run Joint Stock Corporation 
started rising in February 2012, and its actual controller, Luo Lihua and her relatives, sold 
75.95 million shares through 12 transactions by April 2012, earning 780 million yuan in 
cash. The former president of Guang Dian Electric quit his position in November 2011 
and then sold out his 120 million shares of the company in July 2012 for 496 million 
yuan. Many of the majority shareholders seemed to play the capital games so precisely 
that it again raised doubts about tunneling and insider trading. For example, at the end of 
January 2012, the stock of East Yuan Lin fell to a record low price. Director Liang and 
supervisor Deng purchased numerous shares and then sold shares at a high price on 12 
September, earning 28.27 million and 1,423 million yuan in cash, respectively. During 
this period, East Yuan Lin implemented incentive equity and dividend policies to cause 
its stock price to rise.  
 The fat-finger event of China Everbright Securities Company in 2013. The 
most shocking event in the 2013 stock market was the fat finger event of China 
Everbright Securities Company. Around 11:05am on 16 August 2013, 71 stocks, mainly 
of state-owned banks and oil companies, rose and closed immediately at the daily limit of 
moving up, which caused the Shanghai Composite Index to grow by more than 5% in just 
three minutes, increasing 80% in the transaction volume (Hexun Stock, 2013). This 
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abnormal surge resulted from the huge buy orders by China Everbright Securities 
Company, the fifth-largest securities brokerage in China. As China Everbright Securities 
stated, the huge buy orders were caused by a fat-finger error when a dealer mistakenly 
sent buy orders worth 23.4 billion yuan to the Shanghai Stock Exchange (the deals closed 
were worth 7.27 billion yuan) due to a computer technical problem (Hexun Stock, 2013).  
 On 18 August 2013, the CSRC concluded that China Everbright Securities’ huge 
buy orders in the morning were due to technical errors and internal control defects, but its 
sales of shares and stock index futures before disclosing the former errors were deemed 
as insider trading. On 14 November 2013, the CSRC issued an administrative penalty, 
fining Everbright Securities more than 500 million yuan (five times the profit obtained 
from insider trading), and banning four company executives responsible for the case for 
life from the securities industry. The CSRC appeared to encourage retail investors to 
claim for compensation through legal procedures. More than 60 retail investors filed suits 
against Everbright Securities for compensation for their losses caused by the fat-finger 
event. But on 18 February 2014, Beijing No. 1 Intermediate Court accepted the suit 
against the CSRC brought by Yang Jianbo, former chief of the trading department of the 
Everbright Securities. Yang Jianbo requested the court to annul the CSRC’s 
administrative penalties, as he claimed that the occurrence of trading errors was not 
inside information and the sales of stocks and futures in the afternoon were normal 
practices to offset the loss caused by the technical terrors and did not constitute insider 
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trading (Hexun Stock, 2013). The court overruled Yang Jianbo’s claims and supported 
the CSRC’s administrative penalties21.     
 The difficulty of checking insider trading. As the People’s Supreme Court 
admitted, the difficulties in discovery and evidence collection led to a sharp discrepancy 
between small number of cases handled by the court and the increase of insider trading in 
reality (Liao, 2013). The cases raised discussions on identification of inside information, 
classification of the subject of insider trading, and the scope of activities of insider 
trading. How to identify when the information is made public is a problem. According to 
Western experience, when the information impacts the securities market, it can be 
regarded as having been made public (X. Yu, 2009; Liao, 2013). Another issue is whether 
the inside information must be true, that is whether the inside information obtained is 
consistent with the information published in the officially designated media. In reality, 
even the information published in the officially designated media might be faked; for 
example, some listed companies’ financial reports and statements published in the 
officially designated media were faked; but they were information that affected the 
securities market. Thus, if the inside information turns out to be in general accord with 
the information published in the officially designated media, they can be identified as real 
information (X. Yu, 2009; Liao, 2013). If the information is inconsistent with those 
published, the person revealing it cannot be the subject of the crime of insider trading, but 
might be the subject of the crime of making and spreading false information or market 
manipulation.   
                                                           
21 http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-12/26/c_127337609.htm 
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 The 1997 Criminal Law added a new article (Article 180) providing penalties 
against insider trading. After revisions, the maximum term of imprisonment was 
increased to 10 years. But insider trading has increased greatly in recent years, especially 
in the process of corporate restructuring. Some scholars argue, considering the striking 
potential illegal gains and the difficulty of investigation and evidence collection, the 
maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment cannot curb the impulse of offenders (Liao, 
2013). On 16 November 2010, the General Office of the State Council forwarded the 
Opinions Regarding Fighting and Preventing Insider Trading in Capital Markets issued 
by the CSRC, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of Supervision, the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), and the 
Bureau of Corruption Prevention, jointly. The Notice requires the establishment of a 
registering system for persons with inside information for corporate self-inspection and 
administrative regulatory check. According to this Notice, in 2011 the CSRC made the 
Regulation Regarding Listed Companies’ Establishment of Registering and Management 
System of Persons with Inside Information. But those who knew inside information often 
used accounts under the name of other persons to conduct stock trading, or revealed 
inside information to other persons. On 22 May 2012, the Supreme People’s Court and 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate jointly issued the Interpretation Regarding the 
Application of Specific Laws in Handling Cases of Insider Trading or Revealing Inside 
Information, and put it into effect on 1 June 2012. Supplementary to the Criminal Law 
Article 180, the Interpretation specifically defines and classifies the subjects of the crime 
of insider trading.  
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Hidden Rules for IPOs on ChiNext 
 ChiNext produced 500 billionaires and numerous millionaires in one year upon its 
establishment (H. Pi, 2010). ChiNext brought great wealth to actual controllers of listed 
companies, corporate executives, securities firms, and venture capital firms; however, at 
the same time, according to the survey by the media, about 70% of public investors 
suffered losses from ChiNext (H. Pi, 2010). As summarized by Pi Haizhou, there were 
three main reasons why the majority of public investors suffered losses from ChiNext (H. 
Pi, 2010). First, the high price-earnings (PE) ratios (the average PE ratio of the stocks on 
ChiNext was 65) made the corporate insiders, securities firms, and venture capital firms 
earn huge profits and exposed the public investors to high risks. Second, excessive 
speculation plagued ChiNext and often resulted in losses of public investors. Although 
the issuance prices were high, many listed companies on ChiNext had small volumes of 
shares and were easily manipulated, which invited manipulators and speculators. Third, 
ineffective regulation aggravated risks to public investors. For example, in the process of 
IPOs, securities firms were often both sponsors and shareholders of listed companies. 
Thus the securities firms had motivation to increase the stock issuance prices. In the 
process of inquiry for price making, the units for price inquiry often quoted high prices to 
favor the listed companies and related parties, but the regulatory department did not 
impose corresponding penalties on misstatements. Measures to curb speculations on new 
stocks often lagged behind, and the light penalty would not deter potential offenders. 
Consequently, the insiders got sudden wealth from IPOs on ChiNext at the expense of the 
majority of public investors. 
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 On 23 June 2010, an article written by a journalist of the 21st Century Economic 
Report exposed the hidden rules among sponsors, middlemen, and venture capital firms 
in IPOs on ChiNext (Lei, 2010). The journalist stated he got to know the hidden rules 
from many insiders of the venture capital firms and investment banks. Since sponsors 
held great power of recommending applicants for listing and mentoring pre-listed 
companies, they could request equity of the companies that applied or prepared for listing. 
An IPO could bring huge profits to the venture capital firm that held equity of the 
company before it was listed on the stock exchange. Thus, venture capital firms made 
efforts to rope in sponsors or sponsoring project groups to acquire the chance to get 
equity of pre-listed companies.  
 After the establishment of ChiNext, the sudden huge profits venture capital firms 
gained from IPOs became more conspicuous. According to statistical reports, 80% of the 
companies listed on ChiNext were supported by venture capital firms. The average 
investment cycle was two years, and the average book rate of return exceeded ten times 
(Lei, 2010). For example, Hai Rui Pu set a record high IPO price, Goldman Sachs, 
holding 12.5% of its equity, obtained a rate of return of 200 times (Lei, 2010). The 
sudden huge profits from IPOs resulted from inflated appraisals and high premiums for 
stock issuance. As venture capital firms could not directly step into the process of listing 
enterprises, and it was hard to get information about the to-be-listed companies through 
public channels, it was an efficient way for them to contact sponsors. Sponsors had 
abundant information about the pre-listed companies, and moreover, they played a 
critical role in deciding the listing of the companies, so the companies usually would not 
reject the recommendation of sponsors. In addition, some sponsors would take the 
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initiative to contact venture capital firms, since they would get huge profits from 
matching venture capital firms to pre-listed companies (Lei, 2010).  
 Insiders revealed to the journalist that a venture capital firm usually gave 
sponsors/middlemen intermediary fees equal to 1-1.5% of the pre-listed company’s 
equity it acquired. After ChiNext was established, the intermediary fees increased to 
about 3% of the equity acquired; for some good projects, sponsors could even get 5% of 
the equity acquired (Lei, 2010). Another payment method for very promising projects 
was that in addition to the intermediary fees for acquiring the company’s equity, sponsors 
requested a certain percentage (sometimes even reaching 20%) of the investment profit 
the venture capital firm earned from selling the equity after the company was listed. The 
insiders said that this was a common practice in the industry. Driven by expected huge 
profits, sponsoring representatives in securities firms and sponsoring project group 
members or senior executives of investment banks often acted as middlemen between the 
companies and venture capital firms for equity acquiring. Venture capital firms usually 
would pay them according to agreements under the table in order to keep a long-term 
cooperation with them. With a lack of effective supervision, the power of sponsors 
produced room for corruption.  
The IPO Fraud Flooded SME and ChiNext 
According to the statistical report, 347 companies conducted their IPOs in 2010, 
among which 81 companies (23.34% of all the newly listed companies) announced the 
sudden downturn of corporate performance in their first yearly financial reports after 
being listed; in 2011, there were 282 newly listed companies, among which 75 companies 
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(26.6%) announced the sudden downturn of corporate performance in their first yearly 
financial reports after being listed; in 2012, since the market was low, only 153 
companies were listed, among which 58 companies announced the sudden downturn of 
performance in their first yearly financial reports after being listed (China Economic 
Weekly, 2013). The sudden change of corporate performance caused doubts about 
misrepresentation in their application in order to meet the requirements of the IPO.  
 The case of Green Land Company. The case of Green Land Company was the 
first case of IPO fraud on the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Board (SME). In the 
first three years after its listing, the company frequently changed accounting firms, 
changed senior executives, and changed financial statements. Especially, from October 
2009 to April 2010, Green Land Company publicized its expected profit in 2009 as more 
than 100 million yuan in the first report; then it changed the number several times, and in 
the end, it announced that it had a loss of 150 million yuan in 2009 (People.com, 2011). 
The abnormal activities of Green Land Company caused doubts. In March 2010, the 
CSRC investigated the company. Actually, when the Green Land Company applied for 
secondary offerings in 2009, the local securities regulatory department noticed its 
financial irregularities, rejected its application, and ordered it to correct the problems. But 
the local regulatory department did not publicize the information (Securities Market 
Weekly, 2013). After the investigation by the CSRC, the case was sent to the public 
security department for criminal investigation in September 2010. Before the exposure of 
the scandal, its four original shareholders sold their shares for huge amounts of cash 
(Xinhuanet.com 2011, April 02). 
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In December 2011, the Guandu District Court of Kunming City fined Green Land 
Company 4 million RMB and sentenced former company president, He Xuekui, to three 
years’ imprisonment with a suspension of four years; other responsible managers were 
sentenced to several years’ imprisonment with a suspension. This judgment caused severe 
criticisms that the punishments were too light. The People’s Procuratorate appealed 
against the court judgment. Consequently, on 7 February 2013, the Kunming 
Intermediate Court made the decision to change the first judgment. According to the 
judicial investigation, Green Land Company inflated its income by 300 million yuan 
before it was listed and inflated its income by 251 million yuan from its listing to 2009. 
Through 35 related companies, He Xuekui and managers faked contracts, invoices, and 
other documents to make false business transactions and inflate assets and income. Green 
Land Company was convicted of IPO fraud, faking financial documents and destroying 
accounting documents, and was fined 10.24 million yuan. This time, He Xuekui was 
sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with no suspension. He Xuekui appealed to the 
Yunnan High Court, but the court overruled her appeal and upheld the judgment of the 
Kunming Intermediate Court. He Xuekui became the first corporate president to be jailed 
for IPO fraud in the Chinese stock market (Nanjing Evening News, 2012).  
Although the criminal penalties provided by the Kunming Intermediate Court 
were more severe than the first court judgment, the fine of 10.4 million yuan imposed on 
the Green Land Company was still too small compared to the huge volume of capital, 346 
million yuan, raised from IPO (Cnr.cn 2013, February 22). He Xuekui, the former actual 
controller of the company, who was convicted of IPO fraud, misrepresentation, faking 
financial documents and destroying accounting vouchers, and was fined only 600,000 
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yuan. It indicated that the offenders would still keep huge profits obtained from the 
financial fraud even after they received criminal penalties.  
 Upon completion of the judicial case of Green Land Company, the CSRC 
imposed administrative penalties on the intermediary agencies and practitioners for the 
IPO of Green Land Company. HuaTaiLianHe Securities Firm was fined at the maximum 
provided by the laws. Two sponsoring representatives had their licenses revoked and 
were banned for life from the securities industry. Shenzhen Pengcheng Accounting Firm 
had its license for securities business revoked. But some argued that the punishment was 
still too light compared to that in Hong Kong, where the sponsoring representative would 
receive a criminal penalty in addition to his license being revoked (Xinhuanet.com 2013, 
February 28th).  
After exposure of the case, scholars emphasized that the low cost for securities 
fraud and high expected profit were the main factors luring potential offenders, thus 
severe punishment should be applied to curb IPO fraud. Some questioned the role of 
sponsors and the Issuance Review Committee of the CSRC in the IPO of Green Land 
Company and claimed that the related institutions and regulatory department should be 
investigated. The vice director of International Finance Research Center of Shenzhen 
University, Guo Shiping, pointed out that this case revealed three problems of the current 
Chinese securities regulatory system (Xinhua News 2011, April 2nd). First, lack of 
supervision over the CSRC in securities issuance review produced more room for 
corruption. He claimed the power of review and decision making should be assigned to 
the stock exchanges, and the CSRC should supervise the work of the stock exchanges, 
which would make a system of checks and balances to reduce the room for corruption. 
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Second, the lack of effective delisting mechanism encouraged securities fraud of listed 
companies in this speculative market. Third, too light a penalty imposed on the offender 
would not deter the potential offenders.  
Lawyers also appealed to strengthen and expand the scope of the protection of 
investors. Currently, administrative penalties or criminal penalties had to be in place 
before anyone could claim compensation for damages. But as stated by securities lawyer 
Xue Hongzeng, the stock exchange’s penalty measures, e.g., reprimand and decision to 
order the listed company to rectify, were not the prerequisite for investors to bring a civil 
compensation case against securities fraud. Thus investors could not claim compensation 
for their interest being damaged by those listed companies that the stock exchanges 
adopted measures to punish. The stock exchanges’ reprimand and order, these lawyers 
argued, should be sufficient prerequisite for civil compensation cases (Xinhua News 2011, 
April 02nd).  
 The case of Wan Fu Sheng Ke. While the case of Green Land had not yet come 
to an end, the Chinese stock market was shocked by another big case of IPO fraud on 
ChiNext. The exposure of the Wan Fu Sheng Ke scandal was triggered by a routine 
inspection by the CSRC and its Hunan Branch that found problems in the company’s 
2012 mid-year report. Responding to the investigation, in October 2012, Wan Fu Sheng 
Ke issued a self-inspection report admitting that the company made false statements in its 
2012 mid-year report, inflating income by about188 million yuan, costs by about 146 
million yuan, and net profit by about 40.23 million yuan; after the correction, the actual 
business income and net profit were 82.17 million yuan and -13.68 million yuan, 
decreasing by 64% and 144%, respectively (China Business Journal, 2013). The CSRC 
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then ordered it to self inspect the financial reports for three consecutive years right before 
its IPO. In March 2013, Wan Fu Sheng Ke issued a self-inspection report to admit that 
the company made false statements in the 2008-2011 yearly reports and inflated the total 
of income and net profit by about 740 million yuan and about 180 million yuan 
respectively. From 2008 to 2010, 47%, 90%, and 84% of the business income, business 
profit, and net profit, respectively, were fabricated (China Business Journal, 2013).  
In August 2013, Wan Fu Sheng Ke Company president, Gong Yongfu, was 
arrested for IPO fraud, misrepresentation and faking financial bills and invoices. This was 
the first case of securities fraud in ChiNext. Xia Cao, an accounting expert, said that this 
honest-looking veteran crippled in the war had cheated the financial experts (Sina.com, 
2014). As described by Xia Cao, it was a kind of culture prevalent in the capital circle of 
Hunan Province that packaging the company was a common step for IPO, and they 
tended to follow hidden rules and ignore laws and regulations. This culture contributed to 
the occurrence of IPO fraud, such as the scandal of Wan Fu Sheng Ke.  
Upon exposure of the scandals, the CSRC imposed severe penalties on the related 
intermediary agencies that provided false information for IPO application. Subsequently, 
among more than 800 enterprises in the process of review for IPO applications, more 
than 200 companies had their IPO applications revoked (Cao, 2013). Meanwhile, the 
CSRC sought public comments on the reform for the system of new stock issuance. 
Ping’an Securities Company, as the sponsor for the IPO of Wan Fu Sheng Ke, was 
sanctioned by the CSRC. The CSRC reprimanded Ping’an Securities Company, 
confiscated its income of 25.55 million yuan from the IPO of Wan Fu Sheng Ke, fined it 
51.1 million yuan, and suspended its certificate as sponsor for three months (Liao, 2013). 
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The CSRC also reprimanded Wu Wenhao and He Tao, the two sponsoring 
representatives, fined them 300,000 yuan respectively, revoked their certificate of 
sponsoring representative, and banned them for life from the securities industry. In 
addition, business executives, internal controllers and project coordinators of Ping’an 
Securities Company for the IPO of Wan Fu Sheng Ke were reprimanded, fined, and their 
certificates of practitioner in the securities industry were revoked. Before this case, the 
CSRC usually just punished the sponsoring representatives who signed for the sponsoring 
business. In this case, the scope and severity of punishment against the sponsor were 
expanded. The CSRC also punished Zhong Lei Accounting Firm and Hunan Bo Ao Law 
Firm as the intermediary agencies for the IPO of Wan Fu Sheng Ke.  
Ping’an Securities Company stated that it did not intentionally make false 
financial statements, but was cheated by Wan Fu Sheng Ke (Xinhua News, 2013). But 
Ping’an Securities Firm was regarded as a notorious financial fraud maker. According to 
a statistical report by iFind from 2009 to March 2013, Ping’an Securities Firm had 
sponsored 73 IPO projects, among which 31 companies announced a sudden downturn of 
corporate performance in the first yearly reports after being listed (Xinhua News, 2013). 
For investors who suffered in the case of Wan Fu Sheng Ke, Ping’an Securities Company 
established a special fund holding 300 million yuan, which was the first time that the 
sponsor took an initiative to compensate investors. But Ping’an Securities Company 
required that if an investor accepts compensation from the fund, he/she can no longer 
claim compensation again from the responsible party; if an investor does not accept 
compensation from the fund, he/she can bring a suit for compensation in accordance with 
the law, but he/she will bear the costs and risks for the litigation. The controller of Wan 
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Fu Sheng Ke Company promised to bear the part of the compensation they should pay, 
and offered 30 million shares of Wan Fu Sheng Ke as a pledge to the China Securities 
Investors Protection Fund Limited Company for compensation. Although it is likely to 
have negative effects on the justice of the administrative penalty, Liao (2013) suggests 
this measure would help efficiently compensate investors who suffered from securities 
fraud.  
 Article 189 of the Securities Law provides, “where an issuer fails to meet the 
requirements of issuance and cheats for the verification for issuance by any fraudulent 
means, if the relevant securities have been issued, a fine of 1% up to 5% of the illegal 
proceeds as unlawfully raised shall be imposed. The person-in-charge and any other 
person directly responsible shall be imposed of fine of 30,000 yuan up to 300,000 yuan.” 
The Criminal Law provides that the offender “should be sentenced to fix-term 
imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention, and concurrently or 
independently a fine of 1% up to 5% of the illegal proceeds as unlawfully raised shall be 
imposed.” For example, Green Land was only fined 10.24 million, while it raised 394 
million through the IPO. Wan Fu Sheng Ke raised 425 million yuan through IPO, equal 
to 21 times its total net profit from 2006 to 2008 before being listed (New Financial 
Observer, 2013). The penalty of imprisonment of not more than five years was also too 
light to deter potential offenders. Compared to the huge profit, hundreds of millions or 
billions of yuan the offender grabbed through IPOs, the amount of fine and incarceration 
provided by the laws was too small to punish offenders. The causes of the frequent 
occurrence of IPO fraud were the expected huge profit from IPO and the too-light penalty 
the current legal system would impose on the offender. 
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 Furthermore, the listed company could not be directly removed from the stock 
market for IPO fraud. For example, Green Land Company was fined only 10.24 million 
yuan, and remained listed on the SME board. Upon the exposure of scandals, the stock 
exchanges revised the rules and provided that if a listed company had recorded losses for 
consecutive three years or its net asset were negative, its stock would be suspended from 
the stock exchange. For a listed company on the ChiNext, if it was publicly reprimanded 
by the stock exchange three times in 36 months, it would be delisted from the stock 
exchange (New Financial Observer, 2013). But it was a problem that if a listed company 
were delisted. Investors buying the shares in the IPO or the secondary market would 
experience difficulty in getting compensation since the raised funds would be hard to 
return.  
The Reflection on the Case of Hontex International in Hong Kong Stock Market 
 In contrast, Hong Kong securities regulatory departments have applied severe 
penalties against IPO fraud recently. The case of Hontex International was an example. In 
December 2009, Hontex International was listed on the Hong Kong stock market, but 
only three months after listing, it was suspended from the stock exchange since the Hong 
Kong Securities and Futures Commission (HKSFC) alleged that its prospectus included 
false information and misleading data. According to the investigation, Hontex 
International inflated its sales income by 381 million HKD (40%), 709 million HKD 
(220%), 905 million HKD (230%), and inflated its profit before tax by 102 million HKD 
(730%), 185 million HKD (1750%), and 298 million HKD (2610%) in 2006, 2007, and 
2008, respectively (Su and Yang, 2012). The HKSFC sued Hontex International in the 
Hong Kong High Court, requesting that the court ban the company and its four wholly-
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owned subsidiaries from transferring or disposing of their assets in Hong Kong, withdraw 
and take over the net capital of 997 million HKD it raised through IPO, and return the 
raised capital to investors. In June 2012, the HKSFC and Hontex International reached an 
agreement that Hontex International would buy back the shares from 7,700 public 
investors at the closing price before the suspension that was about 1.03 billion HKD, 
more than the capital it raised through IPO. The Hong Kong High Court confirmed the 
agreement and ordered Hontex International to implement the agreement. In April 2012, 
the HKSFC imposed a record severe penalty on Zhao Feng Capital, the IPO sponsor of 
Hontex International. The HKSFC revoked its license as sponsor, and fined it 42 million 
HKD, and revoked the license of its president as sponsoring representative (QQ.com, 
2012, April 23).  
 In the case of Hontex International, the severe penalties imposed on the offender 
by the Hong Kong securities regulators increased the criminal cost to more than the 
expected profit from the crime, which achieved the goal of social fairness for public 
investors and would greatly deter potential offenders. More importantly, the HKSFC on 
behalf of the investors sued Hontex International in court, requesting the court to order 
the company to return the capital raised from IPO to public investors. This relief 
mechanism is effective and efficient for compensating investors. In mainland China, 
investors could claim compensation through individual or collective civil litigation, but 
they need to spend much time and cost and bear risks, and even if they win the case in the 
end, they would not get enough compensation to cover their losses.  
 Although the CSRC showed that it would adopt stricter measures to punish IPO 
fraud and misrepresentation, the recent exposure of its dealing with South Textile 
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Company again aroused public criticism (Sina.com, 2014b). On 17 May 2014, South 
Textile Company announced that it received a written decision of administrative penalty 
from the CSRC. The CSRC imposed a warning and a fine of 500,000 yuan on it for 
inflating income by more than 344 million yuan from 2006 to 2010; the former president 
and other corporate managers were warned and fined between 30,000 yuan and 300,000 
yuan. This raised questions: South Textile made false statements for five years, but the 
regulatory department did not discover this for such a long time. According to the 
Securities Law and other related regulations, a listed company that generated losses for 
four consecutive years would be delisted. South Textile generated losses for five 
consecutive years, but was not delisted. The company inflated income by a huge amount, 
but was fined only 500,000 yuan, and the corporate executives received very light 
penalties. This case again caused concern about the negative effect of the low cost for 
crimes and irregularities and the ineffective enforcement of delisting mechanisms.  
Reform of the Chinese Stock Market in the Near Future  
 In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee 
confirmed that a registration system would be adopted to replace the approval system for 
IPO and listing. Subsequently, on 30 November 2013, the CSRC issued the Opinions 
Regarding Furthering the Reform of New Stock Issuance System, aiming to prepare for 
the adoption of a registration system (Shanghai Securities Daily, 2014, June 11). The 
establishment of the registration system would change the role of the government in the 
stock market. The regulatory department would conduct supervision during the process 
and after stock issuance, rather than implementing administrative assignment and 
designation before stock issuance.  
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On 24 January 2014, the New System of Share Transfer was opened, which is a 
market for equity transfer of unlisted joint stock companies, especially for medium and 
small enterprises with high and new technology (Eastmoney.com, 2014). This System is 
a part of the multi-layer capital market, providing a more efficient and inexpensive 
channel for medium and small companies in the earlier stage than those on the main 
board, SME, and ChiNext. In April 2014, the CSRC and HKSRC jointly approved the 
pilot program of Shanghai- Hong Kong Stock Connect (Hu Gang Tong). The pilot stocks 
in the two exchanges were open to investors of mainland China and Hong Kong. It was a 
critical step for investors in mainland China to go into the international capital market, 
which could at some level change the inflated assessment of stock prices in ChiNext and 
the too low assessment of prices of blue chips stocks, and improve the investment 
philosophy of Chinese investors (Sina.com, 2014a, June 28).  
In May 2014, the State Council published the Opinions Regarding Further 
Fostering the Healthy Development of the Capital Market, which is called the New Nine 
Opinions. The New Nine Opinions proposed to develop indirect and direct financing, 
especially to increase the ratio of direct financing, which means the equity market 
representing the direct financing would be given more importance. Some argued that the 
common problems of the stock market, e.g., poor corporate governance and less attention 
to investors in the secondary stock market were because the equity market occupied only 
a small part of the country’s economic system and thus did not gain enough attention. For 
example, in 2013, the funds raised from the equity market were only 401.6 billion yuan, 
while the funds raised from bonds exceeded 9 trillion yuan, and the funds raised from 
bank loans exceeded 12 trillion yuan. Equity financing only occupied 1.8% (Xu and Liu, 
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2014). As its importance and status are enhanced, the corresponding institutions and legal 
system would be developed to improve the protection of investors (H. Zhou, 2014). 
The critical point of the New Nine Opinions is that the goal of the equity market 
is to foster the development of the real economy (S. Zhang, 2014), which indicated that 
the development of the stock market would be closely related to the economic 
development and reflect the status of the real economy. The main tasks of the Chinese 
stock market in the years to come were summarized in the New Nine Opinions as: to 
establish the registration system for stock issuance, to facilitate the construction of a 
multi-layer capital market, to improve the quality of listed companies, to encourage 
market-oriented merger and acquisition and corporate restructuring, to improve delisted 
mechanisms, and to cultivate private equity markets. Currently, the pressure from local 
debts, potential bubbles in the real estate market, and excessive production capacity in the 
manufacturing industry made the government turn to equity financing for more capital to 
support the rapid growth of the economy. In another words, the development of the real 
economy urgently needed an increase in direct financing, the fundraising from the equity 
market (Xu and Liu, 2014). The adoption of the registration system for new stock 
issuance and the establishment of New Share Transfer System were aiming to increase 
equity financing.  
The Securities Law will be revised in the near future to meet the need of the 
adoption of a registration system. As revealed by the drafting group, the revised 
Securities Law would focus on three concepts: expanding the definition of securities, 
centering on information disclosure, and fostering comprehensive operations of securities 
institutions, which would give more autonomy to securities market participants for 
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investment and financing (Economic News Daily, 2014, September 22). The adoption of 
registration system for stock issuance requested higher standards for information 
disclosure by applicants. Applicants for stock issuance would take more responsibility for 
the truth and integrity of information disclosed. The most-watched focus of the revised 
Securities Law is the adoption of the registration system for IPO, which would cause the 
repositioning of the CSRC and the stock exchanges in securities market regulation and 
operation. The current president of the CSRC, Xiao Gang, showed that the Chinese-style 
reform for the registration system would be carried out and then implemented after the 
revision of the Securities Law is completed and the situations are mature (Economic 
News Daily, 2014, September 22).   
Conclusions 
 The release of the 2004 Nine Opinions of the State Council signaled that the 
regulatory authorities recognized that the Chinese stock market should follow market 
principles, comply with the rule of law, and provide stronger protection for public 
investors. The sponsorship system for stock issuance and listing were adopted to enhance 
the transparency of administrative actions and invite public supervision. The SME and 
ChiNext were established to form a diversified capital market and build a closer 
relationship with public investors. The non-tradable share reform aimed to realize the 
market function of corporate value discovery and improve corporate governance. 
Learning from the lessons of previous attempts, the non-tradable share reform invited 
public investors to participate in the decision making process. Meanwhile, the regulatory 
authorities adopted measures to clean up the securities industry and check listed 
companies, attacking misappropriation, illegal guarantees, manipulation, insider trading, 
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and other offences. The Company Law and the Securities Law were revised to strengthen 
regulation of the stock market and protection of public investors. 
 However, implementation of the reforms proposed by the Nine Opinions deviated 
from the original intentions and violated principles for investor protection.  After the 
initiation of the non-tradable share reform, the protection of investors, especially public 
retail stockholders, has been the focus of disputes regarding whether the government 
played an appropriate role in the operation and regulation of the stock market. Given the 
frequent occurrence of irregularities, the sharp fall of the market three years after the 
initiation of non-tradable share reform led to blame being placed on the CSRC. The 
ambiguous rules, inconsistent enforcements, and ineffective regulation invited potential 
offenders. Corporate insiders and related parties took advantage of their power and 
resources to grab huge profits from public retail stockholders during the process of non-
tradable share reform (Y. Lu, 2010; Lang, 2012; Z. Wang, 2010).  
 The recurring irregularities and crimes, such as manipulation, insider trading, rat 
trading and so on, showed the weaknesses in laws and their implementations. For 
example, the laws still provide light penalties, especially monetary sanctions, towards 
IPO fraud and misrepresentation. The case of Green Land was an example. Compared to 
the huge potential profits from the IPO, light monetary sanctions did not reflect the 
principle of justice and could not deter potential offenders (Securities Market Weekly, 
2013). The difficulties in discovering and collecting evidence to demonstrate securities 
frauds, e.g., insider trading and rat trading, also reduced the possibilities of catching 
offenders and decreased deterrence by laws and regulations (Liao, 2013). In addition, in 
some cases it’s hard to demonstrate the causal relationship between securities fraud and 
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losses of investors. For example, in the case of Huang Guangyu, public stockholders 
claimed compensations for their damages, but they failed to demonstrate that their losses 
were caused by insider trading (Luo and Yu, 2010). 
 The enforcement of laws also encountered challenges from the regulatory 
department’s inconsistencies in attacking irregularities. For example, due to concern 
about the stability of the market, when the market was low, the regulatory authorities 
tended to be lenient toward the fund management firms that were responsible for 
irregularities. The recent case of South Textile Company was another example of the 
inconsistencies in law enforcement (Sina.com, 2014b). Although the CSRC claimed it 
would adopt stricter measures against misrepresentation, it still did not follow the laws 
and only imposed too light penalties on the South Textile Company for its 
misrepresentations. The inconsistencies in law enforcements hurt the integrity and 
authority of the legal system (Gu, 2009).  
 Serious IPO fraud, manipulation, misrepresentation, and other securities 
irregularities quickly plagued the relatively new markets, the SME and ChiNext. The 
sponsorship system did not help improve the transparency of the administrative 
procedures and better protect investors. Instead, sponsors took advantage of their 
excessive power and formed the hidden rules for stock issuance and listing on the 
ChiNext (Lei, 2010). In addition, some sponsors employed inside information they knew 
in their duty to grab profits through insider trading. The complicated relationship between 
the government and interest groups made the external regulation over the stock market 
ineffective. A series of irregularities pointed to the nature of the Chinese stock market as 
a money-raising market filled with crazy speculation, which created an environment for 
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rampant securities irregularities with the ignorance of laws and the absence of respect for 
public investors.  
 The above cases, especially those about insider trading, revealed the offender’s 
ignorance of the law or ignoring of the law. The case of Wan Fu Sheng Ke showed a 
culture in the capital circle that preferred hidden rules to laws and regulations (Xia, 2014). 
This indicated that the regulatory departments should make greater efforts to provide 
people with legal knowledge, which would help improve self-regulation and corporate 
internal regulation. It is worth noting that doubts from scholars and some common people 
challenged listed companies and pressed the regulatory departments to punish offenders. 
For example, the investigation on Wuhan XinLanDe was initiated by an investor who 
reported the abnormal transactions to the regulatory authorities. In addition to academic 
stars (e.g., Lang Xianping), common people posted comments online from time to time 
revealing misrepresentation of listed companies. Public supervision brought a positive 
impact on the regulatory authorities and formed an active part of the external regulation.  
 The CSRC was created to be a watchdog for the stock market, but it seems not to 
have met this goal under the current institutional arrangements and environment. In the 
years to come, a registration system would be adopted to replace the approval system for 
IPOs and listing. The legal system and institutional arrangements would be adjusted to 
meet the need of the establishment of the registration system. The registration system will 
require higher standards for information disclosure and impose stricter responsibilities on 
the stakeholders. It does not mean that IPOs and listings do not need the supervision of 
regulatory departments, but rather it indicates the change of the role of the government in 
the operation and management of the Chinese stock market. The Chinese stock market is 
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expected to enter into a new stage, which is the outcome of the dynamics among the 
government, the market, and investors. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC RETAIL STOCKHOLDERS: THE GROWTH OF STOCKIZENS 
Introduction 
 To explore public retail stockholders’ experience in stock trading, their views 
about securities crimes, and their opinions about the stock market regulation, I conducted 
interviews22 with 40 retail stockholders of two Chinese cities, Shenzhen and Haikou. The 
interviews focused on respondents’ motivations for stock investment, how to choose 
stocks, views about misrepresentation, corporate misconduct, insider trading, and 
manipulation, as well as illegal consultation. All of them thought that securities fraud and 
crimes were common in the Chinese stock market and public retail stockholders were a 
disadvantaged group. The majority of the interviewees said the regulation of the stock 
market improved gradually, but penalties imposed on offenders are still too light and 
enforcement is still weak.  
 Although the interviewees were only a very small part and are not representative 
of the entire population of Chinese retail stockholders, their views provided some 
reflections on the stock market regulation and investor protection. The experience of the 
interviewees suggests that the institutional defects aggravated speculation and produced 
temptation to potential offenders. The government’s excessive intervention, corruption, 
and ineffective regulation, intertwined with rampant securities fraud, led to a twisted 
stock market. But relevant mechanisms adopted to operate the stock market help increase 
the transparency of activities of market participants and pressed the government to 
                                                           
22 This is in compliance with IRB Protocol# 1204007760 from Arizona State University. 
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strengthen external regulation. More importantly, it invited a huge group of stockholders 
into this market-oriented frame. By 2014, there were about 100 million individual 
stockholders in China, and the majority were retail stockholders (SSE, 2014; SZSE, 
2014). Through the experience in stock investment, public stockholders enhanced their 
self-awareness and rights consciousness. The interviews also indicated this growth of 
rights consciousness. Public stockholders have grown to a huge group and are called 
stockizens; like the emergence of netizens, they are a force to be reckoned with in China.  
Public Retail Stockholders 
Due to the institutional defects and regulatory weaknesses mentioned above, 
securities fraud and irregularities plagued the Chinese stock market. Given their 
disadvantages in capital, information, and expertise, public retail stockholders confronted 
risks of becoming victims of market manipulation and other securities irregularities. 
However, many experts also argued that the irrational and speculative investors 
contributed to the rampant securities irregularities and lured potential offenders. On his 
weibo, economist Liu Shengjun (2014), argued that an underlying cause of the low-level 
development of the Chinese stock market was stockholders’ addiction to gambling. As a 
consequence, stockholders could not vote with their feet to press for reform of securities 
market regulation, resulting in an unhealthy stock market. Currently, 99.3% of stock 
accounts are individual accounts, and the majority are accounts of retail stockholders for 
short-term investments (CSRC, 2014). Retail stockholders were often regarded as 
irrational and speculative. Interestingly, in Chinese terminology, trading stocks is often 
called “stir-fry stocks” (chao gu), which vividly describes the short-swing kind of 
speculative trading activities. The lack of attention to this group in studies of the social 
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context for securities irregularities and related white-collar crime and the regulation of 
the stock market is a limitation of prior research, which this study begins to address.  
Interviews with Retail Stockholders 
I interviewed 20 retail stockholders in each of two cities in China, Shenzhen (12 
males and 8 females) and Haikou (10 males and 10 females). Shenzhen, close to Hong 
Kong, was the earliest special economic zone in China and remains an important 
economic center in China. It has a population of more than 10 million people, the 
majority of whom are from other places in China. Hainan Province was the biggest 
special economic zone in China. Haikou is the capital of Hainan Province, but it is no 
longer an economic center in China. It is not a big city in China since its population is 
only about 1.2 million people. Haikou is famous for its good natural environment, and 
people here live a relatively slow and cozy life.  
 Using a loose snow-ball approach, I began interviewing stockholders with whom I 
already had an acquaintance so that I could get access to, and then identified other 
interviewees. The interviews were semi-structured, as I prepared a set of questions and 
adjusted my questions in the interviews. I talked with the interviewees in a tea house or 
took phone interviews if we were not available to talk face to face. The interviews were 
conducted as relaxed conversations, and the length of an interview was flexible. An 
interview in a teahouse took more than one hour while a phone interview averaged thirty 
minutes. The interviewees seemed open and willing to share their experience and views. 
Each interview covered almost all the questions I prepared. An interviewee even talked 
with me in a tea house for a whole afternoon, as he liked sharing his stories of stock 
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investments and his thoughts about high-profile cases. I audiotaped the interviews or took 
notes if the respondent preferred not to be recorded electronically. In the analysis, these 
interviews with retail stockholders are coded in the form of “FS1” or “MH1.” The first 
letter indicates the person’s gender (M refers to male, F refers to female); the second 
letter indicates the city (S refers to Shenzhen, H refers to Haikou); the third number 
indicates the order of the interview.  
In terms of age, two interviewees were under 30 (5%), 11 interviewees were in 
the age range of 30-40 (27.5%), 20 interviewees were 40-50 (50%), four interviewees 
were 50-60 (10%), and three interviewees were over 60 (7.5%). In terms of education 
level, three interviewees had less than a college degree (7.5%), 29 interviewees had 
college degrees (72.5%), and eight interviewees had graduate degrees (20%; four females 
and three males in Shenzhen, and one male in Haikou). In terms of profession, 10 
interviewees were government employees (25%), one interviewee was a doctor in a 
hospital (2.5%), two interviewees were college/technical school teachers (5%), 10 
interviewees were state-owned enterprise employees (25%), four interviewees were bank 
employees (10%), five interviewees were foreign/private enterprise employees (12.5%), 
four interviewees were small business owners (10%), one interviewee was self employed 
(2.5%), and three interviewees were retired people (7.5%).  
Motivations for Stock Investments 
 In the interviews, 38 respondents (95%) said they entered into the stock market 
just for investment (speculation) and interest as they did not make a living by trading 
stocks; only two interviewees (5%) ever conducted stock trading for a living, and that 
was years ago. MS11, a private company employee, said he began stock investments in 
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early 1990 when he had no job and tried to make a living from stock transactions. At that 
time, it was much easier to earn money from stock investments since there were only a 
small number of stocks, and there were comparatively many stock investors. But later, 
the majority of stockholders suffered losses in the stock market. FS2, who was self 
employed, described earning her first pot of gold as an intermediary trading shares of 
enterprises before the stock market was officially established and then profited from 
stock investments when the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was open, but she lost a lot in later 
years and now invested with much greater caution.  
All the interviewees admitted that when they began frying stocks, they felt it 
exciting as an enrichment of life. As MS1 (a private company employee) said, when he 
took his friend’s advice to play stocks in early 1990s, he began to feel more autonomy 
and confidence in his life. MH2, a state-owned enterprise employee, described that he felt 
he had a fulfilling life after he started to invest in stocks. MH3, a bank employee, felt he 
was his own master when he conducted stock transactions. MH15, a technical school 
teacher, described the craze of stock investors in the beginning of the stock market came 
out of the context that common people had just changed from political creatures in the 
past to economic creatures with a passion for acquiring wealth. MH11, a retired 
government official, described that when had retired, he felt a loss because he was 
leaving the familiar environment and circle; when he began frying stocks, he regained a 
substantial life; in all, he earned profit from stock investments, and he felt he made 
another success in his life. FH16 (a retired state-owned enterprise employee) said she 
began to buy stocks when she was working, but she lost a sum; after she retired, she 
continued to play stocks to kill time, and of course, wanted to win back the money. 
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Among the interviewees, two retired persons (5%) mentioned that they fried stocks to kill 
time, and admitted they just used their spare money for stock trading. This somehow 
indicated that the stock market provided a place for retired people in China to have a 
different life23, not just surrounding their families like before.  
MH10 (a small business owner), who was born in the 1980’s, discussed the 
conditions for stock investment in China. He said it is common for Chinese people to 
deposit money in banks, but the generation born in the 1980s or 1990s has less inclination 
to save, preferring to do more investments. He also thought they were not fully 
comfortable placing their money in banks since things changed too much in this era, e.g., 
currency devaluation, possible political instability, and unexpected factors. MS4, a 
government employee, said conducting stock transactions helped him enhance his 
understanding of wealth and investment knowledge as well as improve his time 
management. MS10, a private company employee, thought stock investment could be a 
career for life. FH3, a bank employee, said frying stocks is the most convenient 
investment for a working person. FH6, an employee of a state-owned enterprise, stated 
that she had not enough time and money to do other investments, and frying stock was 
the most suitable investment for her. In the interviews, 38 respondents (95%) said they 
wanted to increase wealth from stock trading, and stock trading is the most convenient 
means of investment.  
FH1 (a state-owned enterprise employee) said she bought some stocks when she 
was on maternity leave at home. In the beginning, she was playing the market totally for 
speculation and fun; if she lost, her life would not be affected too much since she just put 
                                                           
23 As I saw in some public trading halls and rooms in securities companies, many stockholders there were old people. 
While they did stock trading, they discussed stocks, chatted and made jokes.    
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her spare money into it. During the 2006 to 2008 long bull market, she won money from 
almost everything she bought, and she profited on more than 100% of her investment. 
Using the money earned from the stock market, she bought a car worth 100 thousand 
RMB. Her husband did not invest in stocks, and was surprised she did so well. As she 
said, she was in charge of financial management for her family, and gave her husband 
pocket money. She continued to add more funds to her stock account. But in the later 
years, the amount of funds in her stock account fell, and now her stock investments just 
managed to break even. She said they often shared information about stocks with their 
friends and colleagues. When they arrived at their office in the morning, they would 
check WeChat24 for information about stocks and discussed what to buy and sell, just like 
talking about fashions.    
FH13, a government employee, said she has remained in the stock market since 
she suffered losses and hoped to win back the money. She just spent her spare money on 
stocks, and losing money in the stock market did not affect her life. She said she earned 
some money, but was too greedy and bought more stocks at high prices when the index 
of the stock market was at the very top. She had heard some inside information about the 
stock of Eastern Square, but she hesitated and then bought shares at the high price of 
about 20 yuan per share. Now it was about 2 yuan per share. FH9, a bank employee, said 
she was conservative and did not spend too much on stock investments. She was sensitive 
to the stock prices, so she would sell out the stock when its price fell a bit. When the 
stock price changed greatly, she could not sleep and often watched the market trend 
online. Sometimes she felt like she was riding in a roller coaster. 
                                                           
24 WeChat is a mobile communication service provided by Tencent in China. Now it is the most popular tool for 
communication in China. 
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 How to choose stocks. Among the interviewees, 36 respondents (90%) stated that 
they had limited knowledge about the stock market, 31interviewees said that they had 
only very basic knowledge about stock trading, and 5 persons expressed they had little 
knowledge about the stock market. Only 4 persons (10%) expressed they had 
professional knowledge about stock trading and relevant financial statements. MH5, a 
government employee, said that he had tried to learn more professional knowledge on 
stock trading and finance, but he realized those things were not useful for stock 
investment since the corporate information was not transparent or the information 
revealed was not true, and situations would change without timely disclosure. MS20, a 
small business owner, said that almost all financial statements of listed companies were 
false, so he did not believe the corporate performance publicized. MH4, a government 
employee, argued that without effective legal protection, even if you went to the listed 
company’s factories or other production bases, you might not figure out the real condition 
of the company. Among the interviewees, 33 persons (82.5%) said that they paid 
attention to macro policies regarding the stock market, among them nine persons (22.5%) 
expressed that they paid close attention to changes in laws regarding the operation and 
regulation of the stock market. But they said that whether they knew the laws or not had 
little to do with their choice of stocks. MS12, a private company employee, said he only 
cared about the macro policies of the stock market and did not care about changes in the 
laws and policies because they did not affect the stock market. He also felt that strong 
protection of investors could not be achieved in the near future. FH8, a state-owned 
enterprise employee, said that she occasionally looked at some changes of laws and rules, 
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and she thought these might affect the general market trend, but individual stock would 
have different performances.  
Four respondents (10%) said they currently chose stocks only based on their own 
analyses. They admitted that when they began to invest in stocks, they chose stocks based 
on advice from friends, including so-called inside information revealed by others, but 
they suffered losses. Now they did not believe so-called inside information and decided 
to analyze stocks by themselves. They chose stocks based on the analyses of the 
company’s financial fundamentals, performance, prospect, the general situation of the 
whole industry, and capital movements. But they also admitted that sometimes the 
movements of stock prices are not related to the corporate performance. Even if a 
company had a very bad performance, its stock prices would rise if the manipulators 
boosted it. Thirty interviewees (75%) chose stocks based on the combination of others’ 
advice and their own analyses. They would like to take the advice of their friends who are 
experts in securities firms or who have good performance and abundant experience in 
stock investment. In addition, they would analyze the stocks by themselves. The 
remaining six interviewees (15%) said they chose stocks only based on advice from 
friends since they did not know how to analyze the market. They just followed the 
instructions of their friends who performed well in stock investment. They thought it 
would be wasting time to think about how to choose stocks by themselves, and it is more 
efficient to follow experts’ opinions. MS14, a state-owned enterprise employee, said he 
used to look for information, watch news, and combine friends’ advice and his own 
analyses to choose stocks; currently, he lets a securities expert manage his stock 
investment. If he makes a profit, he and that expert will share the profit according to the 
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proportion they set; if he loses, he will bear the loss by himself. As a group, the 
interviewees indicated there was a great need for securities experts to provide advice to 
public retail stockholders. 
  Is the Chinese stock market a casino? All interviewees except two (5%) said 
that the Chinese stock market is still a casino. MH3, a bank employee, argued that the 
Chinese stock market has been in operation for more than 20 years and has developed 
into a huge market with the total value of several trillion yuan. Thus, it is not a casino 
although speculation in the market is serious. MS10, an employee of a state-owned 
enterprise, said that the Chinese stock market is not well-regulated, but it is far from a 
casino. But the other 38 interviewees (95%) thought the Chinese stock market is still a 
casino. FH10, a government employee, said when some government leaders said 
something, the stock market would fall or rise sharply, so that it could not be a real 
market for investment. FH7, a government employee, said that unlike investors in 
advanced stock markets who bought stocks for long-term investment, the Chinese 
stockholders were in the market just for short-term speculation; but in China, if you did 
not sell out when you earned money, the stock price would fall and you would never 
know when it would rise, since there is no standard and rule for the market. MS19, a 
small business owner, said that the Chinese stock market had little value for investment; 
for example, the price of a stock he bought 20 years ago was about 20 yuan per share, but 
now the price was only 2 yuan per share. FS3, a doctor, argued that the Chinese stock 
market was still a casino, but it has improved little by little. MH4, a government 
employee, said the government also needs this big casino and should improve its 
financial functions; otherwise it could not develop. FS9, an employee of a foreign 
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company, said that even the stock market was a casino, the government should fight 
against the offenders who violate the rules.  
As the interviews showed, the notion that the stock market is like a casino came 
out of their view of life. MH10, a small business owner, said frying stock is like a life full 
of changes and uncertainties. MS12, a private company employee, described life as a 
stock market since we need luck, skills, and sometimes tricks. MS18, an employee of a 
foreign company, said any investment has a speculative character; as life is a bet, 
choosing a career is like entering into a casino. FH14, a bank employee, thought that luck 
played a big part in winning profits from stock trading. MS14, a government employee, 
thought he would win if his stock investment continued. FH1, a state-owned enterprise 
employee, said that if you like to bet, you should admit the failure and accept the result 
when you lose. MS5, a government employee, said the way you play stocks depends on 
your character; you should blame yourself for the loss if you rushed to buy the stock after 
the stock price rose abnormally, e.g., rising by the maximum rate in five consecutive days. 
FS13, a state-owned enterprise employee, said if you take it as a bet, sometimes you 
should not blame the government for all your losses. FS16, a state-owned enterprise 
employee, said we need self-control and should not let betting get out of control. As 
indicated by the statements above, male interviewees seemed to show a risk-taking mind, 
while female interviewees mentioned luck and emphasized self-control.   
 Views about financial reporting fraud and other corporate irregularities. 
Interviewees had differing opinions about the impact of corporate misconduct on the 
choice of stocks. Two respondents (5%) said that if a company was involved in fraud, 
they would not buy its stock since it was unreliable. Nine respondents (22.5%) said that it 
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slightly affect their choice of stocks. MS4 argued that exposure of corporate misconduct 
showed that the company’s internal corporate governance was not good, and it somewhat 
affected his choice of stocks. MH5 said that whether he cared about the violations 
depended on whether the irregularities will materially impact on the company. The 
remaining 29 interviewees (72.5%) said corporate misconduct little affected their choice 
of stocks. FS2 believed that almost every Chinese listed company conducted fraud; even 
if you caught a batch of offenders, other offenders would take their place. She even said 
that without making false statements, the company’s stock price could not rise sharply. 
FH6 said that if she got inside information that the stock price of the company would rise, 
she would not care about the negative information on the company. Even if the company 
was involved in a scandal, its stock price would rise if some manipulators boosted it. FH1 
said the publicized misconduct of the listed company executives might affect the stock 
price a little bit, but the corporate scandals would not affect her choice of stocks. MH18, 
a state-owned enterprise employee, stated that he did not care about the misconduct of 
listed company executives that were announced by regulatory departments since the 
outcome is definitely settled when the information was publicized; but it might affect the 
related stocks. As the interviews showed, the majority of interviewees did not care much 
about the publicized corporate misconduct since the official announcements of the 
misconduct were delayed, movements of stock prices were not closely linked to corporate 
governance, and corporate misconduct was prevalent. These factors would result in fewer 
stigmas attached to corporate misconduct.   
As for the corporate executives involved in scandals, 37 respondents (92.5%) 
thought they were criminals, it was a tip of the iceberg, and those caught were just 
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unlucky. MS12 said the corporate executives involved in scandals were definitely 
criminals because they robbed their investors’ money. FS13 thought they were liars and 
crooks, although they were regarded as successful big shots. MS18 said, the Chinese 
stock market is still in an age of barbarism; jungle rules apply, and the winner takes all. 
As MS5 stated, the law could not deal with the tigers (big shots), but just punished some 
flies (small potatoes). FS15, a small business owner, stated that rampant corporate 
scandals are unavoidable in this age of rule of man, thus those caught were just unlucky. 
All of these 37 interviewees said the penalties imposed on the offenders were too light. 
MH9 said that since the cost for crime is too small, the expected profit is so high, the 
legal system is so bad, and the moral standards do not work, anybody in their place would 
violate the law to earn a profit. There were three interviewees (7.5%) who said some 
corporate executives might not be criminals. FH6 said corporate executives are ambitious 
entrepreneurs; in all industries, the executives would make more or less fraudulent 
schemes; otherwise they would not win exorbitant profit. FH17 said she did not think the 
offenders are criminals, but she knew that they caused more damage to victims than 
common crimes, e.g., theft and so on. MH20 made a joke that if he were smart enough, 
he would have gone to Wall Street to loot profits from investors all over the world.  
 Views about inside information and insider trading. Among the interviewees, 
38 persons (95%) said that in the past, people liked to search for inside information, but 
now they have become cautious about so-called inside information because of many 
lessons from past experience. MS18 said that inside information must be confined within 
a very small circle; when it has spread to your ears, the information might be changed to 
differ from what it really was. MS17 said manipulators let some people spread false 
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information in order to affect the stock prices. FH7 said that too much information was 
spread and caused distraction. MS20 said if you now try to tell “inside information” to 
someone, he/she would laugh at you and would not believe it. FH1 said that most retail 
stockholders could not get real inside information, and even getting real inside 
information would not guarantee you would profit because the plan included in the inside 
information might not be successfully implemented, or the decision makers changed their 
mind, or other factors delayed the plan. MH3 said even if you knew the inside 
information, when to buy or sell is the critical issue to determine whether you would win 
a profit or how much you would earn.  
All the interviewees said that insider trading is common in the stock market. Only 
two interviewees (5%) said that they usually heard inside information from their friends 
and took their suggestions to choose stocks and decide when to buy or sell the stocks. 
FH6 said her friend was so successful in stock investments that he has bought many 
apartments and stores with the money earned from stock investments. As she said, her 
friend was close to officials in important departments, such as the National Development 
and Reform Commission, State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission, and so on, who knew relevant policies before they were publicized and 
mastered important inside information of listed companies.  
Thirty-eight interviewees (95%) said insider trading is certainly an irregularity or 
a crime, since it violates the principles of equality, openness, and fairness. As MS1 said, 
insider trading is definitely a crime employing information asymmetry. All of these 38 
interviewees said that it’s necessary to fight against insider trading, but it’s a challenge. 
FH13 said the channels for spreading insider trading are very wide and secret, thus it is 
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difficult to catch offenders. FH1 said that there were efforts against securities fraud, e.g., 
rat trading, but it was useless. MH18 said that he thought insider trading and other 
securities fraud could not be avoided, just like day and night, or brightness and darkness. 
MH12 said insider trading is a common crime, it’s unavoidable. Even the US stock 
market saw insider trading, but the US applied strict laws and severe monetary sanctions 
against offenders. In China, offenders are fined only a small amount of money, but 
increasing the severity of criminal penalties and the amount of fines would reduce insider 
trading. Two interviewees (5%) did not think insider trading was a crime. FH6 said that 
insider trading is a common practice, and it is not a kind of crime. FH17 argued that 
insider trading is not a crime since knowing inside information did not mean that you 
would be sure to earn a profit in every transaction. Interestingly, these two interviewees 
are females in Haikou. This somehow indicated their ignorance of the laws regarding 
insider trading. 
 Views about market manipulation. All the interviewees said manipulation is 
common in the Chinese stock market. The vast majority, 33 interviewees (82.5%) said 
manipulators were criminals. According to MS12, the manipulators used negative 
information to suppress the stock price and then bought shares at low prices. They then 
boosted the prices through matched orders or buying and selling shares among the 
accounts actually controlled by them, and finally trapped the stockholders who bought 
shares at high prices. FH13 said although the market manipulators are criminals, almost 
everyone wanted to be this kind of criminal, or hoped to follow the manipulators to 
suddenly earn huge profits. MH12 said that the activities of market manipulation have 
been reduced after 2000 due to strict regulation. MH14 said the regulation of 
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manipulation has improved since the government needed to give hope to public investors. 
There were 7 interviewees (17.5%) who said it is not easy to define market manipulation 
as a criminal action. MS14 argued that he could tolerate market manipulation and 
speculation since the manipulators also bear risks, but could not tolerate financial 
reporting fraud. FH7 said she felt it might be a criminal activity, but manipulation made 
the stock market more provocative and exciting. MS15 said speculation is necessary for 
the market, but excessive speculation and manipulation could expel the retail 
stockholders from the market if they never earned any profit.  
 Views about illegal consultation. For the cases of stock sages (manipulation or 
illegal provision of consultation), all the interviewees had seen online mock stock trading 
models, advertisements about software for stock investment and training classes, and 
other information from so-called stock sages on the internet and cell phone. FH11 said 
that she never believed the so-called stock sages and even most comments of official 
securities firms were nonsense; the common investors’ speculative craze bred the 
emergence of the stock sages. FH15 said one of her colleagues was totally a gambler and 
even asked her to chip in for software from some stock sages. MS3 argued that the 
Chinese stock market is not a real market, thus China has no real stock sages like Warren 
Buffet in the US. MS4 said the so-called stock sages knew many loopholes in laws and 
policies and took advantage of them. MS5 thought the so-called stock sages exploited an 
advantage of information asymmetry. MH2 said these so-called stock sages, at first had 
some skills and influence among the public, then some interest groups asked them to help 
affect the market and reached some agreements to share profit, so they became “black 
mouths” on behalf of the interest groups. MS8 said the so-called stock sages often spread 
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faked information for a long time before they were caught, suggesting that maybe the 
channels for reporting to the regulatory department were not efficient. MH17 said that the 
regulatory department should adopt new measures to handle new offender tactics. MH18 
said that maybe the so-called stock sages at first wanted to do something right, but they 
could not achieve their goal and their activities went bad.     
 Public retail stockholders are a disadvantaged group. All the interviewees 
agreed that the public retail stockholders were a disadvantaged group. As MS14 said, the 
stock market was initiated to serve state-owned enterprises, and thus the government did 
not pay enough attention to public investors. MS15 described the market as always 
working to collect money from public investors. Just like sheep shearing; after the 
sheep’s wool grew longer, the sheep was shorn again. MS4 said the government invited 
investors into the stock market on a bet, and then they must bear the risk of failure for the 
bet. MH18 felt angry that Sinopec, the largest state-owned enterprise, trapped a 
generation of investors; public retail stockholders suffered huge losses from buying 
shares of Sinopec. As the media exposed, Sinopec spent over ten million yuan on a 
ceiling lamp for their office.  
Majority shareholders and corporate executives often looted profit at the expense 
of public investors. MS14 said that he felt cheated that he bought stocks that rose in price 
sharply at the beginning of listing while the majority shareholders and corporate 
executives transferred their original shares and gained a huge volume of cash. The 
corporate performance worsened in a year, the stock price dropped sharply, and he was 
trapped for a long time. MH5 described that he bought a stock and then heard in the news 
that the corporate executives sold huge volumes of their original shares. Ridiculously, 
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when journalists asked a corporate executive of the company “why you sold out your 
original shares while showing optimistic about the prospectus of the company,” he 
answered that he would like to give investors a chance to gain a profit. FS6 said that the 
stock market should be set to optimize the allocation of resources, but public investors 
were often cheated by bad companies.  
MS12 said although the Chinese stock market is not fair to retail stockholders, it 
is the only suitable way for him to do some investments. FH11 said that you should be 
cautious about your investment and protect yourself, since no measure could strengthen 
the protection of investors. Among the interviewees, 23 persons (58%) said that in 
general, the protection of investors improved gradually. MS12 said the regulation 
improved after regulatory departments adopted zero-tolerance policies toward securities 
crime. As MH10 said, a policy made in 2012 that investors could choose a securities 
company to open a stock account and could change the securities firm freely any time 
was the most helpful measure to protect stockholders from misappropriation by securities 
firms. Before the policy, a stock investor was tied to a securities firm, and 
misappropriation of investors’ funds was very common. MH10 said he also helped his 
friends invest in stocks. He said young people did not feel high risks of securities fraud 
right now, but those who had experienced securities fraud still felt uneasy about investor 
protection.  
 Opinions about the regulation of the stock market. Among the interviewees, 
37 persons (92.5%) said the penalties were not light, the remaining 3 persons (7.5%) said 
they did not know whether the penalties were too light. MH5 said public stockholders 
were not tolerant of the securities crimes any more. In the past, they were unaware of the 
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serious securities fraud. FH8 said she was not clear about the Criminal Law about 
securities fraud, but she saw some news about criminal cases and thought the penalties 
were too light compared to the huge profit obtained from the crimes. MH12 said although 
the Criminal Law sets relevant provisions, it should provide more severe monetary 
sanctions. He also made a joke that if he could earn 100 million yuan, he would be 
willing to stay in prison for several years, and even in prison he would live a good life by 
bribing prison officials. FH13 said it’s hard to say what kind of law would be appropriate 
to regulate the market; there is no way but to increase severity of the penalties. MH18 
stated that the Chinese legal system has no class action and effective recovery 
mechanisms, and the light penalties and the lack of a sound credit system made the 
market regulation ineffective; even if the offenders were caught, they could change their 
identities and engage in other fraud again.  
In the interviews, 35 respondents (87.5%) said it’s a challenge to enforce laws to 
fight against securities crimes. FS13 thought the current political system and 
administrative institutions bred serious securities fraud and crimes. MS17 said the 
exposures of some scandals were just the outcomes of political power struggles. MS11 
said it is easier to make laws, but it is much more difficult to enforce the laws and realize 
judicial justice. MH12 opined that sometimes the fights against the offenders became a 
mere formality. MS12 said under the current political system, the CSRC is weak and 
could not exert effective regulation. MS17 said, as the rank of the CSRC is low, it could 
not enforce laws against offenders who were higher-level officials or those with strong 
political connections. MS13 said the regulation of the stock market depends on the 
broader legal environment; without the rule of law, it is hard to implement the laws.  
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The credibility of regulation by the CSRC was doubted. MS14 said that letting the 
CSRC regulate the stock market was just like letting the weasel guard the henhouse. As 
FS2 described, in the early 1990s, some of her friends opened bogus companies, faked 
financial reports, and bribed the government and the CSRC. Finally, their companies 
were listed on the stock market and they raised huge amount of funds. Since she saw the 
facts, she was not confident about the regulation of the Chinese stock market. MH18 
argued that most listed companies must have bribed the CSRC officials to gain approval 
to be listed. Since it’s a hidden rule, even those companies that were actually qualified for 
listing and did not engage in financial reporting fraud must have sent money to the 
relevant officials. Without bribery, you could not have been approved to be listed on the 
stock market. As MS20 mentioned, his friend got internal shares of some listed 
companies because his brother was an official of the CSRC. He then sold out the shares 
at high prices on the stock market. MS4, a government employee, argued that securities 
crimes are just surface phenomena, while in fact it is a consequence of the growth of 
crony capitalism in China. Since Wu Jinglian25 in his TV interviews and articles warned 
of the forming of crony capitalism in China, the term “crony capitalism” has been 
popular in China26.  
Thirty-one respondents (77.5%) said that although there were many problems in 
the regulation of the stock market, it has improved. MH11 said that in general, the stock 
market set a threshold to maintain relative fairness in scope and increased the 
transparency of listed companies. It is not appropriate to close the current stock market 
                                                           
25 Wu Jinglian is a well-known economist in China. His famous “casino theory” greatly influenced the Chinese stock 
market. He was voted People of the Year 2001 and was called the conscience of the economic circle in China. 
26 The term “crony capitalism” has been often seen in messages posted online showing anger about securities fraud and 
unfairness to public retail stockholders. 
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and then reopen a new one, but it should be reformed. As MH5 said, at least now the 
frauds are not obvious like those before, and the false financial documents seemed like 
real ones and would cause confusion. As MH4 stated, we should view the situation of 
regulation dialectically; this is a trap, but also a chance, since the legal system will 
develop through crises. MS11 stated that he thought advanced countries have much better 
legal systems; although some serious fraud occurred in the advanced stock markets, the 
advanced countries have mechanisms for self-rectification. MH10 said that he was not 
familiar with the US history of stock market regulation, but he thought it developed 
through scandals and crises, and then formed relatively sound mechanisms for self-
rectification. MH4 said that China should learn from democratic countries, and he 
believed that China would follow the way of rule of law, but this is a process and needs 
time; it depends on the ruling party’s level of governing the country and the adjustment 
of interest allocation. MH10 was optimistic about the development of the stock market 
since President Xi Jinping has adopted tough policies and measures to attack corruption, 
improve public goods and wellness, and simplify administrative procedures. As he said, 
he just opened a small company and found that he did not have to deal with complex 
procedures.  
Reflections on the Interviews 
 As the interviews showed, male interviewees seemed more likely to conduct 
analyses of the stocks than female interviewees, who tended to ask for their friends’ 
advice. In the interviews, male interviewees talked more than female interviewees, liked 
to share their stories and analyze the institutions and practices of stock market regulation. 
Compared to male interviewees, female interviewees seemed more likely to express their 
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views briefly. In the interviews, the female interviewees in Haikou seemed more relaxed 
about frying stocks. The female interviewees in Shenzhen seemed to show stronger 
opinions about securities crimes than did the female interviewees in Haikou. The reason 
might be that those in Shenzhen were from other places in China and appeared more 
independent in life. They received more education as 50% of them had graduate degrees 
while the female interviewees in Haikou were native Hainanese and only had college 
degrees or below. But in general, most interviewees in the two cities showed similar 
comments about securities crimes and corporate misconduct. They all agreed that 
securities crimes and corporate misconduct were common and public retail stockholders 
were a disadvantaged group.  
 Gamblers vs. victims. The economic reform starting from the late 1970’s 
released the passion for making a fortune that was restricted by the previous planned 
economic system. But due to the high requirements of time and money needed for 
general investments, common people with nine-to-five jobs could not afford to indulge in 
investments. The opening of the stock market in 1990 provided a more convenient way 
for common people to do business for themselves. As mentioned by an interviewee, the 
stock market facilitated the transformation of common people from political creatures 
that were inculcated with abstract doctrines or just watched the economic changes, to 
economic creatures that tried to enhance their wealth and became their own bosses 
through stock investments. In the very beginning, the stories of successful stock investors, 
e.g. Yang Millionaire, a household grass-root hero in the stock market, attracted common 
people to crowd into the stock market.  
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Unlike advanced stock markets that were usually natural results of economic 
development, the Chinese stock market was mainly a product of a government-led reform 
that aimed to serve state-owned enterprises. The government’s excessive intervention led 
to a policy-oriented stock market and violated market principles. For example, to attract 
investors, the government made policies advantageous to state-owned enterprises, or even 
manipulated the market to raise the stock prices of the companies with poor performances. 
As the interviewees showed, since the stock market did not follow market principles, 
financial knowledge and analyses were often not helpful in choosing stocks and thus 
people were not interested in financial analyses of the corporate performance. The 
movement of stock prices did not reflect the corporate performance, which aggravated 
speculation and did not realize the market function of optimizing the resource distribution. 
Since the government’s decisions often greatly affected market movements and 
administrative transparency and information symmetry were lacking, officials and their 
relatives would often exploit unpublicized policies or other inside information to gain 
profits from the stock market. 
Driven by huge expected profits, companies packaged themselves by making 
false financial statements and bribed the CSRC officials to obtain approval for their 
listing. The ineffective supervision and regulation produced room for corruption and 
made financial reporting fraud rampant in the stock market. As the interviewees stated, 
they did not believe the listed companies’ publicized financial statements about their 
corporate performance. Corporate scandals did not often affect the stock prices of 
companies involved. The company’s stock price would rise if manipulators boosted it. 
Thus investors did not care much about the corporate scandals when they chose stocks. 
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All interviewees thought corporate fraud to be common in any industry, and those 
exposed were just unlucky to be caught. Thus, there is little stigma attached to offenders. 
In addition, light penalties and delay in law enforcement neither exert great deterrence to 
potential offenders nor urge the improvement of internal corporate governance and 
individual self-regulation. Since investors’ choice of stocks were not closely related to 
corporate performance and governance of listed companies, their stock transactions were 
more like speculations than investments.  
In the very beginning of the stock market, due to the information asymmetry and 
lack of transparency, it was widely spread that some earned profits by taking advantage 
of inside information, so stockholders were eager to search for inside information. 
Manipulators often exploited this obsession with inside information and let some persons 
spread disinformation to trap investors and rig the market. Due to lots of lessons, e.g., 
false inside information or the unsuccessful implementation of expected plans, investors 
became cautious about so-called inside information that they heard. Although the 
phenomenon of spreading so-called inside information was curbed, a small circle close to 
policy makers or corporate insiders still often took advantage of real inside information to 
earn huge profits. Although insider trading did not ensure that they would make a profit, 
it violated the principles of equality, openness, and fairness, and hurt common investors’ 
interests. 
Manipulation was also common in the stock market. Manipulators used their 
advantages in capital, information, and other resources to rig the market. There emerged 
so-called stock sages who spread false information, sold investment software, received 
fees for training classes, or provided illegal consultations. The cases of stock sages often 
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involved large scale of investors and lasted a long time. Actually, behind these so-called 
stock sages were often the interest groups as manipulators. The loopholes in the laws, 
difficulties in detecting the offenders, light penalties, poor law enforcement due to local 
protectionisms, corruption, unreliable regulators, and so on, led to the low cost for crimes. 
The expected huge profit and the low cost for the crime lured potential offenders. As 
common retail stockholders were disadvantaged in terms of capital, information, and 
expertise, they were exposed to high risks of becoming victims of securities fraud and 
crimes.  
In summary, the institutional defects aggravated speculation in stocks and lured 
manipulators and other securities offenders. The government’s excessive intervention, 
corruption, and ineffective regulation, intertwined with rampant financial reporting fraud, 
insider trading, manipulation, and other securities misconduct, bred a twisted stock 
market in the transition period. Stockholders’ passion for being rich in this abnormal 
market was fomented to the speculative craze that was exploited by the offenders.  
 State-owned interest vs. private interest/self-consciousness. In 2003, the Third 
Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC specifically put forward that 
the stockholding system is the main form to realize the public ownership system. In 2004, 
an Amendment to Article 13 of the Chinese Constitution included lawfully earned 
income from stock investments into the categories of lawful private property rights of 
citizens, which indicated progress in confirming private property rights and protecting the 
interest of stock investors in China. Before the official confirmation of the stockholding 
system, state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises were regarded as the primary 
units of the public ownership system. State-owned enterprises refer to those owned by the 
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people as a whole. But in the real operation, the abstract concept of “the whole people” 
leads to the absence of ownership or unclear ownership; government officials or 
corporate executives obtain actual control over state-owned enterprises in the absence of 
effective supervision. As a result, state-owned enterprises were often exposed to risks of 
tunneling by corporate insiders or executives, and the problem of erosion of state assets 
arose during the economic transition. The adoption of a stockholding system could give 
substantial ownership to state-owned enterprises by distributing equity to institutions and 
individuals. To check the majority shareholders or corporate executives from taking 
advantage of their power to tunnel the companies and hurt the interest of the minority 
shareholders, corporate governance mechanisms were designed to solve the agency 
problem resulting from the separation of ownership and management, to supervise 
majority shareholders or corporate executives, and to protect minority shareholders and 
investors (Lang, 2010). Furthermore, listing state-owned enterprises on the stock market 
could further the transparency of corporate operation and governance, and enhance 
external regulation and public supervision.   
Although the institutional defects of the Chinese stock market curbed the 
fulfillment of the strengths of the stockholding system and the stock market mentioned 
above, the operation and development of the stock market was of particular significance 
to China in the transition. It has fostered the cultivation of individuals with self-
awareness, right consciousness and independent critical spirits. As the interviewees 
expressed, they felt more autonomy and freedom after they entered the stock market. 
Their experience in stock investments actually increased their participation in the 
economic and political sphere. It is noted that although the amount of funds raised was 
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small compared to that in banks or bond markets, the stock market invited the rapid 
growth of economists and financial experts, raised public comments on economic policies, 
and increased dialogues between the common people and the government. The sense of 
participation also promoted their rights consciousness and social responsibilities, 
especially when confronting securities fraud and government corruption.  
In the past, under a planned economy, common people were imbued with the 
notion of the paramount importance of state interest and collectivism, thus self-
consciousness and individual rights were suppressed. But this raised the problem that the 
ruling class would loot the common people in the name of state or collective interest, and 
without the transparency of administrative management and given the lack of information 
flow, people could hardly know they were being exploited. But now, common people 
cared more about their individual interest in daily life rather than the “vague” state 
interest. The stockholders’ online comments especially showed the concrete cases of this 
transformation. For example, in contrast to the advanced stock markets that usually 
reflected the real economy, the Chinese stock market performed poorly while the Chinese 
economy has grown very fast, and thus the majority of retail stockholders suffered losses. 
Although the Chinese stock market could not reflect its real economy due to multiple 
factors, stockholders complained that they did not share the economic achievements, and 
the blind seeking of GDP caused many negative effects, and so on. Some of the largest 
state-owned enterprises entered into the world’s top 500 enterprises through being listed 
on the stock market. The official media sang high praise for it as a demonstration of the 
Chinese economic development. But some stockholders criticized that those largest state-
owned enterprises actually performed badly, and just took advantage of the resource 
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monopoly provided by the government and looted huge profits from the common 
people27. Sinopec (China Petroleum & Chemical) became a target of public outcry. Some 
stockholders criticized that Sinopec allowed foreign investors to earn huge profits from 
its listing on the foreign stock market, but sacrificed the interest of domestic stockholders 
to give benefit to foreign investors and trapped a generation of Chinese stockholders in 
the domestic stock market.  
Furthermore, the stock market increased the transparency of corporate operations 
and regulation of listed state-owned enterprises. Namely, state-owned enterprises 
represent the interest of all the people in the country. But the majority of investors often 
suffered losses from buying stocks of the state-owned enterprises while these companies 
collected huge sums from investors. In addition, the frequent exposure of scandals 
discredited the traditional notion or the government statement that state-owned 
enterprises were more reliable than private enterprises. Possessing privileges, monopoly, 
massive resources, and an intertwined relationship with the government, listed state-
owned enterprises actually would impose more difficulties on external regulation and 
cause more risks to investors than private enterprises would. The revelation of scandals 
told common stockholders that the stock market was plagued with power-money trading 
and bred crony capitalism. Without effective regulation, no matter whether they are state-
owned enterprises or private enterprises, listed companies would be used as tools for the 
economically and politically powerful to loot stockholders. The scandals caused trust 
crises among stockholders and urged the government to strengthen the regulation of listed 
companies. 
                                                           
27 See at online stock clubs, e.g., www.eastmoney.com, www.jrj.com and so on.  
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 Casino culture vs. rules of the game. As the interviews indicated, the notion that 
the stock market is a casino is actually an expression of their view of life. The image of 
Chinese people is that they are diligent and cautious at work and are able to endure 
hardships, but at the same time they like gambling. Casinos in Las Vegas and Macau are 
often frequented by crowds of Chinese people. Interestingly, it is said that the word 
“casino” came from a dialect of Fujian (a province of China) -- “kai shi lou” that means 
“start”28. The early oversea Fujianese liked to play games of betting after work, and they 
usually yelled “kai shi lou” to begin the games. It is not sure whether it is the real origin 
of the word “casino,” but the Chinese people’s passion in gambling became an interesting 
element of the Chinese culture. This casino culture was exaggerated by movies, 
especially a series of Hong Kong movies about the God of Gamblers. The characters in 
these movies were household names in China and even other Asian countries. In reality, 
except for those who indulged in betting and ruined their lives and families, or those who 
used government funds to bet in casinos, most people just went to casinos for 
entertainment. As a Chinese saying goes, “Occasional and small bets add aesthetics and 
spiritual pleasure.” 
Apparently, this kind of Chinese casino culture or gamblers’ culture showed 
Chinese people’s obsession with luck or escapist fantasy. It also showed the stamps of 
traditional Confucianism and Taoism. The majority of common people are diligent and 
cautious in their vocations, work hard for their families, and try to play well in their 
social roles. This shows the positive side of the frame of mind that is cultivated by the 
long tradition of Confucianism. At the same time, they would like to escape from the 
                                                           
28See at http://collection.sina.com.cn/hwdt/20111129/113946955.shtml 
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burdens in the secular world and seek an easy and free life style, which also reflects the 
influence of Taoism. In playing games of chance, they could relax and feel excited. The 
cultural traits are also shown by retail stockholders in their speculative activities in the 
stock market. Not only did the stock market help them release their passion for earning 
wealth, but it also provided a convenient platform for them to play other roles. Frying 
stocks became a part of life sometimes. As mentioned above, some interviewees felt they 
became their own bosses in stock investments, and some did stock transactions during a 
break at the office, or talked about stocks with friends like discussing fashions.  
Chinese people love to say, “If you would like to make a bet, you should be 
willing to accept the failure when you lose.” Some interviewees mentioned that saying in 
the interviews. But this does not mean that the majority of stockholders are indifferent to 
the losses or tolerant of those engaging in securities fraud. Even though they view the 
stock market as a casino, they bet for luck. It is the rule for gambling that every gambler 
is equal and has the same chance, and only luck determines the results. But as Wu 
Jinglian (2001) has criticized, the Chinese stock market is worse than a casino; it was a 
casino without rules since the manipulators and offenders could see the others’ playing 
cards before they engaged in fraud. This violates the principles of equality and fairness, 
even for gamblers in a casino. Stockholders were not indifferent to the securities fraud or 
tolerant towards the offenders. In the very early stage of the stock market, they just were 
unaware of the frauds that resulted in their losses. It was the government that attracted 
public investors into the stock market, and the excessive administrative intervention 
fostered speculation. In a sense, the government was an initiator of market manipulation, 
insider trading, and other securities irregularities that trapped the stockholders. In 
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addition, serious power-money trading and corruption in stock issuance and listing 
aggravated the twisted market and hurt the interest of stockholders. 
Conclusion 
Institutional defects aggravated speculation in the stock market and invited 
potential offenders. The exposure of a series of scandals led to an erosion of public trust 
in the government, aroused public doubt about the pattern of paternalistic governance, 
and raised the public call for stronger protection of common retail stockholders. This was 
shown in the statements of most interviewees that securities frauds were common and 
public retail stockholders were a disadvantaged group, and they suggested that more 
severe penalties should be adopted to punish offenders and increase the cost for crime. As 
the former president of the CSRC, Guo Shuqing publicly claimed in 2012, the stock 
market should be reformed to regain the confidence of investors since they were not fools 
like before (Liao, 2013). Although sometimes the speculative craze of stockholders 
exerted negative influence on the stock market, it is not convincing to conclude that 
irrational retail stockholders were the root cause for the abnormal stock market, since it 
was the institutional defects of the market regulation that invited and aggravated 
speculation and manipulation. And it is not useful to wait for public retail stockholders to 
become mature or rational enough to press for reform. That might be used as a pretext to 
postpone further reform.  
Although the Chinese stock market was still far from a mature market and was 
criticized as the channel for interest transferring through power-money trading and 
securities irregularities, it set a legal framework for adoption of relevant mechanisms to 
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enhance the transparency of activities of market participants and strengthen external 
regulation. More importantly, it invited a huge group of stockizens to join a game with 
the government in a market-oriented framework. Stockizens consisted of the majority of 
the middle class in China, which would be an important force to foster the country’s 
economic and political development. Through their experiences in stock investment and 
participation in fights against securities irregularities, stockholders enhanced their self 
awareness and rights consciousness. The fights against securities irregularities in the 
current stage of the Chinese stock market are actually about the interest distribution 
between the politically and economically powerful and common public stockholders, and 
would be of significance to foster further political reform for a more just and fair society.  
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPLORATION OF INSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS OF REGULATION OF THE 
CHINESE STOCK MARKET AND PROPOSED REFORMS FOR 
REGULATORY MECHANISMS 
Introduction 
 As an emerging market in the transition period, the Chinese stock market was 
initiated to raise funds for listed companies, and its investment function was ignored. 
Moreover, excessive administrative intervention violated market principles and increased 
speculation. Especially, the approval system for stock issuance and listing bred 
corruption and could not contain IPO fraud. In addition, the ineffective delisting system 
could not improve the quality of listed companies and impose sufficient punishment on 
the listed companies engaging in fraud. A series of cases of insider trading, rat trading, 
market manipulation, and other securities irregularities indicated that penalties provided 
by the relevant laws against securities irregularities were still too light to deter potential 
offenders.  
 In addition, legislations lagging behind emergence of problems, insufficient 
resources for implementation of the laws, and lack of supporting mechanisms (e.g., the 
absence of civil compensation mechanisms) discredited claims that investors were 
protected. The “revolving door” phenomenon (Mills, 1957) aggravated the weak external 
regulation of listed companies and securities intermediaries and exemplified the “capture 
theory” in the regulation of the stock market (Newman, 2005). These weaknesses in the 
laws and their enforcement allowed interest groups to “construct law in a manner that is 
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minimally disruptive to the status quo” (Edelman, 1992, p. 1535). This made relevant 
laws and regulatory programs symbolic rather than instrumental (Dwyer, 1990; Tushnet 
and Yackle, 1997; Edelman, 1992; Ryken and Jenness, 2008; Gusfield, 1967). The 
institutional defects and weak regulation of the stock market lured potential offenders. 
 To reshape the role of the government in the stock market and further reform 
market regulation, in 2014 the State Council confirmed that the registration system for 
stock issuance and listing would be adopted in the near future (Shanghai Securities Daily, 
2014, June 11). But some scholars showed concern that the registration system would fail 
to improve the situation if the regulation did not have supporting mechanism (B. Xie, 
2014a; S. Lu, 2013). This chapter proposes the introduction of such mechanisms, e.g., the 
whistleblower program and class action, to enhance public and internal supervision, 
increase the cost for crimes, and improve the legal environment for the regulation of the 
Chinese stock market.   
The discussion in this chapter draws on many statements posted on weibos and 
blogs of known Chinese economists, law professors, securities experts, financial 
commentators, and lawyers. The regulation of the stock market is one of the hot topics 
for scholars and experts in this field, and their posts often receive wide attention. For 
example, Professor Fengqi Cao, one of the drafters of the Chinese Securities Law, had 
7,669,642 fans and a huge number of visits to his Sina weibo29. On their weibos and 
blogs, scholars and other experts shared information about what they experienced in 
making laws, regulation, law practices; posted opinions about the latest policies and 
reforms; and suggested further reforms, which provided abundant information and data 
                                                           
29 See Fengqi Cao’s Sina Weibo at 
http://www.weibo.com/1594643405/B4EUFcUSI?type=comment#_rnd1430692012630 
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for the study of the development and regulation of the Chinese stock market. Some 
lawyers on their weibos called on investors who were victims of securities fraud to bring 
suits against the offenders. They were outspoken in their remarks on institutional defects 
of the stock market and severely attacked corruption and ineffective regulation. Professor 
Liu Jipeng (2013, June 11) said that he drafted the first report to suggest establishing the 
CSRC, and made great efforts to advise the CSRC on improving the market regulation. 
Now, however, he was disappointed with the CSRC and feels closer to netizens through 
weibo. Professor Baisan Xie (2014, November 24) posted on his weibo that he brought 
suits against the Ministry of Finance and then the CSRC for adopting some measures that 
hurt the interests of public investors. Through their weibos and blogs, scholars and 
experts have played active roles in educating people and fostering further reforms.   
Institutional Defects of the Chinese Stock Market 
It seemed that the Chinese stock market did not reflect the development of the 
Chinese real economy, and the majority of public retail stockholders did not benefit from 
the growth of listed companies. In the 1990’s, the majority of companies in different 
economic sectors were not listed, thus the stock market did not reflect the real economy 
(S. Ba, 2014). After that, the structure of the Chinese stock market was a main cause. For 
the long time, the majority of listed companies had been state-owned enterprises, even 
reaching 55% of all the listed companies. By July 2013, the percentage had gone down to 
45%, but the market capitalization of state-owned enterprises listed on the market still 
exceeded 80% of the total market capitalization (B. Xie, 2014c). The state-owned 
enterprises served the national economy and did not pay close attention to stock prices 
and dividends; private enterprises had low profits under intense competition and did not 
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seem to care about the interests of investors (S. Ba, 2014). Under pressure from more 
intense competition in China, financial reporting fraud and insider trading were more 
serious in China than in other countries (S. Ba, 2014).  
In addition, listed companies and underwriters collaborated to determine high 
issuance prices that resulted in high price-earnings ratios and high volumes of excessive 
funds raised30  (what has been called the “three high” phenomena) (F. Cao, 2014e). 
Furthermore, the stock’s price at its first day of being listed on the stock exchange (that 
means it entered into the secondary market for trading publicly) was much higher than its 
issuance price, with an increase of 100% on average during the last two decades. 
Potential huge profits from stock issuance and listings with almost zero risk drove 
companies and the insiders to make every effort, including financial reporting fraud or 
bribery, to get tickets so that they could be listed. Since public retail investors rarely were 
able to obtain stocks in the primary market31, the primary market was manipulated by 
institutional investors and big investors, and the public investors had to buy stocks at high 
prices and thus bear high risks. This formed the separation of the primary market and the 
secondary market32 in the Chinese stock market that participants in the primary market 
always earned profits and the investors in the secondary market mainly suffered losses (F. 
Cao, 2014e).  
Securities Fraud and Irregularities in Recent Years 
                                                           
30 Excessive funds raised refer to the part of funds that the listed company raised from stock issuance exceeded the 
amount planned for its investment projects.  
31 The primary market refers to the market where the listed companies issue new stocks to raise funds before the stocks 
are listed on the stock exchanges. In the primary market, public retail investors have few chances to obtain new stocks.  
32 The secondary market refers to the market where stocks were listed on the stock exchanges for public trading. 
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 Without strict supervision and severe penalties, IPO fraud, insider trading, market 
manipulation, and other securities irregularities, intertwined with government corruption, 
plagued the stock market. The stock market became a platform for the politically and 
economically powerful to loot huge profits from the majority of public retail investors.  
 IPO fraud and misrepresentation. As Fengqi Cao (2014c) argued, the 
administrative examination and approval system for stock issuance and listing was the 
biggest obstacle to the development of the Chinese stock market. It resulted in approval 
of a listing becoming a precious resource sought by companies competitively. The 
demand for stocks exceeded the supply, which led to the deflection of stock prices from 
the real values. Moreover, the administrative examination and approval system created 
more room for corruption. Driven by huge expected profits, companies used every means, 
including false financial reports and bribery, to package themselves so they could obtain 
tickets to be listed on the stock market. Although IPO fraud and misrepresentation were 
rampant, the listed companies engaging in fraud seldom paid compensation to investors 
who were their victims. At the end of 2013, some regulations were promulgated, aiming 
to increase the cost for IPO fraud and deter potential offenders. For example, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange revised the Guidelines for the Content and Format of Stock 
Listing Announcements, providing that the listed company engaging in IPO fraud should 
buy back all their shares publicly traded on the stock market (Securities Times, 2013).  
Another important factor accountable for serious IPO fraud was the ineffective 
delisting system that did not actually kick the offenders or low-quality companies off the 
stock market. Starting in 1993, the establishment of delisting mechanisms was placed on 
the table for discussion. In 2001, the CSRC and the stock exchanges made related 
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regulations on delisting. But by June 2014, only 78 companies had been delisted, only 3% 
of the total of more than 2500 listed companies in the Chinese stock market (T. Ye, 
2014a). According to rules and common practices of the Chinese stock market, the 
delisted companies were placed in the Share Transfer System. They usually returned to 
being listed on the stock market after they improved their financial numbers through 
increasing profit, or being merged or restructured. Usually, the delisted companies were 
sought by other companies for back door listing. For example, the ST Xin Ye was 
suspended from being listed in 2013. It realized a net profit of 4.178 billion yuan through 
successful debt restructuring and then applied for resumption of listing. On 5 June 2014, 
Chang Hang Oil Carrier, listed for 17 years, was delisted from the stock market due to 
three consecutive years of losses from 2010 to 2013. It was the first central government-
owned enterprise delisted from the Chinese A share market. This event seemed to show 
that the regulatory department resolved to improve the delisting mechanisms and gave a 
warning to investors. But one week before it was delisted, its stock price was boosted by 
more than 10%, which indicated that investors did not believe it would be removed from 
the market and thought that they might profit when the company returns to the stock 
market through restructuring (Sina.com, 2014a).  
 Actually, the delisting system has not been effectively applied to kick out the low-
quality listed companies from the stock market. Tan Ye (2014a) suggests that the 
difficulty in effective implementation of the delisting system arises from the following 
reasons. First, many listed companies are central government-controlled enterprises or 
supported by local governments, thus, the CSRC faced great obstacles in removing them 
from the stock market. Second, investors would not support delisting. If a company were 
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delisted because of continued losses caused by financial fraud or tunneling by the 
controlling shareholder, without effective compensation mechanisms, public retail 
stockholders would bear great losses and have no chance to win it back through stock 
trading.  
 In October 2014, the CSRC issued the Opinions for Reforming and Strictly 
Enforcing the Delisting System, confirming that the listed company which conducted IPO 
fraud or serious misrepresentation will be delisted compulsorily (Xia, 2014). According 
to the Opinions, if the delisted company applies for renewal of listing, it should meet the 
standards equivalent to IPO standards. In the past, it was much easier for a company to be 
listed through buying or controlling an existing listed company or delisted company 
(back door listing). Thus, the delisted company or the listed company close to being 
delisted would be used as a shell for back door listing. As a result, the delisting system 
could not achieve the goal of removing a company with poor performance or 
irregularities from the stock market. As the standards for renewal of listing are equated 
with those for IPO, the cost for back door listing increases so that the delisted company 
will not be the precious resource sought by other companies for listing. It was hoped that 
this new policy would fix the loophole in the delisting system (Qiao, 2014). 
 Insider trading. From 2008 to 2013, the CSRC investigated a total of 785 cases 
of insider trading, making up 52% of the cases it investigated during this period; the 
CSRC sent the police 95 cases of insider trading, comprising 57% of the cases sent for 
criminal investigation (SZSE, 2014). In May 2013, the Cai Xin Website reported that the 
majority of the recent insider trading cases occurred on SME and Chinext (Caixin.com, 
2013). It was found that lots of controlling shareholders and corporate executives 
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coincidentally sold their shares after the stock prices were raised or right before the 
corporate reports of losses were published. Information about corporate restructuring was 
often employed to conduct insider trading. Ye Tan mentioned on her weibo the news 
spread online that a known actress held shares of ST Hei Long for three years; after the 
stock resumed listing through corporate restructuring, she sold out all her shares and 
earned 27 million yuan (T. Ye, 2014b). This caused doubts about insider trading, but the 
regulatory department did not take any measures to investigate it.   
 Li Daxiao (2014a), an economist of a securities firm, posted a description of the 
“correlation” between restroom visits and the abnormal movements of stock prices on his 
weibo. When listed companies had meetings of board of directors discussing important 
issues, the regulatory departments, local governments, financial organizations, and other 
units would use excuses to send their staff to attend the meetings. After they knew the 
corporate inside information, they could not wait to the end of the meeting and rushed to 
restrooms. When they went to the restroom, abnormal movements of some stock prices 
occurred, presumably because they contacted their offices or related persons with this 
inside information or purchased/sold stocks themselves while out of sight in the restroom. 
This showed that insider trading was common practice and seemed not to be regarded as 
a securities irregularity or crime.  
As mentioned, the criminal penalties against insider trading were too light to deter 
potential offenders and failed to accomplish the principles of justice and fairness. In 
addition to increasing the length of punishments to restrict the physical freedom of 
offenders, experts appealed for the application of severe monetary sanctions to offenders. 
As experts complained, currently monetary sanctions against insider trading seemed too 
224 
 
light to deter potential offenders. For example, corporate executives of Shen Zhou Tai 
Yue were fined only 480,000 yuan, equal to 10% of the transaction amount of insider 
trading. In contrast, in May 2013, the Hong Kong regulatory department imposed a fine 
of 24.675 million HK Dollars on Sun Min, who earned 55.1 million HK Dollars from 
insider trading with the transaction amount of 88.06 million HK Dollars (Caixin.com, 
2013).  
 Rat trading. In the past two years, more than ten fund management firms were 
found to be involved in rat trading scandals (Cnstock.com, 2014). In 2014, the CSRC and 
judicial departments publicized that more than 15 fund managers were guilty of rat 
trading, and the cases involved amounts from more than 20 million yuan to more than 
one billion yuan. In actuality, many more firms and individuals involved in scandals have 
not yet been exposed. Although more and more cases of rat trading were exposed, no 
fund management firm was punished for rat trading. The fund management firms said 
those were personal actions of the individual offenders and thus excused the firms from 
punishment.  
 It was noted that those fund managers caught were regarded as members of the 
social elite, with high education and high income levels. But they still took advantage of 
their employment to violate laws and amassed huge profits in a short time from rat 
trading. For example, from 2009 to 2012, Su Jing used two million yuan to start 
transactions, and earned more than 36.5 million yuan. Su Jing was finally sentenced to 
imprisonment for two and a half years. Another example was Wei Libo. From 29 
December 2007 to 28 December 2009, while Wei Libo was a fund manager, the loss of 
the funds he managed reached 27.15%, and the media called him the worst fund manager 
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that year. But he earned more than 2.7 million yuan for himself from rat trading in only 
six months. The recent rat trading case of Ma Le again received public attention. Ma Le 
traded more than 70 stocks in 26 months, accumulating more than 1 billion yuan from 
these transactions, and he made a profit of more than 18 million yuan. Ma Le was 
sentenced to imprisonment for three years, but was put on probation for five years. This 
led to criticisms that the criminal penalties were too light. Some investors expressed that 
the court’s light penalty encouraged potential offenders to take risks. On 8 December 
2014, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate appealed against the court judgment of the Ma 
Le case. The Ma Le case might foster the publication of the judicial interpretation of the 
Supreme Court on insider trading and rat trading (Cnstock.com, 2014).   
 The seventh Revision to the Criminal Law effective in 2009 included rat trading 
in the categories of securities crimes. Since Han Gang became the first fund manager to 
receive a criminal penalty for rat trading, cases of rat trading were exposed and offenders 
received criminal penalties. But they received sentences of imprisonment of not more 
than four years. Although the regulatory department applied “big data” technology and 
bore fruit in detecting and discovering rat trading, the light penalty and the lack of 
effective regulation mechanism still led to the low cost for rat trading and did not deter 
the potential offenders.  
 Market manipulation. Compared to the market manipulators in the earlier stage 
of the stock market who often used numerous accounts to conduct matched orders to rig 
stock prices, market manipulators in recent years took advantage of their information 
superiority, e.g., spreading information through online clubs, weibo, and wechat to affect 
stock prices. The activities of market manipulation in recent years appeared more 
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dispersed and concealed (Xinhuanet.com, 2014). In addition, the government’s excessive 
intervention into the stock market through bank policies, tax policies, and corporate 
mergers and restructuring also created room for insiders to rig the market. 
The structure of stockholders on the Chinese stock market is also another 
important factor that invited frequent market manipulation. The majority of investors in 
the Chinese stock market are retail stockholders who are disadvantaged in capital, 
information, and expertise, thus they are often the victims of market manipulators. 
Manipulators tended to select stocks with small volumes of shares and with mainly retail 
investors, who are easy to be manipulated (Xinhuanet.com, 2014). Manipulators also 
liked to speculate on the stocks of companies engaging in mergers and restructuring. In 
recent years, some medium or small-cap stocks, especially those of companies with poor 
performances, were crazily rigged by market manipulators (T. Ye, 2014c). Market 
manipulation was often accompanied by insider trading. Stocks involving merger and 
restructuring became the main subjects of manipulation and insider trading.  
The Weaknesses of the Current Regulation and Suggestions for Improvement 
 Legislations lagged behind. Legislative lag is the first factor accountable for the 
weak regulation of the stock market. Fengqi Cao (2014a), who was one of the main 
drafters of the Chinese Securities Law, described the process of making this law on his 
weibo. The Chinese Securities Law was the first law outside the Chinese Constitution 
that the Chinese National People’s Congress (CNPC) organized experts to draft; drafting 
of other laws was usually organized by the State Council. The drafting group for the 
Chinese Securities Law mainly consisted of the personnel of NPC and scholars of Peking 
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University. They drew on securities laws and regulations of the US, UK, Japan, Korea, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan for reference. They began to work on the draft in 1992 and 
expected to publish it in 1993. But due to resistance from different departments and 
disagreement by the CNPC Legislative Affair Commission, the drafting of the Chinese 
Securities Law became deadlocked. The draft was not put on the table for legislative 
discussion until 1998, when the securities market saw rampant irregularities and the 
related parties came to a rough agreement on the perspectives about the regulation of the 
securities market. Moreover, the Asian Financial Crisis sent a warning and pressed the 
government to make laws to regulate the Chinese securities market. Although there were 
250 regulations and rules about the securities market before the enactment of the Chinese 
Securities Law, they were inconsistent and lacked authority. The Chinese Securities Law 
went into effect in 1999 and set a legal frame for the regulation of the Chinese securities 
market. But Fengqi Cao (2014a) stated that the draft which he had expected to be 
published in 1993 was even better than the version effective in 1999, and was closer to 
the 2005 version. 
The making of criminal provisions about securities crimes also showed a lag of 
legislation in response to endemic corporate scandals and securities fraud. While the 
Chinese Criminal Law as revised in 1997 provides articles of securities crimes, the 
Provisions Regarding Standards for Prosecution of Cases of Economic Crimes including 
securities crimes was issued in 2001. But soon the 2001 Provisions could not meet the 
needs for rapid development of the economy and the emergence of new types of crimes. 
In 2003, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security began to 
revise the 2001 Provisions. It took five years to finish the Supplementary Provisions to 
228 
 
define specific standards for securities and futures crimes provided in the Criminal Law, 
and to connect the Criminal Law with the Company Law and the Securities Law. 
Although rat trading was serious in the securities market, it was not included into the 
categories of securities crimes in the Criminal Law until 2009.  
The Chinese Securities Law was only revised once, in 2005, after it went into 
effect in 1999. This could not catch up with the rapid development of the stock market. 
Take the US Securities Law as a contrast. The US Securities Law has been revised more 
than 40 times since it was enacted in 1933, which means that on average it was revised 
once every two years (F. Cao 2014a). In 2014, it was announced that the revisions of the 
Chinese Securities Law would be discussed by the NPC. The president of the CSRC 
publicly admitted that the revision of the Securities Law would encounter resistance from 
different departments competing for the assignment of regulatory power. 
 Insufficient resources for law implementation. Xiao Gang, president of the 
CSRC, admitted that the resources for regulation could not meet the needs for investor 
protection as securities irregularities increased rapidly in recent years. The number of 
securities irregularities cases increased by 14% on average from 2009 to 2012, increased 
by 21% in 2012, and increased by 40% in the first half year of 2013 (China.com, 2013). 
Among these cases, insider trading cases occupied more than half, and misrepresentation 
and IPO fraud increased greatly. In actuality, a great number of securities irregularities 
were not revealed. The increase might not mean that the number of securities 
irregularities were more than in the past, as they could instead reflect the increased 
exposure of irregularities. But the resources, e.g., personnel, capital, and technology of 
the regulatory departments were still insufficient for investigation and law enforcement. 
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 Xiao Gang (China.com, 2013) admitted that currently there were more than 1,200 
laws, regulations, and rules for the capital market, among which there were more than 
200 provisions about criminal, administrative, and civil responsibilities; but more than 
two thirds of the provisions were not ever applied. As Xiao stated, the problem was that 
the law making and revising were not timely and specific; this largely accounted for the 
ineffective implementation of laws and regulations. In addition, incompatible 
enforcement systems, local protectionism, and other interruptive factors led to poor law 
enforcement. Xiao Gang publicly complained that some securities irregularities involved 
complex relations; e.g., the Party and government officials interrupted law enforcement 
by the CSRC and other regulatory departments. The ineffective enforcement of the law 
due to obstacles from administrative and political power made the law symbolic rather 
than instrumental (Dwyer, 1990). 
 Difficulties in evidence collection and determination. As Liao (2013) stated, 
the regulation of the stock market became stricter, but the market manipulation and 
insider trading continued to grow. One of the important reasons is the difficulty in 
evidence collection and determination. In addition, even when evidence of market 
manipulation was found, it was hard for the investors to be compensated. And if the 
investors brought civil actions for compensation, the court seldom supported the investors 
since the law’s provisions were not clear and the investors could not readily demonstrate 
the causal relationship between the securities irregularities and their losses. To solve this 
difficulty, many advanced countries adopted processes for administrative conciliation, 
and some countries even had 80% to 90% of cases resolved by administrative 
conciliation (Liao, 2013).  
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On 19 December 2014, the CSRC issued the Implementation of the CSRC 
Administrative Conciliation Pilot Measures and requested public comments. Before this, 
for the case of Wan Fu Sheng Ke, the Ping An Securities Firm set a fund to compensate 
the investors, which was similar to administrative conciliation. The CSRC administrative 
conciliation means that during investigation by the CSRC of those suspected of violating 
related securities regulations and at their request, the CSRC and those being investigated 
reach a settlement to rectify the suspected irregularities and compensate investors 
damaged by the offences. Then the CSRC stops the investigation. This could help 
provide an efficient and low-cost way to compensate investors. But some experts 
expressed their concern that this would expand the administrative power of the CSRC 
and create room for corruption (Liao, 2013). The adoption of administrative conciliation 
also needs supporting mechanisms, and relevant laws and more specific judicial 
interpretations should be made. Ma (2014) suggests the introduction of the public hearing 
system into the administrative conciliation processes to increase the transparency of 
administrative conciliation processes.  
 Administrative Measures have been Dominant in the Regulation. The Chinese 
legal tradition and practices preferred criminal and administrative penalties to civil 
compensations. But this model could not meet the needs of economic development and 
social transformation in China. Criminal and administrative penalties alone are not 
sufficient for curbing violations that let offenders make huge profits while economically 
damaging victims. Without effective civil compensation mechanisms to make offenders 
pay victims of securities violations, investors would bear higher risks and the cost for 
crimes would be too low. In this era of “money first,” the low cost for crime and high 
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expected profit drive potential offenders to risk committing crimes and violations. The 
combination of criminal and administrative penalties and civil compensation would be 
more effective to increase the cost for crimes and deter potential offenders.   
It has been criticized that the criminal penalties are too light while administrative 
penalties have been dominant in regulating the stock market. The CSRC’s measures 
toward the Everbright Securities Fat Finger Event also showed the dominance of 
administrative penalties in dealing with securities scandals (S. Lu, 2013d). Although the 
media praised the CSRC’s sanctions against those responsible for Everbright Securities 
Fat Finger Event for setting a record in severity of administrative penalties, Suiqi Lu 
(2013d) showed his disagreement with the CSRC’s measures on this scandal. Lu Suiqi 
criticized the CSRC for placing its administrative penalties above the judicial system 
since it did not send the case to criminal investigation. The CSRC determined that this 
scandal was just a technical error or a fat finger event, and thus evaded the crucial point 
and chose administrative penalties to deal with this case. 
Administrative measures often lacked transparency. For example, Suiqi Lu 
(2013b) questioned where the huge amount of fines and confiscated money that were put 
into the Investor Protection Fund of the CSRC went, and whether they were used for 
compensating the victims of securities crimes and irregularities. The dominance of 
administrative penalties in stock market regulation tends to create more room for 
corruption and reduce judicial authority. In addition, the administrative regulation often 
lagged behind the needs of the market. The application of civil compensation 
mechanisms would invite investors to join the supervision over participants of the stock 
market. Although the 2005 Chinese Securities Law strengthened civil compensation and 
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penalties for violations, the number of articles on civil responsibilities is still less than 
that of criminal and administrative responsibilities. Moreover, the articles of civil 
responsibility are more like general principles and lack specific provisions. Thus it is hard 
to apply them in real cases (Ren, 2008). Furthermore, the forms of lawsuits allowed in 
securities civil compensation cases do not provide effective and efficient support for 
victims of securities fraud to realize their claims for compensation. 
 The problems of civil compensation mechanisms. Before September 2001, the 
court would not consider civil compensation actions against securities crimes and fraud. 
In 2001, the Yi An Science & Technology case and the Yin Guangxia case shocked the 
public and raised heated discussions on the establishment of securities civil compensation 
mechanisms. Upon the exposure of these scandals, even the CSRC encouraged the public 
retail stockholders to claim compensation through civil procedures. Subsequently, 365 
retail stockholders of Yi An Science & Technology brought actions claiming 
compensation of 24.6 million yuan, and several hundred investors brought suits against 
Yin Guangxia Company. But on 21 September 2001, the Supreme Court issued a notice 
stating that securities civil compensation cases would not be accepted temporarily. This 
notice raised criticisms from the academic community and the CSRC. On 15 January 
2002, the Chinese Supreme Court issued the Notice Regarding Issues on Acceptance of 
Civil Compensation Cases Caused by Misrepresentation in Securities Markets. On 9 
January 2003, the Supreme Court published the Provisions Regarding the Trial of Civil 
Compensation Cases Caused by Misrepresentation in Securities Markets.  
Although the Chinese Supreme Court took a step forward, the 2003 Provision 
only allows the acceptance of civil compensation cases caused by misrepresentation in 
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securities markets, excluding civil compensation cases caused by insider trading and 
market manipulation that occupy a large proportion of securities fraud cases. In addition, 
it provides that the prerequisite for acceptance of the cases is the CSRC’s valid 
administrative penalties or the criminal judgments. This also shows the Court’s 
preference for administrative penalties in regulation of the stock market. But this 
provision of a prerequisite led to a delay of compensation for investors as the offenders 
would transfer their assets to avoid enforcement. Moreover, the current Securities Law 
does not provide specific rules on how to compensate victims, and thus could not protect 
investors and ensure that they would be compensated for the damage caused by offenders 
(Ren, 2008). In the case of Yin Guangxia, the investors brought actions claiming 
compensation, and the court supported their claims, but Yin Guangxia said it was 
bankrupt and had no money to compensate the investors. In the end, the investors won 
the case, but did not receive compensation.  
In addition, the 2003 Supreme Court’s Provision only allows for individual or 
joint action (for not more than 10 individuals in a party). On the one hand, this caused 
high litigation costs for individual claimants and thus halted most victims of securities 
violations from claiming compensation through legal proceedings. For example, in the 
Hong Guang case, an investor sued for compensation of 300,000 yuan, but he could not 
afford the cost and did not insist on his claim. In the end, the investor reached a 
settlement with the company outside the court and was compensated 6,000 yuan. On the 
other hand, this increased the burden on the courts. For example, in the ZhongKe Venture 
case and the Lan Tian case, the number of victims reached 7.83 million to 7.92 million 
and they were living in different districts of the country (Ren, 2008). The court could not 
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handle such a huge volume of cases if all the victims brought individual or joint actions. 
The form of action is important to ensure that victims could claim for compensation 
through legal procedures. Many Chinese scholars appealed for the adoption of class 
action to solve the problems of securities civil compensation mechanisms and strengthen 
investor protection, but the class action system has not yet been adopted in China. 
 Poor corporate governance and internal regulation. Use of funds raised from 
the stock market is one of the sources of public criticism. The funds raised should be used 
for companies to conduct technological innovation, increase production scale, and 
enhance competitiveness, but it seemed that the funds were not always used for these 
purposes (B. Xie, 2014c). In addition, the excessive funds the companies raised from the 
stock market were often unaccounted for. While individual investors seldom saw returns 
on their investments, the majority shareholders and corporate executives often became 
billionaires. Without transparent financial management and strict supervision, funds 
raised from the stock market became a lure for potential offenders.  
China Times exposed the huge entertainment expenses of central government-
controlled listed companies, causing public discontent (Hao, 2013). It was revealed that 
the China Railway Construction spent 837 million yuan on entertainment in 2012, and 
China Life Insurance spent 1.4 billion yuan on entertainment. The total amount of 
entertainment expense of ten state-owned listed companies exceeded 2.9 billion yuan, 
and the total amount of entertainment expense of 1,720 listed companies was about 13.8 
billion yuan (Hao, 2013). As the China Times revealed, it was only the tip of the iceberg. 
For example, in addition to its entertainment expense of 837 million yuan, China Railway 
Construction Corporation spent 808 million yuan on travel, 578 million yuan on office 
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expenses, and 2.24 billion yuan on “other” expenses. When the journalist asked a few 
central government-controlled companies what the entertainment expense covered, they 
did not reply. Compared to the extravagant manner of the central government-controlled 
listed companies, private listed companies spent much less on entertainment. For 
example, Long Yuan Construction Corporation, the brand leader of private construction 
enterprises, spent 17 million yuan on entertainment, about 0.12% of its business income 
(Hao, 2013). The huge expenses of central government-controlled companies and their 
unclear uses reflected the lax corporate internal regulation, which created room for 
tunneling and corruption by corporate insiders. 
As scholars (Lang 2010; B. Xie, 2014c) point out, the concentrated ownership 
structure in Chinese listed companies had negative impacts on corporate governance and 
protection of minority investors. The majority of listed companies on SME and Chinext 
are family-controlled enterprises. They used the stock market to collect funds for 
themselves and ignored the interests of public retail investors. The problem of 
concentrated ownership also showed in state-owned listed companies in another way. 
Namely, the majority of shares of state-owned companies belonged to the country, but 
due to the lack of strict supervision, the state-owned companies were actually controlled 
by corporate executives and did not form effective mechanisms to regulate the abuse of 
corporate executive power. In recent years, a series of scandals of state-owned listed 
companies were exposed, which discredited the government’s original intention to 
improve corporate governance of state-owned enterprises through listing them on the 
stock market. 
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Another issue is that corporate personnel often placed the corporate interest above 
the interest of public investors. For example, Yang Jianbo, was punished for insider 
trading in the case of Everbright Securities Firm fat finger event. He sued the CSRC and 
argued that his activities did not constitute insider trading. He stated his sales of index 
futures contracts before the fat finger error was publicly announced merely followed the 
decision of Everbright Securities Firm, and the stock exchange and the Shanghai 
Securities Regulation Bureau knew of these transactions (P. Lu, 2014a). He claimed that 
his activities were just a natural reaction to reduce the losses of the corporation, and thus 
they were professional activities and did not violate the rules. His statements showed that 
he placed the corporate interests above the interests of public investors. This case 
reflected a dangerous way of thinking that gaining a profit for the company became the 
principal goal and an intrinsic value of corporate personnel (P. Lu, 2014a).  
As Fengqi Cao (2014b) stated, the operation of the Chinese stock market deviated 
from the original design and produced interest groups. Majority shareholders and 
corporate executives often placed their own interests above corporate interest and 
grabbed huge profits at the expense of minority investors. In recent years, Chinext 
became a target of public criticism since it produced billionaires from corporate insiders 
and venture capital firms while the majority of investors suffered losses. Right after the 
company was listed, venture capital firms sold their equity and gained an extremely high 
investment return. Corporate executives and majority shareholders also transferred their 
shares at much higher prices compared to the original prices. Xiaolei Zuo (2013a) argued 
that Chinext should not be set as a channel for venture capital firms to withdraw their 
investments. Withdrawal of majority shareholders, corporate executives and venture 
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capital firms right after listing is not good for the growth of the companies. In addition, it 
fostered speculation on Chinext rather than investment. Since the majority shareholders 
and corporate executives became billionaires in a short time, they would care less about 
the long-term development and corporate governance of the company.  
 Weak external regulation over listed companies. Without effective external 
regulation, internal regulation could not be maintained, especially toward the majority 
shareholders and corporate executives, who actually control the company. But the role of 
the government in the stock market made it difficult to enforce external regulation. 
Although listed on the stock market, state-owned enterprises still applied the planning-
style appointment and personnel system. Especially for the largest central government-
controlled enterprises, corporate executives also had the status of high-ranking officials. 
In 2013, the president of China Ocean Shipping Company, one of the largest central 
government-controlled enterprises, argued that the huge losses of the company were due 
to the situation of the industry and had little to do with corporate management. He said 
that if the Party Central Committee and the State Council understood him, he would feel 
satisfied. His bureaucratic tone raised public discontent. Online comments complained he 
should apologize to public investors for causing their losses rather than requesting the 
understanding of the Party and the government (Xiao Zhao, 2013). But the institutional 
arrangement of state-owned listed companies determined that corporate executives were 
to be appointed by the Party and the government, so that they cared less about 
stockholders/investors. This imposed high risks on corporate governance and investor 
protection. 
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In addition, the intertwined connection of regulatory department officials and 
corporate executives affected market regulation. As the Investor Newspaper reported, by 
the end of 2009, 768 listed companies in the Chinese A share market employed former 
government officials or even current government officials as senior executives. Among 
these listed companies, more than 70% were state-owned enterprises (T. Ye, 2013). 
Corporate executives would employ their influence and connection to affect the external 
regulation. Pingbo Lu (2013a) suggested adoption of the withdrawal system for the 
regulatory department. For example, since almost all the previous and current presidents 
of the CSRC were selected from presidents of the biggest state-owned banks, they should 
withdraw from (i.e., recuse themselves from) the cases arising in the state-owned banks 
when they worked there. 
As the stock market was initiated to help collect funds for state-owned enterprises 
and extended to serve the development of enterprises in general, the regulatory 
departments tend to lean toward listed companies. For example, in Zhao Xiao’s (2014) 
weibo, a journalist revealed that the CSRC in an internal meeting with financial media 
asked the journalists not to discredit listed companies. In 2013, a journalist was arrested 
by the police for fabricating securities information. The journalist claimed his analyses 
were based on the information publicized by the listed company, and he and his relatives 
were not involved in trading the company’s shares (Shuli Hu, 2013). In addition, Fengqi 
Cao (2013b) suggested applying market mechanisms to implement supervision over 
listed companies. He suggested an independent third party system should conduct risk 
assessments on corporate governance of listed companies, and investors could go on the 
assessments to make investment decisions. 
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 The role of securities intermediaries. For the case of Wan Fu Sheng Ke, five 
famous Chinese legal scholars appealed to the CSRC that the sponsoring representatives 
and other employees of Ping An Securities Firm involved in the case of Wan Fu Sheng 
Ke had fulfilled their duties and the penalties placed on them were excessive, which 
would hurt the passion of professionals in the securities industry (Sina.com, 2013). Lu 
Suiqi and some scholars in their weibos complained that the legal scholars seemed 
unfamiliar with the dark side of the stock market, in which securities firms and listed 
companies often conspired to engage in securities fraud. These scholars argued that the 
CSRC’s penalties against the sponsoring representatives were actually still too light (S. 
Lu, 2013c). Generally, tactics of IPO fraud included making false financial statements, 
exaggerating business prospects, covering up problems, conducting related party 
transactions, and concealing the actual controller of the company (S. Lu, 2013c). The 
intermediaries for IPO, such as securities firms, accounting firms, and law firms 
employed their expertise to help listed companies conduct fraud. S. Lu (2013b, May 22) 
on his weibo even argued that in addition to the listed company, the sponsor, the 
securities firm, and relevant departments of the CSRC, e.g., the IPO Review Committee, 
should be responsible for the Wan Fu Sheng Ke case. S. Lu (2013a, May 19th) thought 
that although the CSRC suspended some securities intermediaries from IPO business, if 
the regulatory environment did not improve, companies would change their securities 
intermediaries to other firms with closer relationships to the regulator and being more 
clever in conducting fraud. 
The main reason for the lax regulation of securities intermediaries was the close 
relationship between the regulatory departments and securities intermediaries. For 
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example, Liu Jipeng (2014a) carped that the Investor Protection Fund founded by the 
CSRC had run for eight years but had not used any funds for investor protection. Instead, 
it became a large shareholder of the An Xin Securities Firm that took advantage of its 
privilege to conduct irregular practices. According to a report by Beijing Youth Daily, 
since 1998, more than 60 officials left the CSRC and took office in public funds 
management firms, among which more than 40 became senior executives of the firms and 
about 20 became general managers of fund management firms. In 2014, more than seven 
CSRC officials resigned. It was estimated that the plan of establishing the registration 
system for IPO would create a new wave of CSRC officials leaving (Beijing Youth Daily, 
2014). The reason might be that the CSRC officials were attracted by high salaries 
provided by fund management firms, and the registration system would reduce the room 
for grey income. This created a “revolving door” in the regulation of the Chinese stock 
market (Mills, 1957). The former officials used their influence and connections to operate 
fund management firms and affect the regulation of the fund industry. This also 
evidenced the “capture theory” (Newman, 2005).  
 Rong Hong (2014), on his weibo, showed his disappointment about the role of 
securities firms in the Chinese stock market. As he stated, apparently the biggest problem 
of the Chinese stock market was abnormal pricing of stocks (high issuance prices and 
high price-earnings ratios), which resulted from the unequal status of stock buyer and 
seller. Securities firms, as intermediaries between seller and buyer, did not make efforts 
to solve this problem of abnormal pricing, but rather, aggravated the problem. They 
packaged the company to be listed and helped the stock seller set the IPO price, and 
investors in the secondary market bought the stock at the high price. This is a model for 
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how participants in the primary market grabbed huge profit from investors in the 
secondary market. The problem of abnormal pricing bred corruption and caused unfair 
treatment of public investors. 
 Rong Hong (2014) suggested reshaping the role of securities intermediaries to be 
active and responsible market participants. He opined that securities firms and fund 
management firms should be strong representatives for public investors in the secondary 
market and protect their interest. But in the past, securities firms and funds were state-
owned agencies and lacked incentives and strengths to speak for investors. This situation 
is expected to change after a series of mechanisms are to be taken to reform the IPO and 
listing system. Invitation of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII), RMB 
qualified foreign institutional investors (RQFII), private equity (PE), and Shanghai-Hong 
Kong Connect into the Chinese stock market have improved the role of securities 
intermediaries and strengthened the function of value discovery of the stock market. In 
2014, upon resuming IPOs after one year’s suspension, the CSRC adopted measures to 
suppress stock issuance prices, allot shares at market prices, and forcibly grant price 
differentials between primary and secondary markets to investors in the latter. Hong 
Rong suggested that securities firms should see the market trend in the future and adjust 
their way of thinking, enhance their competency, and realize their own value to meet the 
needs of development of the Chinese capital market.  
 The disadvantaged group of public retail stockholders. Currently in the 
Chinese stock market, the majority of stockholders are retail stockholders. On 27 
December 2013, the General Office of the State Council published the Opinions 
Regarding Further Strengthening the Protection of Legal Interest of Medium and Small 
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Investors in the Capital Market, officially admitting that public retail stockholders were 
in a disadvantaged position in obtaining information and resisting risks, and protection of 
their interest was far from reaching the goal of equality and fairness33. As the Opinions 
proposed, intermediary agencies should recommend appropriate financial products and 
provide appropriate services to investors. Listed companies should increase investment 
return and provide investors with a voting system to supervise majority shareholders and 
corporate controllers. The regulatory department should improve dispute resolution and 
compensation mechanisms for investors, strengthen regulation and increase severity of 
penalties, and at the same time educate investors on market risks. 
As the CSRC suggested, it needs to introduce large institutional investors, e.g., 
insurance, pension, and housing funds, to change the current stockholder structure 
(Securities Daily, 2012). The large institutional investors would balance one another and 
create forces to check market manipulation and excessive speculation. But as scholars 
criticized, institutional investors in China currently also like to speculate just like 
irrational retail stockholders do (F. Cao, 2014e). The prerequisite for the development of 
institutional investors is to train financial experts with professional knowledge and 
rational analyses to run institutional investors. Education of ethics and disciplines should 
not be ignored in cultivating financial experts. In addition, as the interviews discussed in 
the prior chapter revealed, retail stockholders tend to ask for advice from experts, so the 
demand for financial consultants is great.  
Discussions on the Adoption of the Registration System in the Near Future 
                                                           
33See at http://www.360doc.com/content/14/0527/08/247661_381317849.shtml 
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 As Fengqi Cao (2013a, September 14) summarizes, the new stock issuance and 
listing system in the Chinese stock market evolved from the quota management system 
(1993-1995), the index management system (1996-2000), the channel system (2001-
2003), to the current sponsorship system (2004-present). In 2014, the State Council’s 
New Nine Opinions confirmed that a registration system would be adopted in the near 
future. Baisan Xie (2014, April 30) discussed the registration system in the US and other 
countries. In 1933, the US Securities Act confirmed the adoption of the registration 
system for stock issuance and listing. Under the registration system, if a company meets 
the relevant standards and sufficiently discloses information required by the law, it will 
be allowed to issue and list stock; the regulatory departments exert general supervision 
over stock issuance and listing, for which material reviews of application documents in 
some important processes are still needed. The registration system takes different forms 
in different countries, but the common ground is that companies as applicants for IPO 
and listing should sufficiently disclose information required by the law, securities firms 
as intermediaries are responsible for the truthfulness and completeness of the information 
applicants submit, and the regulatory department takes charge of reviewing and checking 
the legal compliance of application documents. Sufficient information disclosure is the 
basis of the registration system. Based on the information companies disclose, investors 
evaluate the companies’ values and risks and make decisions about their investments (Liu 
Jipeng, 2013b, December 2).  
 Some scholars and financial experts showed their support for the adoption of the 
registration system in China. Currently in China, the demand for stocks exceeds the 
supply, which causes the stock prices to deflect from their real values. The adoption of 
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the registration system would allow more companies to be listed on the stock market, and 
would lead to a better balance of demand and supply of stocks. Thus, stock prices would 
reflect the real values of listed companies (Daxiao Li, 2014b, November 29). As being 
listed on the stock market is not a rare resource, the cost for being listed will decline, and 
companies would have less reason to seek back door listings. Fengqi Cao (2014c) also 
argued that the registration system would contain excessive administrative intervention 
into stock issuance and listing and reduce the room for power-money trading. Thus, the 
registration system would curb the “three high” phenomena and make the stock market 
follow market principles. The critical point of the adoption of the registration system is to 
adjust the role and function of the regulatory departments. Thus, this transformation 
indicated a change from a government-directed system to a more market-oriented system 
for stock issuance and listing. 
Not all experts agree that this change is for the best, however. Zuo Xiaolei (2013, 
March 10) argued that the registration system is just a form to govern stock issuance and 
listing. If the regulator had strictly enforced the law and fulfilled its obligations, the 
approval system could have been sufficient to curb the listing of low-quality companies 
and misrepresentation. Pingbo Lu (2014b, June 30) stated that it won’t be helpful for 
China to copy the US experiences blindly since the Chinese stock market is a primitive 
market just focusing on fundraising, while the US stock market is a mature market based 
on value discovery. Pingbo Lu (2014b, June 30) argued that it is more feasible to exert 
stricter supervision over the activities of companies in the process of stock issuance based 
on the current approval system. He thinks that high prices, high price-earnings ratios, and 
high excessive funds raised were due to lax control. He said the CSRC should control the 
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total amount of fundraising in IPOs of the whole stock market and control the amount of 
fundraising of individual stocks. Since the CSRC checks on the necessity and feasibility 
of financing for investment projects of companies, companies should raise funds through 
stock issuance according to the amount approved by the CSRC. The CSRC does not need 
to set IPO prices, but should supervise listed companies in order to avoid high excessive 
funds raised (P. Lu, 2013, September 13th). Pingbo Lu (2014b, May 20th) argued that the 
CSRC should conduct macro-control of the total amount of financing, which is not 
administrative intervention, but applying economic tools to set boundaries for financing 
through the stock market. 
Suiqi Lu (2014, January 22) also warns of high expectations for the registration 
system. S. Lu argued that the registration system and the approval system are just the 
forms, rather than the essence, of the stock market regulation. The prerequisites for the 
effective operation of the registration system are a market with thorough competition, 
self-disciplinary securities firms and listed companies, the regulator’s full enforcement of 
the laws, and strong protection of investors. But the Chinese stock market lacks these 
prerequisites for the registration system. Suiqi Lu states that if the nature of the Chinese 
stock market as a platform for fundraising does not change, the adoption of the 
registration system will be a cover-up for money collection. Jipeng Liu (2014b, 
November 20th) also argued that China lacks the basic conditions for the adoption of the 
registration system. Liu Jipeng took the US as an example. As he stated, the US has a 
strong litigation culture, close connections between administrative and criminal penalties, 
strict recovery mechanisms, and a high percentage of institutional investors, which lay a 
solid foundation for the successful operation of the registration system. Han Zhiguo 
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(2014, December 2nd) argued that the adoption of the registration system would be a 
desirable future trend for the Chinese stock market, but it is not appropriate to adopt this 
system right now. Due to the absence of a credit system and the lack of effective civil 
compensation mechanisms for investors (e.g., class action), the adoption of the 
registration system would cause more risks to public investors. 
As summarized by Baisan Xie (2014a), the adoption of the registration system 
needs relevant supporting mechanisms and should adapt to the real conditions of the 
country. Xie Baisan asserts that the registration system sets a low threshold for stock 
issuance and listing, but there are supporting mechanisms for strong regulation. The 
relatively successful operation of the registration system in the US is based on supporting 
mechanisms centering on strong protection of investors. One such mechanism is the 
advanced litigation system and associated civil compensation, especially the class action 
system, providing strong protection for public medium and small investors. Another is 
the severe penalties against securities offenders including listed companies, 
intermediaries, and related parties. In addition, the majority of investors in the US stock 
market are institutional investors, more professional and rational than individual investors. 
Baisan Xie (2014a) argued that China has not yet established economic and legal 
requisites for the registration system, e.g., the Chinese stock market is still a closed 
market, state or institutional shares are not fully circulated, and the regulation of the 
market is still poor. One of the biggest problems is that penalties against securities fraud 
and crimes are still too light. If the registration system is adopted in the near future, 
without effective supporting mechanisms for the market regulation, it might cause more 
problems, e.g., companies and securities intermediaries conspire to fabricate application 
247 
 
documents for listing, listed companies with poor performances make false financial 
reports, and so on. Xie Baisan suggests adopting a mix of registration and approval 
systems in the transition to establishment of a registration system.   
As Fengqi Cao (2013c) suggested, in the transition to the registration system, the 
functions of the CSRC and the stock exchanges should be transformed, and the review 
and regulation for stock issuance and listing should be separated. As Fengqi Cao 
describes, the stock exchanges currently are an extension of the CSRC, and their 
executives are appointed by the CSRC. Thus, they actually are not independent of the 
CSRC. For example, the current Chinese Securities Law provides that the CSRC is 
responsible for stock issuance while the stock exchanges are responsible for stock listing 
and trading, but in actuality, if the CSRC approves the stock issuance, the stock 
exchanges will approve the stock listing and trading. The CSRC and the stock exchanges 
did not form a relationship of checks and balances. To meet the need of the registration 
system, the stock exchanges should be transformed to be independent and self-
disciplinary organizations. Liu Jipeng (2013b, December 2) expressed that the Stock 
Issuance Review Committee should be dismissed, and the CSRC should change the 
current status as one having power but without responsibility.  
 The president of the CSRC, Xiao Gang, confirmed that the CSRC should 
transform its function from paying more attention to ex-ante review and approval to 
focusing on post-hoc regulation (China.com, 2013). In the past, the CSRC made more 
efforts to review applications of stock issuance and listing, and were concerned less about 
the market regulation. To adopt the registration system, the stock exchanges will be 
assigned the power to review the material content of applications for stock issuances and 
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listing, and to establish listing and delisting mechanisms, while the CSRC will check the 
legal compliance of application documents. Fengqi Cao (2013b, November 30) 
emphasized that the CSRC should focus on supervising listed companies and securities 
intermediaries, protecting investors, fighting securities irregularities, and maintaining the 
market order. The critical point of the adoption of the registration system is to invite 
market-driven mechanisms to transform the role of the government in the stock market. 
To reduce the room for corruption by the collusion of the government and the 
economically powerful, scholars suggested introducing relevant mechanisms to invite 
public supervision and strengthen investor protection.  
Whistleblower Program 
In the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, US scholars raised heated discussions on 
fighting against securities fraud and irregularities that contributed to the collapse of the 
financial market. To strengthen the regulation of the financial market, in 2010, the US 
Congress published the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act), which added Section 21F “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protections” to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (US SEC, 2014). The whistleblower 
program provides monetary awards, anti-retaliation protection, and identity 
confidentiality protection for individuals who offer the SEC important information about 
securities violations that leads to successful actions against the violations and the 
resulting monetary sanctions of more than one million USD. For any action, the 
whistleblower (one or more individuals) aggregately could receive awards equal to 10% 
to 30% of the amount of the funds collected from monetary sanctions against the 
securities violations (US SEC, 2014).  
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The US SEC made a broader interpretation of whistleblowers to include those 
who report violations to the corporate authority internally and then to the SEC, which 
encourages corporate internal regulation and extends the scope of anti-retaliation and 
identity confidentiality protection. The US SEC established the Office of Whistleblower 
(OWB) to administer the whistleblower program. The whistleblower monetary awards 
are paid from the Investor Protection Fund established by the US Congress, which 
ensures that the funds collected from the monetary sanctions would be paid for the 
victims of securities violations. In 2014, the US SEC received 3,620 tips from 
whistleblowers in many other countries, including China. A whistleblower living outside 
the US received an award exceeding 30 million USD (US SEC, 2014).  
Given the difficulties of evidence discovery and collection for securities 
violations, a whistleblower system should be established in China (Liu and Wang, 2014). 
Usually, only the corporate insiders, employees, or related parties could know important 
information about violations of securities laws. The high monetary incentives with anti-
retaliation and confidentiality protection provided by the whistleblower program could 
drive them to report the violations, since the monetary awards they could get from the 
whistleblower program would be much higher than the expected profit they could obtain 
from securities violations. A whistleblower program could divide corporate insiders and 
make it more difficult to complete fraudulent schemes. As a result, a whistleblower 
program would increase the cost for crime and provide great deterrence to potential 
offenders.  
Class Action 
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 Many Chinese scholars appealed for the adoption of class action to build effective 
civil compensation mechanisms for investors damaged by securities irregularities and 
crimes. Class action34 is a form of lawsuit in which one or a few persons or a small group 
representing a larger group sues against violations of the laws. Class action is often 
applied to cases consisting of numerous claimants with the same kind of cause, such as 
cases on labor disputes, environmental pollution, product quality, and securities fraud, 
involving compensation for victims damaged by violations of the laws. Class action was 
first seen in 1848 as a statutory law provision in the NY Field Code. In 1938, the US 
Federal Civil Procedures provided specific procedures and categories of class action. In 
1966, the “opt-out” rule was adopted for class action, which provides that the plaintiff 
class includes victims of the violation being sued, except those who specifically confirm 
that they give up the suit (Ren 2008). The laws and related mechanisms caused the rise of 
class action in the US, especially suits against violations of the securities laws (Ren, 
2008). 
 As a class action case often consists of small claims from a large number of 
individuals, the violation may cause massive losses across numerous victims, but the 
claims might be small for each individual victim. If an individual victim brings a suit, the 
litigation cost will be high compared to the claim. The high litigation cost often prevents 
an individual victim from bringing a suit to recover the loss caused by the violation. The 
US Federal Judicial Center studied class action cases in four federal district courts, 
finding that the members of the plaintiff class obtained compensations of 315 to 528 USD 
on average; if each of them brought an individual suit, the litigation cost would have 
                                                           
34 See at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/class_action. 
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exceeded 10 times the compensation awarded (Willing, Hooper, and Niemic, 1996). The 
system of class action reduces the litigation cost for individual claimants and encourages 
victims to claim their rights through legal proceedings. In addition, it also decreases the 
judicial cost for handling the issues involving numerous claimants. This provides 
investors with economic and efficient mechanisms for civil compensation and strengthens 
the protection of their interests.    
 It was said that Chinese legislators used the US class action as the reference in 
developing Article 54 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law (Jiang, 2008). As this article 
provides, “with respect to a case in which the subject matter of action is of the same 
category and one party consists of numerous persons or of an uncertain number upon 
initiation of the lawsuit...Claimants who have filed at the people’s court may select 
representatives from among themselves to engage in litigation…The act of litigation of 
such representatives shall be effective for the party they represent…The judgments or 
orders rendered by the people’s court shall be effective for all the claimants who have 
filed at the court…”35. For securities civil compensation cases with numerous victims, the 
form of representative action should have been suitable. But the Chinese Supreme Court 
in its 2003 Notice Regarding Issues on the Acceptance of Civil Compensation Cases 
Caused by Misrepresentation in Securities Markets specifically forbids the application of 
representative action for these kinds of cases. To restrict lawyers from participating in 
actions for numerous claimants, in 2006, the Chinese judicial departments specifically 
forbade the application of contingent fees in securities civil compensation cases and other 
actions. The Chinese Supreme Court’s restriction of representative action arose out of 
                                                           
35See at http://china.findlaw.cn/jingjifa/shewaifalv/swflfg/20110414/91492_5.html. 
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concern that mass activities would cause social unrest; in addition, the courts lacked 
experience to handle group litigations (Z. W. Chen, 2003).  
 According to the Chinese Supreme Court’s Notice, claimants for securities civil 
compensation can bring individual or joint actions (for not more than 10 individuals in a 
party). This arrangement created high litigation costs for individual claimants, which is 
the main factor that halted most victims of securities violations from claiming 
compensation through legal proceedings. For example, in the Zhong Ke Venture case and 
the Lan Tian case, the number of victims reached 7.83 million to 7.92 million, and they 
were living in different districts of the country (Ren, 2008). The total amount of the 
losses caused by a violation was huge, but the loss of an individual investor was 
comparatively small. The high cost for litigation kept the victims from bringing suits to 
recover losses. In addition, the court could not handle such a huge volume of cases if all 
the victims brought individual or joint actions. Even if the courts accept and try the cases, 
different courts would make different judgments toward the same cause. The 
inconsistency in judgments would hurt the judicial authority and could not ensure a fair 
judgment to each victim (Ren, 2008). The adoption of class action can concentrate 
numerous claims to a court, and thus will save judiciary costs and enhance judicial 
efficiency.  
 While the class action system in the US strengthened the recovery mechanisms 
for victims and increased the cost for crimes, it also led to abusive litigations and caused 
a waste of social resources (Kreese and Rosenbaum, 2005; Ren, 2008). For example, the 
related laws provided rules advantageous to the plaintiff class, e.g., the plaintiff need not 
provide sufficient evidence before initiating a suit. Some took advantage of the class 
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action mechanisms to make troubles for companies (Kreese and Rosenbaum, 2005). In 
addition, driven by strong incentives, such as contingent fees, lawyers made great efforts 
to increase class actions against companies. In some cases, lawyers placed their benefits 
above the interest of plaintiffs and made the cases end in ways that would be the most 
beneficial for them (Phillips and Miller, 1996). To avoid the high cost and long process 
of litigations, the defendant had to reach a settlement with the plaintiff class even though 
they knew the claims lacked solid foundations. In response to the phenomena of abusive 
litigations, the US Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. The US Congress enacted 
the Class Action Fairness Action in 2005, which aims to adjust the imbalance between 
plaintiff and lawyer, reduce excessively high cost for the defendant, and pay more 
attention to due process in class actions (Kreese and Rosenbaum, 2005). These laws and 
measures reduced abusive litigations of class action in the US.  
The potential negative effects of a class action system are not a concern in China 
currently. China has not yet reached a stage of strong civil rights for citizens, active 
lawyers, and independent judges, like those in the US. And Chinese scholars and 
legislators should learn from the US lessons to avoid potential negative effects of class 
action.  
Conclusion 
In summary, the Chinese stock market is an emerging market during the 
economic transitional period. It was initiated to raise funds to solve the capital shortage 
of state-owned enterprises. This character made it a market focusing more on fundraising 
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than investment. As a result, the Chinese stock market became a market for more 
speculation than investment, and a policy-oriented market rather than a market-driven 
market. The regulatory department did not pay enough attention to the interests of 
investors. With lax regulation, companies and securities collaborated to cause high stock 
issuance prices, high price-earnings ratio, and high excessive funds raised (“three high” 
phenomena), grabbing huge profits from the stock market and causing high risks to 
investors. Furthermore, without effective supervision, institutional defects created room 
for power-money trading and lured potential offenders. Consequently, the Chinese stock 
market was plagued with IPO fraud, insider trading, market manipulation, and other 
securities irregularities, intertwined with government corruption. The collusion of the 
politically and economically powerful made the Chinese stock market a channel for 
looting huge profits from the majority of public retail investors.  
To curb rampant securities crimes and irregularities, a regulator should increase 
the cost for crimes through adoption of more severe penalties, combining criminal and 
administrative penalties and monetary sanctions, improving the delisting system, 
improving civil compensation mechanisms, shifting the burden of proof to defendants in 
civil compensation cases, strengthening external regulation over listed companies and 
intermediaries, and strengthening corporate governance. Institutional investors, 
consultation firms, and financial experts should be developed to help change the investor 
structure and foster rational investors. In the near future, a registration system will be 
adopted to curb the “three high” phenomena that resulted in serious securities fraud. 
Actually, the core of the establishment of the registration system is to transform the role 
of the government in the Chinese stock market. Supporting institutions should be 
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established to effectively run the registration system and strengthen market regulation 
and investor protections. The critical point for supporting mechanisms for investor 
protection is to increase the cost for crime, reduce the cost for regulation, and exert great 
deterrence to potential offenders.  
The establishment of a whistleblower program is feasible and urgent in China. 
Economically, a whistleblower system could save the regulatory department the costs of 
detecting and investigating securities irregularities, help enforce monetary sanctions 
against securities offenders, curb ongoing securities fraud to avoid causing further losses 
to investors, and increase the resources for victim compensation. The adoption of class 
action will also have great significance in China. A class action system could unite public 
investors to form a force which could press the powerful offenders to pay high prices for 
their violations and strongly deter potential offenders. In addition, the application of class 
action will shape the legal culture and promote rights consciousness among the common 
people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
256 
 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: REBUILDING SOCIAL 
VALUES AND ADJUSTING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE 
GOVERNMENT, MARKET, AND PUBLIC STOCKHOLDERS 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 As the 2014 State Council’s New Nine Opinions proposed, a registration system 
would be adopted for stock issuance and listing, with the goal of further expanding the 
Chinese stock market; correspondingly the Securities Law and other laws would be 
revised, and supporting mechanisms would be established to achieve this goal. This arose 
from the need to develop the real economy. Currently, the Chinese economy faces 
pressure from local debts, potential housing bubbles, and excessive production capacity 
in the manufacturing industry, which forces the Chinese government to turn to the stock 
market for more capital to support the real economy (Xu and Liu, 2014). Actually, the 
Chinese stock market still has great room for expansion. Compared to bank deposits, only 
a small amount of funds entered the stock market. In China, bank deposits reached 116 
trillion yuan, among which individual deposits were about 50 trillion yuan in 2013; but 
the stock market raised only 400 billion yuan, while the whole social financing was 17 
trillion yuan (F. Cao, 2014b). However, rampant securities fraud and crimes ruined public 
confidence in the Chinese stock market. This necessitates further reform to correct the 
failure of Chinese stock market regulation and strengthen investor protection. Sustainable 
development of the Chinese stock market cannot be accomplished without protecting the 
interests of investors, especially large numbers of retail stockholders 
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 Centering on the theme of stockholder protection, this study examines the social 
contexts and institutional factors that shaped the development of the Chinese stock 
market and the evolution of the market regulation during the last two decades. To explore 
the construction of regulatory mechanisms and the roles of the government and other 
players in the stock market, this study applies relevant socio-legal theories, especially 
“law and finance” theories, which were based on historical and comparative studies of 
financial market regulation across various countries. For stock market regulation, the 
critical task is to curb securities irregularities and crimes. In this study, white-collar 
criminological theories, especially crime-as-choice theory, are applied to interpret the 
causes of securities irregularities and other offences related to the Chinese stock market. 
Through historical review, policy analyses and case studies, this study examines the 
effects of relevant policies and laws on the regulation of the Chinese stock market in 
reality. 
 The role of the Chinese government in the stock market was a source of public 
criticism. Inviting investors into the stock market while not implementing effective 
regulation, the Chinese government became a provider of temptations. Also, the Chinese 
government was involved in some securities irregularities, e.g., insider trading in the 327 
event and manipulation in the 5/19 market rise as discussed in Chapter 3. These kinds of 
government actions damaged its authority and blurred the boundaries between lawful 
activities and violations. The role of the government as both a referee and player in the 
stock market at the same time made external regulation ineffective and discredited its 
claim of investor protection. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, IPO fraud, 
misrepresentation, insider trading, manipulation, and other securities irregularities, 
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intertwined with government corruption, plagued the Chinese stock market. Due to their 
disadvantages in terms of capital, information, and expertise, public retail stockholders 
were exposed to high risks of becoming victims of securities irregularities and crimes. 
The Chinese stock market became a platform for the politically and economically 
powerful to loot huge profits from the majority of public retail investors. 
 A series of scandals led to calls for new legislations and other reforms. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Chinese State Council issued the Nine Opinions, adopting 
measures to refine regulatory mechanisms. Subsequently, the sponsorship system 
replaced the principal underwriter recommendation system for stock issuance and listing. 
But it turned out that the sponsorship system did not enhance the administrative 
transparency and better protect investors. Instead, sponsors often traded their power for 
money and colluded with companies to perpetrate fraud. The SME and ChiNext were 
established to form a diversified capital market in order to reduce speculation in the stock 
market. However, rampant securities fraud quickly plagued the relatively new markets, 
the SME and ChiNext. Recurring irregularities and crimes showed the weaknesses in 
laws and their implementations. The critical problem was that penalties provided by the 
laws against securities fraud and crimes were still too light. Meanwhile, poor 
enforcement of laws made the market regulation largely ineffective. As the cost for crime 
was low, expected high profits attracted potential offenders.   
As summarized in Chapter 6, the Chinese stock market was initiated to collect 
funds for state-owned enterprises. This character led it to a market focusing more on 
fundraising than investment. Without changing this character, the Chinese market became 
a policy-oriented market flooded with speculation. Accordingly, investors, especially 
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public retail stockholders, were not provided with sufficient protection. Institutional 
defects created room for relevant government officials to trade power for money, and this 
lured potential offenders. In the near future, the registration system will be adopted to 
transform the role of government in the Chinese stock market. But we should not be 
blindly optimistic about the registration system as the Chinese stock market learned many 
lessons from reforms in the past as discussed in prior chapters. Supporting mechanisms 
should be established to realize the effective operation of the registration system. The 
critical point for supporting mechanisms is to increase the cost for crime and reduce 
potential profits from the crime, thus strengthening market regulation and investor 
protection.  
Based on the exploration of causes for rampant securities offences in the Chinese 
stock market, this study recommends the regulatory departments adopt more severe 
penalties, combining criminal, administrative penalties and monetary sanctions against 
securities offenders. Effective civil litigation system (e.g., class action, civil 
compensation mechanisms, shifting the burden of proof to defendants in civil cases, and 
so on) should be established to make offenders pay high prices for their misconduct and 
ensure investors are compensated for their losses. To improve the quality of listed 
companies, the regulator should improve the delisting system and strengthen external 
regulation over listed companies and intermediaries. This study also recommends 
adoption of a whistleblower program to strengthen external and internal regulation and 
greatly deter potential offenders.  
To reduce speculation in the stock market, more channels for investment should 
be established to spread investors to different markets. The interviews showed that 
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investors crowded into the stock market because they had no other or better options for 
investment. The government should allow financial institutions to make more financial 
products for investment and build a diversified capital market. In addition, the 
government should develop institutional investors, consultation firms, and financial 
experts to help change the investor structure and foster rational investors. At the same 
time, the government must make relevant laws and rules to regulate markets for new 
financial products and strengthen supervision over financial institutions. In recent years, 
shadow banks engendered high risks to the financial market. Shadow banks refer to the 
financial institutions that do some business like banks but are not included in the scope of 
regulation of banks and thus lack strict supervision.  
 As this study indicates, law and finance theories shed light on the development of 
the Chinese stock market and the evolution of market regulation. The themes of investor 
protection, comprehensive regulatory mechanisms, effective law enforcement, the crash-
then-law pattern, and so on addressed in the law and finance literature provide 
inspirations for further political and legal reforms of the Chinese stock market. This study 
presents brief comparative analyses of broader regulatory patterns and the roles of 
governments and other actors in financial markets of China and other countries. Future 
comparative study of specific financial regulatory mechanisms of China and other 
countries will add valuable contributions to the field of socio-legal studies on financial 
market regulation.  
 This study also shows that white collar criminological theories, especially crime-
as-choice theory, provide important perspectives for interpreting the causes of securities 
irregularities and crimes in China. Although Chinese contexts are different from those of 
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Western countries where white-collar criminological theories were developed, the 
Chinese stock market has seen and will confront problems that occurred in Western 
countries. The concepts of state and elite deviance and the government as supplier of 
lures are very helpful for exploring the role of the government and institutional defects 
that bred rampant securities crimes in China. China can learn from the experiences of 
other nations that have confronted the need to regulate stock markets and fight white-
collar crime. Applying the theoretical framework, this study explores the causes of 
securities crimes and violations associated with the Chinese stock market within 
historical, social, and political contexts which were not systematically addressed in prior 
research on securities crimes in China. Future study on specific types of securities crimes 
or specific cases would help further understanding of relevant laws and their 
enforcements. 
The theories reviewed in this study, e.g., Dorn’s (2010) claim of a democratic 
approach to financial regulation, Coffee’s (2001) historical discourse of shareholder 
democracy, and white-collar criminologists’ emphases to contain elite deviance, pointed 
to the significance of common public in fostering political and legal reform. The Chinese 
stock market invited a vast number of stockizens into the market-oriented frame. This 
group of stockizens has potential to become an important force to foster reform for 
investor protection and market regulation. But prior research on rights consciousness or 
research on securities crimes in China did not pay enough attention to the views of the 
group of public retail stockholders. This study begins to address this limitation. Chapter 5 
describes the interviews of public retail stockholders and analyzes their experiences in 
stock investment and views about stock market regulation. The interviews showed the 
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growth of rights consciousness among public retail stockholders. Future study on public 
retail stockholders in specific cases would help further understanding of how they would 
react to specific securities frauds causing damage to them.   
Rebuilding Social Values and Adjusting the Relationship among the Government, 
Market, and Public stockholders 
Recent noteworthy arrests of corrupt high-ranking officials exposed the collusion 
of the politically and economically powerful in looting public stockholders and indicated 
the growth of crony capitalism in China (China Funds Daily, 2014). As this study shows, 
the series of securities fraud and irregularities have roots in institutional factors and social 
contexts during the transitional period in contemporary China. In the current stage of the 
Chinese stock market, fights against securities irregularities are actually about the interest 
distribution between the political and economic elite and common stockholders. The 
political and social atmosphere that provides fertile ground for the growth of securities 
irregularities and crimes needs to change. As the political economy is in a transitional 
period, China’s primary task is to build social values and standards to govern and adjust 
the relationship among the government, the market, and common people, as well as lay 
the ideological and cultural foundation for further political reform. Rediscovering 
Chinese classics and learning experiences from other countries would inspire the 
government to go beyond ideological contentions and adapt the implanted laws and 
mechanisms into the local environment, thus laying the social and institutional 
foundations for further political reform.   
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 Capitalist spirits vs. socialist reform. The Chinese stock market has been 
plagued with insider trading, manipulation, and other securities irregularities, often 
involving the collusion of government officials and businessmen, which seems like 
repeating the early history of Western stock markets. In Western countries, the stock 
market was originally created by the government (the king and the Houses) to sell bonds 
that the government was not able to pay (Lang and Yang, 2012). But a series of scandals, 
e.g. the South Sea Bubble, the Mississippi Bubble, and so on revealed the collusion of the 
government (the king) and the businessmen, and led to the collapse of stock markets in 
Europe in the seventeenth century (Gray, Clark, and Frieder, 2005; Lang and Yang, 
2012). After the South Sea Bubble, share-holding companies were forbidden for about 
100 years in the United Kingdom; the relevant functions of banks in stock investments 
were not allowed by the French government for 150 years (Lang and Yang, 2012). In 
1720, the United Kingdom enacted the Bubble Act to regulate the stock market (Harris, 
1994). The 1929 US stock market crisis also saw scenes similar to the South Sea Bubble 
(Gray et al., 2005). Consequently, the US government passed the 1933 Securities Act and 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, applying strict laws to enforce information disclosure 
and fiduciary duty to strengthen the regulation of the stock market.  
 In their book The Capitalist Spirits and the Socialist Reform, Lang and Yang 
(2012, p. 76) used the history of stock market regulation in Western countries as one 
example to support their conclusion that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggles to contain corruption by enhancing democracy and rule of law.” 
Lang and Yang (2012) contend that during the Chinese economic reform the disputes 
between the left (followers of Karl Marx) and the right (followers of Adam Smith) in fact 
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ignored the goals of these two thinkers. According to them, both Smith and Marx showed 
great compassion for workers and poor people and severely attacked corruption by the 
politically and economically powerful. In The Wealth of Nations published in 1776, 
Adam Smith (1934) views the market as an invisible hand to regulate activities of 
individuals in seeking their own interest and then benefit the whole society. This notion 
of an invisible hand is the basis for adoption of a liberal economy to limit the power of 
the government in the economic sphere and curb the collusion of the government and 
businessmen. In contrast, Marx tried to adopt another way, that is, abolishing private 
ownership, to curb the corruption and to seek a just and harmonious society. As Lang and 
Yang (2012) contend, both Smith and Marx had in common a goal of realizing a just and 
harmonious society.  
 Lang and Yang (2012) review that Europe went from oral commitments to the 
Magna Carta, the Reform Act, to the democratic system adopted for the political regime, 
and state power shifted from the hand of the king, nobility, bourgeoisie, to the common 
people; the high cost for violation under the rule of law ensured the implementation of 
democratic politics to curb corruption resulting from the collusion of the government and 
the economically powerful. In other words, the cost for violating the democratic politics 
would be proletarian revolution. Lang and Yang (2012) state that Marx’s theory in 
Capital, published in 1867, greatly influenced the development of political and legal 
systems in Western countries. According to Lang and Yang (2012), the primitive 
capitalism in Marx’s age had collapsed, as Western countries adopted a democratic 
political system to curb corruption of the government and bourgeoisie to preclude the 
outbreak of proletarian revolution. This interpretation showed their well-intentioned 
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efforts to advise the Chinese government to go beyond the ideological contentions and 
further political reform to develop democracy and the rule of law in China.   
 Lang and Yang (2012) emphasized the principles for further economic and 
political reform: allow some people to become rich while other people do not become 
poorer, apply strict laws to curb collusion of government and businessmen to prevent 
insider trading and ensure fundamental social equality, allow all people to have potential 
to become rich. This seemed a response to Deng Xiaoping’s adage “allow a portion of the 
people to become rich first” brought forward when he initiated the economic reform. 
Deng Xiaoping’s point was significant in providing incentives for people to create wealth 
and emancipating people from egalitarianism under a planned economy. However, “allow 
a portion of the people to become rich first” became the justification for some people to 
earn money by violating laws or taking advantage of loopholes in laws and policies. This 
also became the justification for those who grabbed huge profits from the stock market 
through securities irregularities at the expense of other stockholders. But the emergence 
of serious wealth disparity and inequality in today’s China urges people to reflect on this 
point. Lang and Yang (2012) use the example of the current US stock market as a 
contrast to the Chinese stock market. In the US stock market, the majority of listed 
companies were not controlled by big families, as the common public holds the majority 
of their shares; strict laws are applied to regulate the stock market, and the US SRC has a 
huge power in law enforcement. The institutional arrangements made the US stock 
market realize the function of wealth redistribution for common people. But the Chinese 
stock market formed interest groups or even crony capitalism, where the majority of 
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stockholders bore the cost for financial reform but did not share the economic 
achievements. This violated the basic principles of equality, justice, and fairness. 
 Morality and the idea market. In How China Became Capitalist, Coase and 
Wang (2012) draw attention to the great work of Adam Smith, the Theory of Moral 
Sentiment, and note the importance of morality in the economic world. They emphasize 
that Adam Smith’s classic works, The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, constituted the theoretical bases for liberal economy, that is, market and 
morality are the two invisible hands to regulate economic players. But the latter is often 
neglected by economists. Coase and Wang (2012, p. 206) criticized the embarrassment of 
the current economics community in that “the stupendous loss in the depth and richness 
of human nature is a noticeable part of the price we have paid in transforming economics 
from a moral science of man creating wealth to a cold logic of choice in resource 
allocation.” 
 Coase and Wang (2012) also brought out some important Chinese ancient classics 
that are still meaningful and relevant to improving the political and legal system in 
today’s China. For example, they quoted the words of The Book of Lord Shang to address 
the importance of definite provisions of rights and duties. Lord Shang was an important 
representative of Legalism, which emerged during the Warring States (475-221 B.C.) and 
became the predominant political philosophy in the Qin Dynasty. As The Book of Lord 
Shang stated,  
Now if laws and mandates are not clear, nor their titles definite, the men of 
empires have opportunities for contention; in their contentions people will differ 
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and there will be no definiteness…When rights and duties are indefinite, even 
men like Yao and Shun (superior men as moral models) will become crooked and 
commit acts of wickedness, how much more then the mass of the people! This is 
the way in which wickedness and wrong-doing will be greatly stimulated. The 
ruler of men will be despoiled of his authority and power, will ruin his country…” 
(Yang Shang, 1928, p. 332-333)  
 Coase and Wang (2012) emphasized that if the government is not subject to the 
rule of law, the rights and duties for state-owned enterprises would be indefinite, which 
would invite corruption and cause market disorder and political risks. The problems of 
indefinite rights and duties were also shown in the Chinese stock market, as state-owned 
listed companies often enjoyed the government’s biased policies and violated the laws 
and market principles. The stock market needs to introduce mechanisms to confirm 
corporate ownership and enhance the transparency of activities of market participants, 
which would clarify rights and duties for market players and place them under public 
supervision.  
 After reviewing the process of China’s transformation, Coase and Wang (2012) 
point out that the lack of a free, open, and active market for ideas would be the biggest 
obstacle for the further development of the Chinese economy and politics. As they 
criticize, in China, universities currently lack autonomy, and the government still 
employs strict ideological control and state surveillance. This is not helpful to enhancing 
innovation in science and technology, to maintaining a healthy social order, and to 
developing cultural renovation and spiritual civilization. They give great hope to Chinese 
intellectuals that have the traditional spirit of “shi.” This refers to the literati class who 
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were creators of ideas in traditional Chinese society and were regarded as the 
representatives of moral standards. The spirit of shi was described by Mencius when he 
defined “a great man” as “he cannot be led astray by riches and honor, moved by poverty 
and privation, or deflected by power or force” (Mencius, 2009, p. 62). As Coase and 
Wang (2012, p. 197) suggest, “a critically minded public, willing to challenge authority, 
but tolerant and open-minded, offers circumstances conducive to a free market for ideas.” 
 Rediscovery of Chinese classics. Since the initiation of the economic reform, 
scholars have made great efforts to introduce Western thoughts and culture into China, 
which greatly influenced the government and common people. The government made 
laws and relevant mechanisms learned from advanced countries to foster economic 
development. Although the government exerted ideological control in order to maintain 
its ruling, most people admired Western advanced economies, politics and culture and 
thought that full westernization might be the future way for the world. But in recent years, 
scholars turned to rediscover Chinese traditional thoughts and culture for rebuilding 
national spirit. The enthusiasm for Chinese classical studies emerged within the context 
that China achieved some economic progress while Western countries experienced a 
slowdown in economic growth and confronted some social problems. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the occurrence of serious frauds, e.g., the Enron case, the Madoff case and so 
on, ruined the Chinese public’s admiration of the Western regulatory patterns. Especially, 
the exposure of irregularities by international investment banks (e.g., Goldman Sachs) 
toward the Chinese capital market seemed to indicate the greed of financiers and caused 
calls for strong regulation of the financial market.  
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 Rediscovery of Chinese traditional culture showed the resumption of self-
confidence and national dignity. In addition, this is also a good way to reconsider the 
Western patterns and reflect the adaptation of the implanted cultures and mechanisms. 
When it comes to the implantation of thoughts, laws, and mechanisms, the most 
important issue is how to adapt them into the local environment. Excellent Eastern and 
Western thoughts have great things in common. Finding or cultivating intellectual soil to 
support the implanted mechanisms would be an effective and efficient way for their 
adaptation into the local societies. This would exert positive impacts on the government 
and lay a social foundation for further political and economic reform. For example, as the 
online comments showed, some Chinese government leaders would like to disseminate 
universal values, but universal values were attacked as Western tools for imperialism by 
their opponents; in contrast, Confucian and other traditional classics advocating 
benevolence, equality, freedom, and so on would be accepted more readily by the 
Chinese government and common people. For China, how to go beyond the ideological 
contention and cultivate a democratic system (perhaps without a multi-party system) for 
public benefit is a primary task.  
 Rereading the traditional Confucian classics, we could find great values that are 
of significance to a modern society. Traditional Confucianism emphasizes moral 
cultivation and self regulation. It brought forward a conception of Jun Zi (the superior 
man) that referred to a man of complete virtue and used it as the goal for moral 
cultivation. For Confucianism, filial piety, fraternal submission, faithfulness, truthfulness, 
propriety, righteousness, and sense of shame constitute the core of moral standards. 
People should perform their social roles in compliance with moral standards. The 
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Analects of Confucius record the philosopher Tsang saying, “I daily examine myself on 
three points: whether, in transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful; 
whether, I may have been not sincere to my friends; whether I may have not mastered 
and practiced the instructions of my teacher” (Confucius, 1971, p. 139). Another famous 
saying, “What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others” (Confucius, 1971, p. 
301) became a basic rule on how to deal with other people in society. But nowadays 
China is plagued with fraud and cheating in many fields. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
misrepresenting companies became normative for the circle of businessmen who wanted 
to list their companies. Self examination or self regulation is critical to the healthy 
development of individuals and for maintaining social order. For example, businessmen 
should often perform self examination and regulation in compliance with the principles of 
faithfulness and truthfulness. But this moral touchstone has been ignored for a long time, 
which to a great degree might account for the moral crises in the business circle of 
present-day China.  
 In the field of economic operation, the traditional Taoist values should be used in 
reference to government actions. The Taoist notion of “nature order” or naturalism is 
regarded as the ideological foundation for economic laissez-faire (Gernet, 1985; Spengler, 
1964). Adam Smith adopted the Taoism’s notion as the basis for a liberal economy which 
aimed to curb a government controlled by interest groups from intervening in economic 
operations (Lang and Yang, 2012). The conception of “invisible hand” fostered the 
development of non-interventionism or a free economy. As a liberal economy was 
established, the collusion of the government and interest groups was greatly curbed from 
economic operations. In recent years, some Chinese scholars, represented by Zhang 
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Weiying, criticized Keynesianism that argues for the government as the visible hand to 
affect economic activities (W. Zhang, 2010). This was actually in response to the Chinese 
government’s excessive intervention into the economic sphere. The scholars argued that 
government intervention should be the last resort under the circumstance of market 
failure, and the government should not use Keynesianism to justify its excessive 
intervention (W. Zhang, 2010). Although there is no agreement on which economic view 
is better, the government should subject itself to the rule of law to avoid corruption 
resulting from power-money trading and should not relax law enforcement. As for the 
Chinese stock market, the government’s excessive intervention was criticized as the 
“restless hand” that violated market principles and bred serious corruption (Y. Lu, 2008). 
The Chinese government should control its restless hand and adjust its role to the 
regulator of the stock market and provide stronger protections for investors. 
 The government should not excessively intervene in the stock market and violate 
market principles. It does not mean that the government should relax the regulation of the 
stock market. Instead, scholars and public opinion appealed for government to apply 
more severe penalties to punish offenders, strengthen oversight of the stock market, and 
even strengthen regulation of the wider society. This also reflected the culture trait of 
Legalism. Legalism emphasizes setting definite rights and duties and using strict laws 
and severe penalties to govern the state. Han Feizi, the most important representative of 
legalism, claimed that since human nature is evil, strict laws, harsh penalties, and rewards 
should be applied to govern a country (Han, 2003). According to Legalism, the system of 
law (Fa) rather than the ruler ran the state; successful enforcement of the law would led 
to a strong state, no matter whether the ruler is weak or strong. In the long history of 
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China, the ruling class applied the mainstream Confucianism combined with some 
legalist ideas to govern the country. The political philosophy of legalism served the 
monarchical totalitarianism and was different from the Western notion of “rule of law,” 
but the social context of China has changed greatly. Eventually, the rule of law can be 
realized only by a government that is willing to subject itself to the law. This needs 
strong supervision and pressure from a public possessing rights awareness and legal 
consciousness.   
 Legalism and Confucianism are based on different assumption of human nature. 
While Legalism assumes that human nature is evil, Confucianism thinks that human 
nature is good and prefers the rule of morality. Confucius says, “If the people be led by 
laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the 
punishment, but have no sense of shame; If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought 
to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and 
moreover will become good” (Confucius, 1971, p. 146). Although Confucianism seemed 
too optimistic about human nature and rule of virtue could hardly handle the more 
complex social relations in modern societies, the significance of forming the inner sense 
of shame and moral cultivation should not be ignored. As Adam Smith (1969) also 
indicates in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the rule of law could not be fulfilled 
without the rule of morality. The rule of law (visible regulation) and rule of morality 
(invisible regulation) should work together to govern the state and regulate social 
relations. The Chinese government should put its visible hand more on the enforcement 
of rule of law and should not intervene too much into economic activities, as Taoism 
suggests.  
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 Furthermore, common people should actively supervise the government. The 
proverb “while water can carry a boat, it can also overturn the boat; the ruler (the 
government) is the boat, while common people is water,” said by Confucius, was often 
mentioned by the Chinese rulers in dynasties, and even today the Chinese government 
often emphasizes it. Chinese culture encouraged common people to resist the bad 
ruler/government. This was shown in the popular Chinese saying, “Do those kings and 
the gentry certainly have blue blood (Di Wang Jiang Xiang, Ning You Zhong Hu?)?” In 
Chinese culture, blood does not determine the future of people, and the social upward 
mobility has been invigorated. As Yu Yingshi (2013) argues, in history, China did not 
lack democratic thought elements, but did not form democratic systems. Fukuyama (2012) 
points out that contemporary China represents responsive authoritarianism, but it would 
be hard to prevent it from falling into a vicious circle of “bad emperor.” 
 In today’s China, the rapid growth of the middle class is regarded as a huge 
potential force to foster further political reform in China. As mentioned above, public 
stockholders were primarily members of China’s middle class. Public stockholders could 
become a force to be reckoned with in further economic and political reform in China. 
The Chinese stock market has introduced market mechanisms to define rights and duties 
of market players, invite public stockholders into the game with the government in a 
market-oriented framework, enhance transparency of market players, and now urge 
transformation in the role of the government. It’s critical to establish relevant 
mechanisms to realize civic participation in supervising the government and 
strengthening protection of common public investors. For example, this study 
recommends the establishment of a whistleblower program, which, in a broader sense, 
274 
 
will also promote individuals’ social responsibility to maintain justice and provide a 
means of supervising the political and economic elite. The adoption of class action will 
touch the allocation of profit and resources and test the resolution of reformers. The 
critical point for the adoption of class action is to establish a legal framework to invite 
public stockholders to fight against securities violations and shape a new relationship of 
administrative departments and individual stockholders in maintaining market order and 
public interest. More importantly, the adoption of the class action could help place the 
court at the center of regulation, motivate lawyers, and further the rule of law in the 
Chinese stock market. 
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Table 1 
 Description of Interviewees in Shenzhen and Haikou 
 
 Shenzhen 
(Total: 20) 
Haikou 
(Total: 20) 
Female 
Total: 8 
Male 
Total:8 
Female 
Total: 10 
Male 
Total: 10 
Age Under 30 
 
 1  1 
30-40 
 
3 3 3 2 
40-50 
 
4 5 5 6 
50-60 
 
1 2 1  
Up 60 
 
 1 1 1 
Education 
Level 
Under College 
 
 1 2  
College 
 
4 8 8 9 
Graduate 
 
4 3 1  
Profession Government  
Employee 
2 3 3 2 
Doctor 
 
1    
College/Technical 
 School Teacher 
   2 
State-Owned Company 
Employee 
2 2 3 3 
Bank Employee 
 
  3 1 
Foreign/Private  
Company Employee 
1 4   
Small Business Owner 
 
1 2  1 
Self Employed 
 
1    
Retired 
 
 1 1 1 
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This is an English Translation of the Questions I will ask in the interviews. The interviews will be 
conducted in Chinese (Mandarin).  
 
1. When did you enter into the stock market?  
2. What was the primary reason why you entered into the stock market? (to make a living, 
investment, interest, entertainment, to kill time) 
3. What has been the effect of your participation in the stock market on your life? 
4. Could you please describe your most unforgettable experience as a stockholder? 
5. Overall, have you earned money from the stock market? If not, why have you still stayed 
in the stock market? 
6. Have you had professional knowledge about how the stock market operates? 
7. Have you paid close attention to changes in laws and policies regarding the operation and 
regulation of the stock market? 
8. How have you chosen stocks to purchase? How have you decided to sell stocks (according 
to recommendations, your own analysis, or at will)? 
a. If according to recommendations, whose recommendations or advices have you taken?  
b. If according to your own analysis, how have you analyzed the stocks? 
c. Have you taken both others’ advice and your own analysis? 
9. Have you cared about the performance of the listed companies whose stocks you bought? 
10. Have you paid attention to the misconduct of listed company executives that were 
announced by regulatory agencies? Have those announcements impacted your choices of 
stocks? 
11. Could you please talk about your views on the rise of corporate scandals? Have they 
impacted your stock trading activities? 
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12. Could you please talk about your views on the corporate executives that accounted for the 
scandals? Do you view them as criminals, bad persons, or smart guys, ambitious 
enterprisers? 
13. Could you please talk about your views on China’s stock market? Do you view it as a 
casino?  
14. Could you please talk about your views on the regulation of the stock market? Please 
evaluate the external and internal oversight of the stock market. 
15. Could you please talk about your views on the protection of retail stockholder’ interest in 
China? Do you think Chinese retail stockholders are vulnerable? 
16. I have a few questions about insider trading:   
a. Are they common practices in stock trading? 
b. Are they criminal activities? 
c. Is it necessary to adopt more severe measures to prevent these activities?  
d. Is it possible to reduce these activities in the current Chinese contexts? 
17.  I have a few questions about illegal manipulation of stock prices:  
e. Are they common practices in stock trading? 
f. Are they criminal activities? 
g. Is it necessary to adopt more severe measures to prevent these activities?  
h. Is it possible to reduce these activities in the current Chinese contexts? 
18. I have a few questions about the cases of “Stock Sages” which refer to illegal provision of 
consultations on stock trading: 
a. Have you ever seen this kind of so-called insider information from “stock sages?” If 
yes, where have you seen it? (online, newspaper, magazine) 
b. What accounted for the emergence of this kind of cases? 
19.  From your perspective, what are the primary causes of securities fraud and other white-
collar crime associated with China’s stock market?  
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20. Do you think the criminal laws provide appropriate penalties against securities crime?  
21. What measures do you think should be taken to strengthen the protection of stockholders’ 
interest? 
 
 Thank you! 
 
